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ABSTRACT 
 
 
AN INNOVATIVE STEP TOWARDS RESOLVING TURKEY’S “HEADSCARF 
CONFLICT”: ASSESSING THE APPLICABILITY OF “INTERACTIVE 
CONFLICT RESOLUTION” AT THE CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS 
LEVEL 
 
 
AYLİN AYDIN 
 
Program of Conflict Analysis and Resolution, M.A. Thesis, 2005 
 
Supervisor: Dr. Esra Çuhadar Gürkaynak 
 
 
Key Words: Interactive Conflict Resolution (ICR), protracted social conflicts (PSCs), 
headscarf, Civil Society Organizations 
 
 
Interactive Conflict Resolution (ICR) approaches are non-official methods suggesting 
that through sustained contact and interaction, negative perceptions and attitudes of the 
parties towards each other can be exchanged so that empathy can be built paving the 
way to the resolution of protracted conflicts. Accordingly, the objective of this study is 
to conduct an assessment of Turkey’s “headscarf conflict” in the context of Islamist and 
Kemalist CSOs. Following the findings of this assessment, conditions that should be 
taken into consideration for a successful ICR intervention are indicated and the 
applicability of the ICR approaches to the headscarf conflict is evaluated. The purpose 
of this endeavour is to identify the most appropriate ICR approaches for this case.  
 
Given the assessment of the headscarf conflict, the Islamist CSOs appear to strongly 
emphasize their needs for identity, recognition and justice, while the Kemalist CSOs 
indicate their needs for identity and security. Moreover, it is discovered that while 
certain concepts such as human rights, democracy, secularism, and women rights are 
shared by the adversarial parties, different values are attributed to them.  
 
The evaluation of the ICR approaches to the headscarf conflict suggests that human 
needs; identity; and transformation-oriented approaches appear to be the most 
appropriate ones in addressing the underlying causes of the conflict. Concerning the 
resolution of the headscarf conflict, transformation-oriented approaches appear to be the 
most appropriate ones for an initial ICR intervention, while communal relations and 
communication based approaches seem to be appropriate for a subsequent intervention.  
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ÖZET 
 
 
TÜRKİYE’NİN BAŞÖRTÜSÜ SORUNU’NUN ÇÖZÜMÜNE YÖNELİK YENİ 
BİR BAKIŞ AÇISI: “SORUNLARIN ETKİLEŞİMLİ ÇÖZÜMÜ” MODELİNİN 
SİVİL TOPLUM ÖRGÜTLERİ ALANINDA UYGULANABİLİRLİLİĞİNİN 
İNCELENMESİ 
 
 
AYLİN AYDIN 
 
Uyuşmazlıkların Analizi ve Çözümü Programı, Yüksek Lisans Tezi, 2005 
  
Danışman: Dr. Esra Çuhadar Gürkaynak 
 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Sorunların Etkileşimli Çözümü (SEÇ), çıkmaza giren toplumsal 
uyuşmazlıklar, başörtüsü, Sivil Toplum Kuruluşları 
 
  
Gayri resmi metodlar olan ve üçüncü kişiler tarafından uygulanan “Sorunların 
Etkileşimli Çözümü” (SEÇ) yöntemleri, taraflar arasındaki işbirliği ve iletişimin 
arttırılması, ve olumsuz düşünce ve tutumların açıkça ifade edilebilmesi ile sorunun 
çözümüne yönelik önemli bir adımın atılabileceğini savunurlar. Karşı tarafın 
korkularının, ihtiyaçlarının, değerlerinin ve önyargılarının anlaşılması suretiyle çatışan 
gruplar arasındaki uzlaşma yolunun açılacağını vurgulayan bu yöntemler genellikle 
çatısan kimlikler ve değerler üzerine kurulu, ve çıkmaza giren toplumsal ya da gruplar 
arası sorunlara uygulanır. Bu çalışmanın amacı, Türkiye’nin başörtüsü sorununu İslamcı 
ve Kemalist STKlar çerçevesinde değerlendirerek SEÇ’in başörtüsü sorununa uygulanıp 
uygulanamayacağını belirlemektir. Bu doğrultuda, hangi yöntem(ler) daha uygun 
olacaktır ve başarılı bir SEÇ müdahalesi için hangi durumlar göz önüne alınmalıdır gibi 
sorulara yanıt aranmaktadır. 
 
Başörtüsü sorununu STK’lar bazında değerlendirdiğimizde İslamcı STK’ların kimlik, 
tanınma ve adalet ihtiyaçlarına, Kemalist STK’ların ise güvenlik ve kimlik ihtiyaçlarına 
vurgu yaptıkları sonucuna varırız. Bunun dışında her iki taraf demokrasi, laiklik, kadın 
hakları ve insan hakları gibi kavramları eşdeğer biçimde vurgularken onlara 
yükledikleri değereler ve anlamlar önemli ölçüde farklılaşmaktadır.  
 
SEÇ yötemlerinin başörtüsü sorununa uygulanabilirliğine baktığımızda ise bireysel 
ihtiyaçlar, kimlik ve dönüşüm odaklı yöntemlerin, uyuşmazlığın altında yatan temel 
nedenleri daha kapsamlı gösterebildikleri için daha uygun metodlar olarak ortaya 
çıkmaktadırlar. Başörtüsü uyuşmazlığının çözümü ile ilgili olarak ise, dönüşüm odaklı 
yöntemler, herhangi bir SEÇ müdahalesinin ilk aşamasında uygulanabilecek en uygun 
metod olarak gibi görünmektedir. Bu ilk aşamayı takiben ise, iletişim ve ilişki bazlı 
yöntemlerin uygulanması daha uygun olacaktır. Tüm bu SEÇ yöntemleri olası bir 
müdahalenin ilk aşamalarında uygulanmadıkları takdirde insani ihtiyaçlar, kimlik, 
psikolojik ya da müzakere bazlı metodlar istenen yapıcı sonuçları veremeyecek gibi 
görünmektedir.  
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CHAPTER 1 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
1.1 Scope and Aim of the Study 
 
 
 
Being on the agenda since the beginning of the 1980s, the debate on wearing 
headscarf in public places has intensified and become a source of polarization in the 
political life in Turkey since the mid 1990s. What has triggered this conflict was the 
demand coming from university students to attend the classes with their headscarves, in 
accordance with Islamic precepts.1 Later on, a category of the professional women 
(especially doctors and lawyers) also began to raise their demands to be able to perform 
their jobs with that particular dressing style. They have stated their major demands in 
terms of “identity”, claiming that the right to wear headscarf in public realm is a 
requisite of civil rights, freedom and that forbidding its usage is anti-democratic and 
authoritarian. However, these demands were not found acceptable by the authorities, on 
the grounds that they were against the Dress Code. Accordingly, those who have been 
against these demands have been claiming that such demands constitute a threat to the 
basic principle of Kemalist regime, which is “laicism”. On the other hand for the 
secularists, turban is not allowed in public space because it, as an Islamic symbol, 
cannot be reconciled with the “secular identity” of the state. Consequently, the way in 
which the events and discussions around wearing headscarf in public places was 
articulated led to an opposition between secularists and religious oriented people and 
groups; or between Kemalists and Islamists. The headscarf issue continued to escalate 
with the polarization of the public opinion leading the way to new debates on human 
                                                 
1
 According to the common Islamic interpretation, women have to cover the parts of their bodies 
particularly their hair and shoulders to preserve their virtue and not kead to disorder. That islamic 
principle is called “hicab”.    
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rights, political liberties, and identity politics. That debate can be mainly defined as a 
continuation of traditional tension between the secular democratic regime and Islam in 
Turkey. (Arat, 2001:1)  
Related to the abovementioned characteristics of the “headscarf conflict”, in this 
study I take this conflict as a “protracted conflict”2  since it is deeply important to a 
large group of Turkish people; based on a complex set of historical, religious, cultural 
and political issues among which the irreconcilable moral differences including 
fundamental moral, religious and personal values are always emphasized; and it has 
remained unresolved for a long period of time. Moreover, the headscarf conflict has 
escalated, transformed and resurfaced repeatedly; and eventually has become stuck at a 
high level of intensity and destructiveness that is claimed to threaten the basic human 
needs and values of a large group of people.  
For the resolution of “protracted social conflicts”, starting to analyze them by a 
“subjectivist approach”3 has great importance, since the outbreak of these types of 
conflicts are dependent on the appearance of certain perceptions, beliefs, attitudes and 
motivations that need to change for conflict resolution to occur. (Azar 1990; Kriesberg 
1998) As Reimann (2002:4) claims, analyzing intractable conflicts from a pure 
objectivist approach in terms of seeking the origins of these types of conflicts only in 
the social and political structure by ignoring the perceptions of the parties involved, 
leads to conservative and status quo oriented approach to conflict resolution. Therefore, 
in this study, by focusing on these perceptual factors I conduct the assessment of 
Turkey’s “headscarf conflict” in the context of Islamist and Kemalist Civil Society 
Organizations (CSOs).  
For the resolution of intractable conflicts, changing the conflicting parties’ beliefs 
regarding their own and the other group’s goals, as well as changing the adversaries’ 
undertsanding of the conditions of political environment and the situation of their own 
group (Burton 1990; Fisher 1997; Kelman 1997; Kriesberg 1992) has great importance. 
                                                 
2
 I also interchangeably use it with the term “intractable inter-group conflict”. 
 
3
 The subjectivist approach to conflict focuses primarily on the perceived incompatibility of goals. The 
essential implication of this approach is that many goals are subjectively perceived as incompatible, 
whereas from an objective point of view they can be thoroughly compatible. This may be due to 
misinformation, cultural misunderstanding, or misperceptions such as stereotypes, mistrust and emotional 
stress. (Reimann, 2002) 
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The Interactive Conflict Resolution (ICR) approaches that are non-official conflict 
resolution methods, are based on this assumption and see the perceived incompatibility 
of goals due to misinformation, cultural misunderstanding, or misperceptions (such as 
stereotypes, mistrust and emotional stress) among the conflicting parties as critical 
aspects of conflicts. Moreover, the theoretical groundwork of ICR indicates that through 
increased cooperation and improved communication between parties, common interests 
and shared needs can be revealed out so that in the long-run a successful resolution of 
the conflict can be reached. All ICR theorists claim that it is only through parties’ 
interaction and communication that perceptions and attitudes may be expressed and 
changed and reconciliation can be achieved. Building personal, intellectual and even 
political ties among the groups in conflict are often justified on the basis that such 
contacts alter hostile stereotypes, increase understanding of the other side’s fears, and 
help pave the way for inter-group peacemaking efforts. (Saunders, 1999:20) In other 
words, ICR methods are defined as those used in efforts to create a conflict-resolving 
environment in which the parties engage in carefully structured dialogue to gain insight 
about their specific conflict and conflict processes in general through which they 
discover new means of creatively resolving their conflict. (Rothman, 1997:6)  
Concerning all these aspects ofICR, one of the objectives of this study is to 
conduct an assessment of Turkey’s “headscarf conflict” in the context of Islamist and 
Kemalist CSOs which will be called “stakeholder analysis”4 in this research. The 
purpose of the stakeholder analysis is to identify whether the ICR can be used in the 
headscarf conflict, if yes which approach is more suitable and what conditions should 
be taken into consideration for a successful ICR intervention. In accordance with these 
broad objectives, I have two supplementary objectives. First, through the “stakeholder 
analysis” I aim to give a general picture of the relationships among Islamist and 
Kemalist CSOs (in terms of interaction and communication); the potential of improving 
their communication; their awareness of the conflict; their identification of the conflict; 
the issues emphasized by them; their needs, values and concerns; their proposed 
                                                 
4
 “Stakeholder analysis” can be defined as an approach for understanding a system by identifying the key 
actors or stakeholders in the system, and assessing their respective interest in that system” (Grimble et al. 
1995 cf. Ramirez, 1999). In other words, the “stakeholder analysis” refers to the identification and 
description of stakeholders on the basis of their characteristics, interrelationships, positions and interests 
related to a given conflict. Stakeholder analysis can help to discover existing patterns of interaction, 
analytically to improve interventions, to assess their capacities towards the resolution of the conflict. 
(Engel, 1997) In this study the stakeholder refers to the Islamist and Kemalist CSOs.  
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solutions for dealing with the conflict; their visions related to the limitations towards the 
desired change; their willingness in terms of acting together for the resolution of the 
conflict; and their perceptions of the ICR field. However, this examination should not 
be interpreted as a sociological analysis of these CSOs, but rather as a preliminary study 
with a limited objective that aims at building an analytical framework through which the 
applicability of the ICR approaches to the headscarf conflict can be evaluated.  
To sum up, initially this thesis reviews the literature on “protracted social 
conflicts” and categorizes “Interactive Conflict Resolution” approaches in order to 
systematically be able to evaluate their applicability to the headscarf conflict. 
Subsequently, it gives a general overview of Turkey’s “headscarf conflict” to indicate 
that this conflict is protracted in nature and conducts an assessment of the conflict in the 
context of Kemalist and Islamist CSOs. Afterwards, it discusses the findings of this 
analysis and indicates the conditions that should be taken into consideration in a 
successful ICR intervention. Finally it evaluates the applicability of the ICR approaches 
in the headscarf conflict in order to find out the most appropriate ICR approach(es) that 
can be applied on this conflict. 
 
 
1.2 Research Questions 
 
 
 
The broad research question of this research is: In the context of civil society 
organizations, can the ICR approaches successfully address the “headscarf conflict” in 
order to initiate a “reconciliation process” among the organizations; and help them 
come up with a common ground? To find out the most appropriate ICR approach(es) for 
this specific conflict, I try to explore the factors that should be taken into consideration 
while designing an ICR process addressing the “headscarf conflict”.  
While assessing the headscarf conflict in the context of Islamist and Kemalist 
CSOs that provides important findings for my broad research question, I answer these 
sub-questions: 
-  How do the stakeholders of the “headscarf conflict” identify themselves? 
-  What are the networks and other groups that the stakeholders belong to? 
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-  What are the interests that each stakeholder has towards the “headscarf conflict”? 
-  What is the level of interaction and communication between the stakeholders?  
-  How do the stakeholders perceive each other? 
-  How do the stakeholders define the conflict?  
- What are the issues (of the “headscarf conflict”) emphasized by the stakeholders? 
-  How do the parties identify the desired change related to the “headscarf conflict”?  
- What is the parties’ awareness of the “headscarf conflict” ?  
- What kind of solutions do the stakeholders propose for the resolution of the conflict? 
- What kind of limitations do the stakeholders emphasize towards the desired change? 
- Are the stakeholders willing in terms of acting together to deal with the headscarf 
conflict? 
- How do the stakeholders perceive the ICR and its applicability in the headscarf 
conflict?  
 
 
 
1.3 Research Methodology 
 
 
 
1.3.1 Level of Analysis 
 
 
Most of the ICR approaches can be defined as “small-group processes” in which 
the key actors (participants of the problem-solving workshops) or “middle-range 
leaders” participate in problem-solving discussions facilitated by an impartial third-
party. (Fisher, 1997; Lederach, 1997) “Middle-range leaders” that are also called as 
“mid-level leaders” or “opinion-leaders” (Mitchell, 1993) are people who function in 
leadership position within protracted conflict but they are not necessarily controlled or 
connected by the authority or the structure of the government. So, these people are less 
constrained and freer in their interactions, but at the same time maximize the transfer of 
new learning and knowledge into the political process (ex: academics, intellectuals, 
ethnic/religious leaders, NGO leaders or other people that are well known and respected 
by the top-leaders) (ibid.) Looking from the ICR perspective, I believe that for the 
official resolution of protracted conflicts, reconciliation among opinion leaders (mid-
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level leaders) is crucial since in the long run this will provide a transfer5 affect. In other 
words unofficial approaches have value as pre-negotiation and peace-building 
mechanisms that lay the groundwork for official negotiations especially when the 
conflict is highly polarized. (Keashly and Fisher 1996: 245 cf. Çuhadar- Gürkaynak, 
2004:9)  
In the context of Turkey’s headscarf conflict, my rationale for choosing CSOs as 
the level of analysis can be based on the CSOs’ ability to affect the public opinion and 
grass roots through the writings and other activities of their representatives who work in 
academia, media, private sector, education or jurisprudence and through the campaigns 
with which the CSOs form close relations with the grassroots. However, for the 
resolution of Turkey’s headscarf conflict what should be influenced is the decision 
making process or state since this conflict is not a communal one but a politicized 
conflict that can be resolved only by political applications or by reconciliation at the 
political level.  
However, concerning Turkey’s CSOs’ capacity in affecting the decision-making 
process two important limitations come to the fore. First of all it should be kept in mind 
that the CSOs in Turkey cannot form strong pressure groups who can directly affect the 
decision making process. (XI. STK Sempozyumu, 2002:136-139) Secondly, the “state”6 
that is one of the primary parties to the headscarf conflict does not have a homogeneous 
structure so that the question “How can the CSOs generate spillover affect on this 
heterogeneous actor?” comes to the fore. Given these limitations, it should be stated that 
in the context of the headscarf conflict the characteristics of the Kemalist CSOs form an 
important opportunity in terms of influencing the decision making process. Considering 
the character of the Kemalist CSOs who strongly identify themselves with official 
ideology and as protectors of the Atatürkist principles and have good relations with 
Kemalist bureaucratic elite a possible reconciliation among the CSOs will at least draw 
                                                 
5
  ICR scholars generally claim that once the relations between the participants of the workshops improve 
and their perceptions of the conflict change as a result of the contact and dialogue between the 
adversaries, it will spill over or “transfer” to a wider circle. Thus, in time, this will contribute to a de-
escalation of that conflict. How this wider circle is defined changes from one conflict resolution initiative 
to another.(Çuhadar-Gürkaynak, 2004) 
 
6
 By the word “state” what is meant is not only the government or the political parties in power, but also 
the military-bureaucratic elites and the representatives of this mentality who situate themselves at the 
“centre”. This heterogeneous structure of the state reflects itself in the heterogeneous position of the state 
towards the headscarf conflict.  
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the attention of the “pro-headscarf ban institutions”7 and these conservative Kemalist 
institutions of the state will inevitably have to take this transformation in the civil 
society into consideration.  
Another characteristic of the CSOs in Turkey is their structure, which is not 
completely independent of politics.( Mardin, 1995; Toprak, 1996; Göle, 1994) However 
this specific characteristic of the CSOs in Turkey would bring an important opportunity 
to an ICR intervention. First of all since there is not an actual tension in the society 
(grass-roots level) and since the headscarf conflict is highly constrained in political 
aspects, this characteristic of the middle-range leaders would automatically prevent 
elimination of the political aspects from the ICR process. Another reason for choosing 
the CSO as my level of analysis is closely related with their flexible structure. Although 
the CSOs in Turkey do not appear to be completely independent from the government 
structure or political concerns, still the executives would not be formally constrained by 
the authority so that they would be freer in their interactions and be more flexible than 
formal officials.  
Although the objective of this study is to identify the appropriate ICR 
approach(es) for the headscarf conflict; the fundamental aim is to underline the 
existence of promising intervention models that can be applied towards the resolution of 
the headscarf conflict. Approaching the headscarf conflict from a Conflict Resolution 
perspective, analyzing the level of the society that has the capacity and strategic ability 
towards the resolution of the conflict is an important starting point. The applicability of 
the ICR approaches will be based on this analysis which I hope will provide the 
groundwork for the implementation of the selected ICR process(es). To sum up, how 
and from which perspective one approaches the conflict shapes the process one 
recommends towards its resolution. This study focuses on the CSOs that can serve as 
“mid-level leaders” in Turkey’s “headscarf conflict”. These organizations not only 
represent the conflicting parties to the “headscarf conflict” but also have strategic 
capacity towards affecting the resolution of the conflict.   
 
                                                 
7
 Concerning the heterogonous structure of the state and its position, the conservative Kemalist 
institutions including the Turkish Military Forces who have pro-headscarf ban stance should be the target 
since they have the tendency to ignore the headscarf conflict and perceive it in zero-sum terms that blocks 
the resolution of the conflict. 
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1.3.2 Methods Used 
 
 
The present study is not a rigorous sociologic analysis of the Islamist and 
Kemalist CSOs. Rather it is a preliminary study having the limited purpose of giving a 
general picture of the Islamist and Kemalist CSOs’ identities in order to assess the 
applicability of ICR in this conflict. Since the main purpose is to evaluate the 
applicability of the ICR approaches to the headscarf conflict and to indicate the 
conditions that should be addressed in an appropriate ICR process, this general analysis 
of the Kemalist and Islamist CSOs will be used only as an analytical framework to 
evaluate the ICR approaches.  
The bulk of data for the assessment of the headscarf conflict in the context of 
CSOs comes from three main sources. These sources include bibliography available 
related to the headscarf conflict in general as well as the Kemalist and Islamist CSOs; 
publications, web pages, press releases, bulletins, monthly journals of the organizations 
and semi-structured interviews8 (see Appendix A ) conducted with the representatives 
of the following Islamist CSOs (Women’s Rights Organization Against Discrimination 
(Ayrımcılığa Karsı Kadın Hakları Derneği) [AK-DER];  Organization of Human Rights 
and Solidarity for Oppressed People (İnsan Hakları ve Mazlumlar İçin Dayanışma 
Derneği) [MAZLUM-DER]; Association of Free Thought and Educational Rights 
(Özgür Düşünce ve Eğitim Hakları Derneği) [ÖZGÜR-DER]) and from the following 
Kemalist CSOs ( The Association of Atatürkist Thought (Atatürkçü Düşünce Derneği) 
[ADD]; The Association of Support for Modern Life (Çağdaş Yaşamı Destekleme 
Derneği) [ÇYDD]; The Association of Turkish Women’s Union (Türk Kadınlar Birliği) 
[TKB] ) These interviews constitute an additional source of information for the analysis 
of attitudes, perceptions, and relations of the stakeholders. The numbers of interviewees 
for each organization are not selected with the concern of methodological 
representation9 but rather with the purpose of identifying potential participants for the 
ICR workshop.   
 
                                                 
8
 For the interview questions look at Appendix A. 
9
 The number of interviewees for each organization is as the following: Ak-Der (1); Özgür-Der (1); 
Mazlum-Der (2); ÇYDD (3), ADD (3) and Turkish Women’s Union (2). 
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1.3.3 Types of Sampling 
 
To represent the polarization of the “headscarf conflict”, I have conducted the 
assessment of the conflict in the context of Kemalist and Islamist CSOs. In the selection 
process the most important point was to include the civil society organizations that 
obviously have conflictual identities, perceptions, interests and positions related to the 
“headscarf conflict”. This was very important since the relation between the selected 
CSOs had to represent Turkey’s “headscarf conflict” in general. Taking into 
consideration all of these aspects, during the selection of the organizations I have used 
some academic works, articles (from the journals and newspapers); web sites, statutes 
and some publications of the civil society organizations as well as my previous 
knowledge in order to identify the key actors. Moreover, I have consulted and talked to 
some scholars who are knowledgeable about the organizations that have clear position 
and interest in the “headscarf conflict”. In order to capture the “gender” issue of the 
“headscarf conflict”, I have also included women organizations from both the Kemalist 
and Islamist rank. 
  
 
 
1.3.4 Methodological Caveats  
 
Emphasizing that the assessment of the headscarf conflict that is conducted in this 
study is not a rigorous sociologic analysis, a thorough sociologic analysis of these CSOs 
would have further improved my “stakeholder analysis”. Including the other CSOs that 
can be grouped under Islamist and Kemalist identity; selecting all their headquarters and 
branches that are situated in Ankara, Istanbul and Izmir as the domain of the research; 
conducting unstructured interviews with their executives as well as their members and 
conducting survey research through which I could have reached larger number of 
respondents would have provided me more valuable data. Through such a 
comprehensive sociologic research I could have more precisely indicate the differences 
among the CSOs that have the same position towards the headscarf conflict; consistency 
of the arguments stated by the executives with the other members of the organization; or 
other strategically important aspects concerning the relationship among the 
organizations, perceptions to each other, visions towards the conflict and each other as 
well as propositions towards the resolution of the conflict. However, for such a research 
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a long time and considerable funding should be devoted. For further studies on the 
“stakeholder analysis” of the headscarf conflict in the context of CSOs, it could be 
suggested that conducting such comprehensive sociologic research would be useful for 
the methodological and epistemological structure for a study of this kind and for the 
sake of the consistency of the “stakeholder analysis”.  
Moreover, conducting interviews with the executives of the CSOs that have 
relatively moderate and neutral stance in the headscarf conflict would have provided me 
additional valuable data to indicate the strategic resources in Turkey’s civil society for a 
successful third-party intervention in the headscarf conflict. Although, Flying Broom 
(Uçan Süpürge), Başkent Women’s Platform (Başkent Kadın Platformu), Ka-Der (the 
Association for the Support and Training of Women Candidates) [Kadın Adaylarini 
Destekleme ve Egitme Derneği] and İHD ( Human Rights Association) [İnsan Hakları 
Derneği] are included in the study as potential “bridge-builders” due to their moderate 
position to the headscarf conflict, they were reviewed from their publications, bulletins, 
web pages and executives’ declarations. Because of time restriction, not incorporating 
these CSOs in the field research reveals another caveat of this study. 
 
 
  
1.3 Design of the Study 
 
 
 
Within the aforementioned context, the following chapter provides an introduction 
to the theory underlying the thesis and the terms used throughout. It specifically focuses 
on the “Protracted Social Conflicts” and “Interactive Conflict Resolution” (ICR).  By 
giving the basic definitions, theoretical background and characteristics of the 
“protracted social conflicts” I aim to draw the theoretical basis for my definition of 
Turkey’s “headscarf conflict” as a “protracted conflict”. By presenting ICR as an 
alternative method for the resolution of “protracted conflicts” and indicating its general 
characteristics and theoretical background, I categorize the ICR approaches into “seven 
theories of practice” having the aim to provide the theoretical basis through which I can 
evaluate the applicability of ICR in the “headscarf conflict”.  
Chapter Three gives a general overview of Turkey’s headscarf conflict by 
indicating the chronology, context and escalatory dynamics of the conflict. 
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Subsequently, by signifying the current stage of the conflict and the resolution attempts 
and propositions for the resolution of the conflict the protracted character of the 
headscarf conflict is evaluated. The main objectives of this chapter are to construct a 
general picture of the conflict; to provide the ground that will help to pinpoint the 
positions and interests of the Kemalist and Islamist CSOs within the larger conflict; and 
to authenticate that the headscarf conflict is a “protracted inter-group conflict with 
identity and value aspects at the centre”.  
In Chapter Four, by using the data from the interviews conducted with the 
executives as well as the publications and web sites of the CSOs an assessment of the 
headscarf conflict (in the context of the Islamist and Kemalist CSOs) is presented to the 
reader. This analysis focuses on the stakeholders’identity and characteristics; their 
visions of the headscarf conflict; their relations with each other; societal context in 
which the stakeholders operate, and their attitudes towards the resolution of the conflict. 
The contribution of this chapter is that it forms the “analytical framework” of the 
“headscarf conflict” through which the applicability of the ICR approaches will be 
evaluated and the conditions that should be addressed in an appropriate ICR approach 
will be stated.  
In Chapter Five based on the general assessment of the headscarf conflict 
conducted in the previous chapter, a strategy for indicating the fundamental principles 
of an appropriate ICR process and for choosing the appropriate ICR approach(es) will 
be built. Strategy building will be based on the perceptions of the Kemalist and Islamist 
CSOs’ interviewees towards the applicability of the ICR approaches in Turkey’s 
headscarf conflict; identifying strategic opportunities and constraints for the 
applicability of the ICR processes; identifying the strategic resources; and identifying 
strategic objectives that should be taken into consideration in an appropriate ICR 
approach. , 
 In Chapter Six, taking into consideration the theoretical features of ICR 
approaches and the “analytic” and “strategic” insights of the headscarf conflict, the 
applicability of the ICR approaches (seven theories of practice according to which the 
ICR approaches are categorized) in Turkey’s headscarf conflict will be evaluated. 
However, preceding this evaluation the conditions that should be addressed and taken 
into consideration in an appropriate ICR process will be indicated.  Stating these 
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conditions will provide an important reference point through which the applicability of 
the ICR approaches can be evaluated and construct the case specific framework of the 
ICR process design that can be implemented in the future specifically in the headscarf 
conflict.  
Chapter Seven is the conclusion, which focuses on the implications of this study 
for theory, practice and future research. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY 
 
 
 
 
The main objective of this chapter is to construct the theoretical background of 
this study and to introduce the terms used throughout. In the first part by focusing on the 
“Protracted Social Conflicts” (PSCs) and stating their definitions, theoretical 
explanations and characteristics, I will try to provide the theoretical ground for 
specifying the theoretical characteristics of Turkey’s headscarf conflict as a “protracted” 
conflict. In the following chapters this theoretical ground would be used as the reference 
point for identifying the appropriate ICR approach that would be proposed as an 
intervention tool. Accordingly, in the second part of this chapter the general principles 
of Interactive Conflict Resolution approaches are introduced and categorized according 
to their visions towards the nature of protracted conflicts; their macro-goals; micro-
objectives; their mechanisms for achieving these objectives; and suggested impact on 
the wider conflict. Concerning this categorization, the main objective is to provide the 
theoretical ground through which the applicability of ICR on the “headscarf conflict” 
would be evaluated and the appropriate ICR approach for the headscarf conflict would 
be designated. 
 
 
  
2.1 Overview of Protracted Social Conflicts: Basic Definitions, Theoretical 
Background and Characteristics 
 
 
 
 In the present study, Turkey’s “headscarf conflict” is defined as a “protracted” 
conflict since it is based on a complex set of historical, religious, cultural, identity and 
political issues. Furthermore, there seem to be irreconcilable differences involving 
fundamental cultural, religious, political and personal values emphasized by the 
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Islamists and Kemalists. Moreover, the headscarf conflict has remained unresolved for 
long periods of time, escalated and eventually has become stuck at a high level of 
intensity that appears to threaten the basic human needs and values of a large group of 
people. The following literature on PSCs forms the theoretical ground for the definition 
of the “headscarf conflict” as a “protracted” conflict by revealing out how this actual 
conflict shares many characteristics of the PSCs stated in the literature. 
 
 
 
2.1.1 Basic Definitions of Protracted Social Conflicts (PSCs) 
 
 
Soon after the Cold War ended, many conflict resolution theorists and 
practitioners began to depict a new group of conflict. Naming those type of conflicts as 
ethnic conflicts (Horowitz, 1985), they have tried to provide an explanation for the 
violent post-Cold War environment. However, in time it has become clear that this new 
class of conflicts often involved identities not strictly associated with ethnicity. Hence 
to illustrate the phenomena that these conflicts are difficult to manage, intense, stuck, 
and extremely difficult to resolve (Coleman, 2000) other classifications emerged as well 
including “protracted social conflicts”(Azar, 1990); “deep-rooted conflicts” (Burton, 
1990); “enduring rivalry” (Goetz and Diehl, 1993 Cf. Sandole, 2003); “intractable 
conflicts” (Kriesberg, 1998) “moral conflicts” (Pearce and Littlejohn, 1997) “communal 
conflicts” (Gurr and Davies, 2003) and recently the common term “identity-based 
conflicts” (Rothman, 1997) 
At first, Azar stated the term “protracted social conflict” (PSC) in order to refer to 
the ongoing and apparently irresolvable nature of disputes in locations such as the 
Middle East, Sri Lanka, Northern Ireland, Cyprus, the Horn of Africa, Cambodia and 
Africa. (Azar, Jureidini and McLaurin 1978 Cf. Fisher 1997) Azar defines “protracted 
social conflict” as: 
 “Mutually incompatible goals among parties, amidst a lack of resolution   
mechanism cause communal cleavages to become petrified and the prospects for 
cooperative interaction progressively more poor.” (Azar, 2002: 16) 
Likewise, Burton defines deep-rooted conflicts as those: 
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“…which involve deep feelings, values and needs (that) cannot be settled by an 
order of from outside authority such as court, an arbitrator or a more powerful 
nation. These are conflicts which appear to be endless, erupting into emotional 
displays and even violent from time to time.” (Burton, 1990:3)  
Naming these types of conflicts as identity-based conflicts Rothman defines them as:  
“… deeply rooted in the underlying individual human needs and values that 
together constitute people’s social identities, particularly in the context of group 
affiliations, loyalties and solidarity…. They are rooted in the articulation of and 
the threats of frustrations to people’s collective need for dignity, recognition, 
safety, control, purpose, and efficacy”(Rothman, 1997:7)  
Similarly, by using the phrase “protracted, intractable conflict”, Coleman emphasizes 
the enduring and intransigent structure of these conflicts that is resistant for resolution. 
(Coleman, 2000) 
 
 
 
2.1.2 The Theoretical Framework of Protracted Social Conflicts 
 
 
Most of the conflict resolution theorists and scholar/practitioners claim that 
understanding the theoretical and idiosyncratic causes that led to the emergence of PSCs 
is very crucial. Emphasizing the importance of this aspect Azar (1990) and Burton 
(1990) suggest that if people’s psychological responses to their unfulfilled needs can be 
understood and addressed, the surface issues that seem to preoccupy conflict loose their 
significance. Similarly, Druckman (1997) and Kelman (1997) propose that examination 
of the way in which group attitudes and perspectives feed, escalate and perpetuate inter-
group conflict can provide conceptual tools to overcome psychological barriers to 
peacefully resolving conflict. In the same way as his colleagues, Sandole (2003) also 
suggests that there is something generic about the psychological processes of conflict, 
and that an understanding of these processes - the ability to ‘map’ conflict in general - is 
key to any intervention.  
Believing that identfying the sources, preconditions and the theoretical basis of 
intractable conflicts is very important for identifying appropriate conflict resolution 
methods, I will indicate to the main theoretical explanations concerning PSCs. In the 
conflict resolution field, there are many different theories that explain the emergence of 
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PSCs. Basing their explanations on social-psychological, political, developmental, 
structural and psychoanalytic theories, the conflict theorists have tried to find out the 
preconditions and sources of prolonged struggles. In Turkey’s “headscarf conflict” the 
“needs”, “values” and “identity” of the Islamists and Kemalists appear to be at the 
crossroads of the conflict as well. Thus, in this part, I will focus only on the protracted 
conflicts whose emergence can be theoretically explained with the following theoretical 
frames: “basic human needs”; “identity” and “values”. Although these three aspects are 
closely related with each other, to denote the effect of each frame on the 
characterization of protracted conflicts, elaborating on them separately becomes an 
important undertaking. 
2.1.2.1 Basic human needs 
Azar, who for the first time has coined the term “protracted social conflict”, 
identifies four groups of variables as a precondition for PSCs:  communal content of a 
society, human needs, the state's role and international linkages. (2002) Indicating all 
these as preconditions for the emergence of PSCs, Azar puts special emphasis on the 
concept of “human needs” by stating: 
“We are led to the hypothesis that the source of protracted social conflicts is the 
denial of those elements required in the development of all people and societies, 
and whose pursuit is compelling need in all. These are security, distinctive 
identity, social recognition of identity and effective participation in the processes 
that determine conditions of security and identity and other such developmental 
requirements.” (Azar 1985:60 Cf. Fisher, 1997:83)   
As well as Azar, Burton also explains the genesis of “deep-rooted conflicts” with 
unfulfilled needs by developing his own “basic human needs” theory that takes its 
origin from Maslow’s (1954) work. (Cf. Kimmel, 2000: 12).10 Developing Maslow ’s 
notion of “hierarchy of needs” Burton expands “basic human needs” to include material 
and nonmaterial needs as: recognition, valued relations, distributive justice, identity, 
security, autonomy, dignity, belonging, physical needs and personal development needs. 
(Burton, 1990) At the end, Burton comes up with a unique theory by distinguishing 
between needs which are universal human motivations conditioned by biology; values, 
which are ideas, habits, customs and beliefs characteristic of particular social 
                                                 
10
 In his work Maslow claims that human motivation is based upon a "hierarchy of needs", moving from 
basic physical requirements up to psychological requirements such as recognition, attainment and 
fulfillment that are claimed to be biologically innate. ( Kimmel, 2000) 
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communities; and interests which are the aspirations of individuals or identity groups 
within a social system (Burton 1990: 36–38). According to him, only interests can be 
negotiated, while ‘needs will be pursued by all means possible’ (Burton 1990: 36) that 
in turn leads to the intractability of all types of conflicts where human relations are at 
the center.  
Although Burton’s theory has found many supporters in the conflict resolution 
field, it has also been criticized for its emphasis upon genetic determinism and its 
subsequent failure to take culture and social institutions into consideration. (Scimecca, 
1998: 45) For instance, Avruch and Black who are cultural anthropologists ask which 
specific needs are universal and what is the theoretical basis of their origin. (Avruch and 
Black, 1993). Christopher Mitchell also (1993) raises the question of whether some 
needs are more important than others. Although Burton originally saw these needs as 
genetically based, in a response to Avruch and Black, he modified his position. (Cf. 
Lumsden et. al. 1996: 39) Burton accepts that humans have a “dual inheritance system”, 
one cultural and one genetic but he continued to advocate that what is important is the 
“existence of universal patterns of behavior” (Burton and Sandole, 1987 Cf. Sweeney 
et. al. 1996).  
Burton’s “basic human needs” theory that is used to understand deep-rooted 
conflicts, has also been criticized for its focus upon "the self" that reflects a Western 
perspective. (Avruch, 1998) Avruch and Black argue that non-Western societies and 
cultures are far more group-oriented, and suggest that rather than the individual per se, 
the need for social attachment may be more dominant in other cultures. (1993) 
Although the critics of “basic human needs” theory do not call for abandoning the 
human needs theory, they call for testing the premises in the context of other cultures. 
Since it is claimed that even for some who support basic human needs as a gateway to 
conflict resolution and prevention, there is an inherent contradiction between some 
culturally specific norms such as human rights and human needs. (Scimecca, 1998:43) 
However, although equating the origin of all protracted conflicts with unfulfilled human 
needs may seem too simplistic, many conflict resolution scholar/practitioners perceive 
the satisfaction of these needs as a crucial step for the resolution of PSCs. 
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2.1.2.2 Identity frames 
As an important aspect of “basic human needs”, an important number of theorists 
have put the identity frame at the center of the fundamental drivers of intractable 
conflicts. First of all it should be underlined that an identity group generally is defined 
in ethnic, racial, religious, linguistic or cultural terms. Taking the identity group as a 
unit of analysis of the PSCs, many theorists of the field argue that through identity 
groups, human needs are expressed. (Fisher, 1997; Azar, 1990) Supporting this 
argument Rothman points out: 
“When people’s essential identities, as expressed and maintained by their primary 
group affiliations are threatened or frustrated intransigent conflict almost 
inevitably follows” (Rothman, 1997:14) 
Through this statement it becomes obvious that Rothman emphasizes the identity group 
as the analytical unit of PSCs and furthermore he labels the PSCs as “identity-based 
conflicts”. In the same manner as Rothman, Burgess and Burgess also underline that all 
the causes of intractability are combined in the identity conflicts, arguing that identity 
conflicts involve conflicts over social status, privilege and the distribution of scarce 
resources, along with a moral component, since each group tends to believe in its own 
moral superiority. (Burgess and Burgess, 1996)  
Explaining inter-group protracted conflicts with reference to “identity” is a social-
psychological and psychoanalytical phenomenon. As a social-psychological concept, 
“identity” as a source of inter-group conflicts finds its roots in “social identity theory”. 
Tajfel who is one of the architects of ‘social identity theory’ defines it as: 
 “ [social identity is] part of an individual’s self concept which derives from his 
knowledge of his membership of a social group (or groups) together with the 
value and emotional significance attached to that membership.” (Tajfel 1978:63 
Cf. Brown, 2000: 210)  
To put it in another way, social identity is claimed to consist of an individual’s self-
image that derive from the social categories to which the individual perceives him- or 
herself to belong in; and to the value and emotional significance ascribed to that 
membership. Going further social psychologists even suggest that people satisfy their 
needs for positive self-identification, status, or reduction of uncertainty by identifying 
with a group (Hogg & Abrams, 1993 Cf. Maoz, 2000) This in turn leads to favorable 
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comparisons of the “in-group” vis-à-vis the “out-groups” (Turner, 1987 Cf. Brown, 
2000) This leads to differentiation; and stereotyping of other groups generally in hostile 
terms constructing the basis for the emergence of inter-group conflict. (Tajfel, 1981 Cf. 
Jackson, 2002) Taking the origin of his arguments from cognitive-social psychological 
identity theory, Fisher argues that typical competitive orientation taken by conflicting 
parties fuels the perception of threat and the development of intense ethnocentrism, 
mistrust which feed ineffective communication and interaction. (Fisher, 2000)  
On the other hand psychoanalytically informed identity theory emphasizes how 
threatened identity rooted in unresolved past loss and suffering launches and perpetuates 
inter-group conflict. (Ross, 2001) In psychoanalysis, it is claimed that the existence of 
‘psychological gap’ between ‘good’ self and ‘bad’ leads to “dehumanization” of the 
enemy furthering the intractability of the conflict. (Wedge, 1986; Kriesberg et al, 1989; 
Volkan et al, 1990 Cf. Gillard, 2000)  As Volkan claims, high emotional salience is 
attached to group differences that are reinforced through symbolic and ritual behaviors 
binding individuals to their own groups. He also points out that the stories of loss, 
suffering and historical grievances exacerbate the conflicts and facilitate their 
intractability. (Cf. Bar-Tal, 2000) To sum up, taking some specific identity theories 
from the fields of cognitive and social-psychology, and psychoanalysis, several conflict 
resolution theorists provide a diagnostic mapping of the conflict.   
2.1.2.3 Value frames 
Differentiating “values” from “needs” Burton identifies values as ideas, habits, 
customs and beliefs that are characteristic of particular social communities. (Burton, 
1990:36-38) Concerning “values” Pearce and Littlejohn argue that culture has a 
powerful influence on the moral order since systems of meaning and ways of thinking 
differ from one culture to another so that people from different cultures typically 
develop different ideas about morality and the best way to live.(Pearce and Littlejohn, 
1997:49) Similarly Ross argues that by means of culture people locate “self” and 
“other” through which they interpret the “other”’s behaviours, develop varying degrees 
of biased inter-group perceptions that involve ethnocentric evaluations and stereotypic 
lenses causing emotional frustration in the “other” and triggering the emergence of 
conflicts. (Ross, 2001)  However, at this point it should be underlined that not only 
people’s perceptions, but the policies of the states are shaped by culture. (Rabie, 1994) 
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In this sense “values” should not be understood in pure cultural domains but also in 
political and ideological domains.  
Relating “values” to “identity”, Pearce and Littlejohn claim that people understand 
their experience and make judgments about what is important or not through their 
values and in turn these patterns of meaning shape the way individuals understand facts 
and issues and help them to develop a sense of identity. (Pearce and Littlejohn, 
1997:51) In other words acting as a common frame of reference, values strengthen the 
structure of group and individual identity, providing a shared normative foundation that 
makes harmonious in-group interaction possible as well as meaningful. Similarly 
Kimmel argues that as people are socialized, group members learn to centre their 
judgments on values fundamental to their group identity so that people sharing the 
similar values have more or less equivalent realities and mindsets. (Kimmel, 2000: 456) 
In this sense value based conflicts are claimed to revolve around incompatible 
preferences, principles or practices that people believe in and are invested in with 
reference to their group identity. (Fisher, 1989:34) According to Fisher, it is difficult to 
compromise or accommodate value conflicts because they lie at the center of people’s 
identities. Therefore, Fisher argues that peaceful coexistence may be the most likely 
solution for these types of conflicts, involving adherence to some super-ordinate values 
that allow for differences among subordinate values. Going further he claims that in 
successful multicultural societies, respect for differences and a valuing of basic human 
rights must take precedent over the value preferences of any particular group. (Fisher, 
1989:34) Similarly Bartos and Wehr argue that value conflicts occur when groups with 
different world-views, different assumptions about the best way to live or different 
standards of rightness and goodness stress the importance of different things and 
develop radically different or incompatible goals. (Bartos and Wehr, 2002: 41)  
Defining “value conflicts” as “moral conflicts” Pearce and Littlejohn claim that 
these types of conflicts involve intractable issues from which the parties are unwilling to 
compromise. (Pearce and Littlejohn, 1997: 50) Subsequently, they assert that because 
struggles over values often involve claims to status and power, parties may have a great 
stake in neutralizing, injuring or eliminating their rivals so that any compromise about 
their values are claimed to be perceived as a threat to their very identity. (Pearce and 
Littlejohn, 1997: 70) Going further they claim that moral conflicts often stem from a 
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desire to safeguard basic human needs such as security and social recognition of identity 
so that on some occasions, the continuation of a conflict becomes preferable to what 
would have to be given up. (Pearce and Littlejohn, 1997: 73) 
 
 
 
2.1.3 Characteristics of Protracted Social Conflicts 
 
 
In the literature, many different terms are used to capture the intense, inescapable, 
complex, traumatic and resistant to resolution characteristics of PSCs. Some of these 
terms are: “protracted” “destructive”, “deep-rooted”, “resolution-resistant”, 
“intransigent”, “grid locked”, “intractable”, “identity-based”, “needs based”, 
“complex”, “extremely difficult to resolve”, “malignant”, “enduring”, “deadlocked”  
(Burgess & Burgess, 1996; Coleman, 2000; Lederach, 1997) The phenomenon of PSCs 
is also defined and characterized as: bitter, hostile interaction among groups, where 
hatred, political and economic oppression and other forms of victimization (perceived 
or actual) running along identity-based lines and periodically flaring up in acts of 
extreme violence (Rassmussen, 1997). Yet, there are some scholars who claim that 
intractability is a “perception”, not a firm characteristic, which can be perceived 
differently by different people or groups.(Burgess & Burgess, 2003 ) Meaning that if a 
conflict is perceived to be intractable, its disputants are likely to engage in desperate 
measures that in turn increases the intractability of the conflict.(ibid.) 
Being inspired from Coleman’s (2003) organization of the distinguishing 
characteristics of PSCs into highly interactive five categories (see Figure1) , in this part 
I will review the literature in order to further elaborate on these five categories.    
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Figure 2.1 Protracted, intractable conflict system 
Taken from: Coleman, Peter T. (2003). “Characteristics of Protracted, Intractable 
Conflict: Toward the Development of a Metaframework–I,  Peace and Conflict: 
Journal of Peace Psychology, 9(1), 1–37  
 
2.1.3.1 Issues 
Related to the central issues in PSCs, Coleman claims that intractable conflicts 
tend to involve needs or values that disputants experience as critical to their own or their 
groups’ survival and that as conflict escalates the issues are often transformed and take 
a threatening character. (Coleman, 2003:4) More specifically, PSCs involve deeply 
symbolic issues, ideologies, and processes of meaning-construction. (Rouhana & Bar-
Tal, 1998) For instance, the tangible issues (land, money, water rights, etc.) that may 
trigger hostilities in these settings become very important because of the symbolic 
meaning assigned to them. (Bar-Tal, 2000; Kelman, 1999) In the same way, Lederach 
and Rothman claim that intractable dimensions of conflicts are often embedded within a 
larger set of values, beliefs, identities, and cultures (such as the parties’ religious beliefs, 
ethical principles, philosophical worldviews, or cultural traditions) (Lederach, 1997; 
Rothman, 1997) 
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Conceptualising conflicts as “a mixture of objective and subjective elements that 
escalate and de-escalate over time”, Fisher and Keashly propose that “the subjective 
elements increase and take on greater importance as conflict escalates”. (1991:234) 
They have described how as conflict escalates the issues tend to shift from “substantive 
interests and positions to concerns regarding the relationship, to basic needs and values, 
and ultimately to the very survival of the parties”(Fisher & Keashly, 1991:236) From all 
these arguments it becomes obvious that although most PSCs involve both resource and 
identity types of issues, identity-based issues tend to be dominant in intractable 
situations as it is the case for the “headscarf conflict” in Turkey. 
2.1.3.2 Relationship between adversaries 
As far as the relations between the adversaries involved in PSCs are concerned, it 
is argued that as the conflict escalates, the opposing groups become increasingly 
polarized through in-group discourse and out-group hostilities, resulting in the 
development of polarized collective identities constructed around a negation of the out-
group (Druckman, 1997; Kelman, 1997). Similarly Volkan argues that the anxieties that 
lie beneath PSCs can act to “blur realistic considerations, lead to irrational actions, and 
create resistances to change and progress toward adaptive negotiations” (Volkan, 1997: 
343).  
Coleman differentiates the nature of the relationships that distinguish tractable 
from intractable conflicts along four dimensions. The first aspect is based on the fact 
that with intractable conflicts, the relations between the parties develop in situations 
where exclusive social structures limit intergroup contact. Lack of contact facilitates the 
development of abstract, stereotypical images of the other, autistic hostilities and 
intergroup violence. (Coleman, 2003: 20) Secondly, in intractable conflicts, the 
relationships are claimed to be percevied as inescapable and the parties “see no way of 
extricating themselves without becoming vulnerable to an unacceptable loss” (Deutsch, 
2000: 44).  The third  character of the nature of the interdependent relationship of the 
parties in intractable conflicts is claimed to be an intense, often inescapable combination 
of cooperative and competitive goals, which at their core concern issues are 
irreconcilable or nonnegotiable. (Coleman, 2003: 21) Finally, Coleman asserts that 
intractable conflicts that escalate and de-escalate, but persist over time, tend to damage 
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or destroy the trust, faith, and cooperative potential necessary for constructive or 
tolerant relations. (Coleman, 2003: 23) 
 
2.1.3.3 Context 
Concerning the context in which PSCs are embedded, Azar indicates that many 
PSCs are rooted in a history of colonialism, ethnocentrism, racism, sexism, or human 
rights abuses which causes a large power imbalance. (Azar, 1990) Coleman also argues 
that PSCs regularly occur in situations where a severe power imbalance between the 
parties exists and where the more powerful party exploits, controls, or abuses the less 
powerful one. (Coleman, 2000)  Azar defines this context of PSCs as “structural 
victimization” where the identity, security, and right for effective political participation 
of members of low power groups are denied (Azar, 2002). Complementarily, under 
“social injustice”, Deutsch claims poverty, environmental degradation or poor access to 
health care and other forms of structural injustices jeopardize the physical safety and 
security of people. (Deutsch, 2000)  Because of its dangerous effects on marginalized 
communities, Galtung (1969) labels this pattern of oppression as “structural violence” 
and claims that the pattern of deprivation–insulation –violence–repression largely 
accounts for the long-term, cyclical nature of many intractable conflicts.(Cf. Kriesberg, 
2003) 
2.1.3.4 Processes 
In general all types of conflicts are shaped and characterized by idiosyncratic 
processes that are named as “dynamics” of the conflict, in terms of “interaction” 
between adversary parties. Tamra Pearson d’Estrée states this general characteristic of 
the conflicts as:  
“Conflict requires “three legs of a stool”: 1- real difference in interests, resources, 
power, and so on between the two parties, 2-stereotypes, or more general negative 
schemas or expectations and 3-perceived injustice. Let us add an essential fourth 
element to this: interaction between the parties. It is this interaction between the 
parties, the dynamics of the conflict that takes predisposing conditions and turns 
them into actual conflict.” (d’Estrée, 2003:69) 
In that case, it can be argued that in order to understand how the issues and context of 
conflicts make them “intractable”, a special emphasis should be given to the inner 
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processes of PSCs. Many scholars in the field claim that over time, a variety of 
cognitive, moral, and behavioral processes combine to bring PSCs to a level of high 
intensity and perceived intractability (Fisher & Keashly, 1991; Rubin, Pruitt, & Kim, 
1994). For instance, it is claimed that the cognitive processes that are based on 
misperception, selective perception, self-fulfilling prophecies, over commitment and 
entrapment negatively affect the interpersonal, inter-group functioning, their 
communications, relations, interactions and perceptions. (Fisher & Keashly, 1991; 
Rubin, Pruitt, & Kim, 1994) Fisher and Keashly argue that all of these cognitive 
processes can cause the other side to be viewed as non-human, the relations to be seen as 
hopeless, the conflict to be framed in terms of survival needs, and the outcomes to be 
seen as lose – lose. (Fisher & Keashly, 1991) Moreover, as the PSCs that are deeply 
important to people remain unresolved for long periods of time, they tend to escalate, 
transform and resurface repeatedly, eventually becoming stuck at a high level of 
intensity and destructiveness.(Coleman, 1997) Related to this, in the conflict literature 
there is a widespread thought asserting that intractable conflicts are self-perpetuating. 
Meaning that the enemy is not the other side, but rather the process of escalation, that 
takes conflicts out of the disputants’ control, and pushes them to act in increasingly 
extreme ways that would not be considered acceptable.(Burgess & Burgess, 2003) From 
all these statements related to the inner dynamics of the PSCs, the formation of 
intractable cycle becomes understandable.  
2.1.3.5 Outcomes 
Coming to the outcomes of PSCs, it is extensively agreed that their consequences 
are detrimental, including high loss of life, damage to property, economic costs, 
division of families and communities, extreme violence and dislocation. (Coleman, 
2000; Kriesberg, 1997; Lederach, 1997). In addition to these physical costs, the social 
and psychological costs are immense too including fear, hatred, anger and guilt that are 
difficult to deal with while the conflict is ongoing, and that are equally difficult to 
remedy after the conflict has been resolved. (Kriesberg, 1998) These conflicts tear apart 
relationships, lead to protracted state of trauma for individuals and communities and 
challenge institutions which spend most of their time dealing with these issues rather 
than focusing on their primary goals. (Coleman,2003). At times, these conflicts may 
subside and appear to be resolved, but if their root causes are not addressed they tend to 
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resurface and intensify again when external circumstances permit or encourage their 
expression.  If the outcomes do not begin to satisfy the basic human needs, they will 
lead to the existence of latent conflicts which may cause further cycles of manifest 
conflicts, often spilling over into new issues and actors. This statement supports Azar’s 
argument claiming that PSCs result in negative-sum that is loose-loose outcomes where 
there are no winners since all parties to these conflicts tend to be victimized in the 
process. (Azar, 2002) 
 
 
 
2.2 Interactive Conflict Resolution (ICR) Approaches as a Method for Resolving 
Protracted Social Conflicts (PSCs) 
 
 
 
In this part of the chapter, definitions of ICR and general similarities and 
differences between various ICR approaches will be stated. In the last part, I provide a 
categorization of the ICR approaches under seven “theories of practice”and construct a 
theoretical reference point through which I will evaluate the applicability of ICR 
approaches to the headscarf conflict and identify the appropriate approach for the 
headscarf conflict in the following chapters. Additionally, this categorization of the ICR 
approaches will be my contribution to the ICR literature. 
 
 
 
2.2.1 Definitions of Interactive Conflict Resolution (ICR) 
 
 
 Recently, the term ‘interactive conflict-resolution’ has become widely established 
to denote: 
“small group, problem-solving discussions between unofficial representatives of 
identity groups or states engaged in complex, destructive intercommunal or 
international conflicts that are facilitated by [an] impartial third party of social 
scientist-practitioners” (Fisher, 1997:8). 
In a broad manner Fisher defines ICR as:  
“facilitated, face-to-face activities in communication, training, education or 
consultation that promote collaborative conflict analysis and problem-solving 
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among the parties engaged in PSC in a manner that addresses basic human needs 
and promotes the building of peace, justice and equality. (Fisher, 1997:8) 
Fisher equates ICR with the implementation of conflict analysis or problem-solving 
discussions in a workshop format that are directed toward mutual understanding of the 
conflict and the development of collaborative actions to de-escalate and eventually 
resolve it. (Fisher, 2001) Similarly, Rothman identifies ICR approaches as those used in 
efforts to create a conflict-resolving environment through problem-solving workshops 
in which influentials meet with each other; are guided by a panel of third party 
facilitators; and engage in carefully structured dialogue to gain insight about their 
specific conflict and conflict processes in general through which they discover new 
means of creatively resolving their conflict. (Rothman, 1997) 
  As yet, there is no unified terminology for ICR approach, its representatives have 
interchangeably used the following terms: “controlled communication”, “problem-
solving workshops”, “third-party consultation”, “conflict resolution and provention” 
(Ropers, 1995) and  “analytical problem solving workshops”, “interactive problem 
solving”, “human relations workshops”, “inter-communal dialogue”, “sustained 
dialogue”, “track-two diplomacy”11, “unofficial diplomacy” and  “multi-track 
diplomacy”12. (Fast, 2002) In the literature, frequently we come across with their 
interchangeable use, whereas they are not equivalent in their philosophies and 
methodologies and this complicates the definite position of ICR within the conflict 
resolution field. 
 
 
2.2.2 General Similarities and Differences between the ICR Approaches  
                                                 
11
 Joseph Montville coined the term “track-two diplomacy” and identified it as unofficial, non-structured 
interaction between members of adversarial groups or nations directed toward conflict resolution by 
addressing psychological factors. (Montville,1993) He characterizes track-two diplomacy as 
complementary to official/track-one diplomacy opening up opportunities for communication, cross-
cultural understanding and joint efforts to explore how the needs of the parties might be addressed when 
official dialogue is blocked or constrained. (Montville,1987 Cf. Fisher, 2002) The methods used under 
“track- two” diplomacy range from problem-solving workshops to fact-finding missions; from training 
measures, consultation and organizational development for the new NGOs in the societies undergoing 
transformation to public relations work in favor of conflict-regulation strategies. (Montville, 1993) 
 
12
 John McDonald and Louise Diamond invented the term “multi-track diplomacy”(1996 Cf. McDonald, 
2002) proposing nine tracks of peacemaking and peacebuilding, starting with tracks I and II as proposed 
by Montville. To these they add several further tracks that work within various sectors of global society to 
promote peace. These are: track III (private-sector business involvement in peace process), track IV 
(citizen-to-citizen exchange programs), track V (media), track VI (education and training) track VII 
(peace activism), track VIII (religion), track IX (funding). (McDonald, 2002)   
 28 
 
 
To provide a well-grounded categorization of the ICR approaches that would be 
presented in the following part, emphasizing the general similarities and differences 
among the ICR approaches is crucial. In this sense, the common points of the ICR 
approaches can be summarized as the follows: 
a. “Contact Hypothesis” is the general theoretical basis of the ICR approaches: 
Building personal, intellectual and even political ties among the groups in conflict are 
often justified on the basis that such contacts alter hostile stereotypes; increase 
understanding of the other side’s fears, and help pave the way for inter-group 
peacemaking efforts. (Saunders, 1999) This common argument in ICR, takes its origin 
from “inter-group contact hypothesis” that is introduced by social psychologists Gordon 
Allport in 1954 and is furthered by Pettigrew. Allport (1954 Cf. Dovidio et. al. 2001) 
argued that bringing members of different groups into contact with one another in 
various ways is the best way of reducing any tension or hostility, improving inter-group 
relations, and reducing prejudice.  
In Allport’s view however, it is not enough for groups just to see more of each 
other since he advocates that contact alone would not guarantee inter-group harmony. 
According to this hypothesis, positive effects of contact occur only when certain 
essential conditions are met. Allport mentions these conditions as: equal group status  
(it is regarded as important since the groups in face-to-face interaction all expect and 
perceive equal status in the contact situation); the support of authority, law, or custom 
(local governments, founders, the media and intermediary organizations can function as 
instrumentals in promoting and facilitating constructive efforts to strengthen inter-group 
relations); common goals and inter-group cooperation (inter-group relations can be 
improved if there is contact and cooperative interdependence between groups in the 
pursuit of common and superordinate goals).(Cf. Maoz, 2000) For the success of 
contact theory in reducing inter-group conflict and prejudice, some theorists also 
mention supplementary conditions. One of these conditions is ‘contact over time’ 
claiming that frequent and sustained contact and cooperation among groups is critical 
for fostering inter-group relations, overcoming their anger/prejudice and develop 
trust.(Brewer, 1999) This argument can be indicated as the theoretical basis for the ICR’ 
s sequential workshop series.   
 29 
The process of perceptual and attitudinal change through inter-group contact 
provides a theoretical setting for ICR’s notion of “Resolution”. Through inter-group 
contact, in social-psychology literature, four processes of change have been stated. 
These are: learning about the other group; changing behavior; generating affective ties 
and in-group reassessment.(Pettigrew, 1998 Cf. Maoz, 2000) New learning is claimed to 
correct one’s negative and incorrect view toward out-group members and discover that 
in-group norms and customs are not the only ways to manage the social world. Hubbard 
(1999b) argues that extended contact and communication make people perceive 
similarities with the other group’s members that lead to the reduction of uncertainty and 
anxiety. Although inter-group contact has important effects on the conflicting parties 
and on their relationships, there are multiple factors that work to constrain positive 
outcomes of contact and many criticisms have been raised against its effectiveness. 
Nevertheless communication and contact with the adversary is supposed to play an 
important role in interactive conflict resolution field.  
b. The ICR approaches share the common goal that is based on generating options 
and alternatives for resolving deep-rooted conflicts through deep understanding, mutual 
recognition and respect; rather than settling disputes or suppressing differences. 
(Fisher,1997; Burton, 1990)  
c. All ICR approaches give importance to transfer effect asserting 
institutionalization of the group’s activities within the environment of conflict leading to 
changes in public opinion as well as changes in the opinions of governmental decision-
makers (Ross and Rothman 1999) that is defined by Kelman as “transfer into political 
process”.(Kelman, 2000) However, this transfer is not only confined to including key 
participants or influential who have close relations with the decision makers or the 
capability to affect the decision making process. The transfer affect of the ICR 
approaches can be also maintained by institutionalizing these approaches by multiplying 
the number of the participants who go through the workshop experience. (Anderson, 
1996) 
d. In all ICR approaches the general character of the third-parties is based on their 
“neutrality”; capability of building a trusting relationship with the parties to the conflict 
(Ropers, 1995); having considerable knowledge about the conflict and the parties in 
question; knowledge and expertise in conflict analysis, human relations skills, 
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interpersonal and cross-cultural communication and in small-group processes. (Fisher, 
2002) 
 After stating the commonalities of the ICR approaches, below is the discussion of 
the main differentiating points of the ICR approaches to be used as a reference point in 
my ICR typology. 
a. The theoretical framework on which each ICR approach is based on ranges 
from basic human needs theory, identity theory, and psychodynamic theory to 
intercultural communication theory. 
b. Their general approach to the nature of protracted conflicts and how they can 
be resolved: while some approaches emphasize unmet human needs or threatened 
identity as the source of protracted conflicts; others emphasize cultural differences as 
well as lack of knowledge and skills (concerning the conflict, its resolution options and 
the adversary party) as factors increasing the intractability of the conflicts.  
c. Methodological tools used during the intervention of each ICR approach range 
from reflexive dialogue, analytical dialogue, transcend discourse, relational empathy, 
communication skills and problem-solving trainings, mourning of past losses, sustained 
dialogue to other interactive activities including sports, arts and other professional 
activities.  
d. The participants involved in the ICR approaches range from influentials, 
middle-range leaders, grass-roots leaders to participants coming directly from the 
grassroots. However, in general people who are not officials, but who can have an 
impact on the thinking of decision-makers and society at large are chosen as participants 
for ICR workshops. Due to this characteristic, ICR is defined also as a “middle-range 
approach” (Lederach, 1997) where participants are typically invited because of their 
knowledge of the conflict and their proximity to key decision makers. Mitchell (1993) 
defines such participants as “opinion-leaders”13 – those who are in a position to 
influence public opinion and similarly Lederach defines these types of participants as 
“middle-range leaders”. (Lederach 1997) 
                                                 
13
 Those opinion leaders could be academics, intellectuals, ethnic/religious leaders, humanitarian 
leaders(NGOs) who have to be known by top-leaders and have connections to the constituency that top-
leaders represent.(Lederach, 1999) 
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e. The role of third-party changes according to his/her type and degree of 
intervention in ICR workshop. These interventions can be classified under three 
headings: “content observation”; “process observations” and “theoretical inputs”. 
(Kelman, 2002) In “content observations” the third-party suggests interpretations and 
implications of what is being said and point to divergences between the parties and to 
issues of clarification. In “process observations” the third-party has the opportunity to 
observe the interactions between the parties at the inter-group level. Yet, this 
intervention type has great importance for the success of the workshop since 
interactions between the parties may reflect dynamics of the conflict between their 
communities. The other intervention type of the third-party where it provides 
“theoretical inputs”, help participants distance themselves from their own conflict by 
providing them conceptual tools for analysis of their conflict and offering them relevant 
illustrations from previous research.(Kelman, 2002:92) In some ICR approaches these 
three types of interventions are used systematically and simultaneously, whereas in 
other ICR approaches only one or two of these interventions are used by the third-party. 
Moreover, parallel to their objectives, the emphasis given to each type of intervention 
and other roles of the third-party change from one approach to another.   
f.  The micro-objectives/internal objectives14 (refer to changes that take place 
during the actual workshop, and normally include changes at the individual level (Ross 
and Rothman, 1999)) of ICR approaches change across each type of intervention.  
g. The macro-goals/external goals (refer to the “transfer/spillover effect”15 of the 
changes occurred in the group process to the wider conflict) of ICR approaches change 
across each type of intervention.  
 
2.3 Categorization of ICR Approaches: Seven Theories of Practice of ICR 
 
                                                 
14
 Rouhana classifies the micro-objectives in four categories: “ psychological, such as forgiving the other 
and achieving psychological healing; interpersonal, such as reducing mutual stereotypes, attitudinal 
changes, improving interpersonal relationships, and establishing personal relationships across the divide 
of the conflict; political, such as changing participants’ views about the conflict through mutual learning 
about the other side’s political needs and political constraints and having participants create new ideas for 
solving particular problems between the two sides; and educational, such as training participants in 
conflict resolution logic and tools or integrative negotiation strategies.”(Rouhana, 2001:297) 
 
15
 ICR scholars generally claim that once the relations between the participants of the workshops improve 
and their perceptions of the conflict change as a result of the contact and dialogue between the 
adversaries, it will spill over or “transfer” to a wider circle. Thus, in time, this will contribute to a de-
escalation of that conflict. How this wider circle is defined changes from one conflict resolution initiative 
to another.(Çuhadar-Gürkaynak, 2004) 
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In this part I will differentiate and categorize the ICR approaches under seven 
theories of practice that have the common concern in providing a step towards the 
resolution of protracted conflict. While formulating this categorization, I will take each 
approach’s idiosyncratic theoretical framework and their take on each aspect of ICR as 
a guide. In other words, besides their theoretical frameworks coming from distinct 
fields, the ICR approaches will be classified according to their visions towards the 
nature of protracted conflicts and the factors that increase intractability of these types of 
conflicts (“Conflict”); their visions towards how protracted conflicts can be resolved 
concerning their specific activities and methodological orientations (“Interaction”); and 
their objectives that are aimed to be reached at the end of intervention (“Resolution”).  
Although this “ICR approaches” categorization is inspired by Marc Howard 
Ross’s “Six Theories of Practice in Ethnic Conflict Resolution” (Ross, 2000), the seven 
theories of practice that will be presented in this study focus not only on ethnic, but all 
types of protracted conflicts and they are confined to the interactive conflict resolution 
field.16 For example, while Ross includes “identity theory” inspired by social-
psychology and Saunders’ “communal dialogue” process under “psychoanalytically 
informed identity theory”, I categorize these theories of practice under three separate 
headings: “identity approaches”, “psychodynamic approaches” and “communal 
relations”.  
In this study, the seven theories of practice under which the ICR approaches will 
be classified are: human needs approaches; identity approaches; psychoanalytic 
approaches; intercultural communication; communal relations; principled negotiation; 
and transformation-oriented elicitive approaches. I will compare the core assumptions 
of these seven theories of practice concerning their theoretical orientation from which 
their understanding of protracted conflicts and their resolution emanates from; how each 
views the nature of protracted conflicts or the fundamental aspects increasing the 
intractability; the general pathways that they propose to change protracted conflicts; 
their methodological orientations (best method to transform the conflict); the specific 
                                                 
16
 Ross defines these theories of practice as “less formal procedures that are sometimes called as track-
2”.(Ross, 2000:1003) However, in this study I differentiate track-2 diplomacy from ICR, since in track-2 
fact-finding missions, institution building and organizational development for the NGOs are also 
included. Nevertheless, with the term ICR I refer to the problem-solving workshops, training groups, 
consultation and other measures that can be characterized with small-group dialogue process.  
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effects that are expected on participants and how each practice is supposed to impact the 
course of a wider conflict beyond its direct effects on the participants. (transfer/spillover 
effect)  
Although while classifying the ICR approaches their concrete theoretical 
framework will be taken into consideration, since some of the ICR approaches appear 
not to have a specific theoretical framework or do not denote explicit problematic 
aspects of protracted conflicts on which they focus, in their categorization I will take 
into consideration their particular and limited objectives that obviously differentiate 
from the other approaches in the classification. Concerning all these categorization 
points it should be underlined that at some levels these theories of practice share 
considerable commonalities because of the previously mentioned general ICR principles 
on which they are based. Moreover, some approaches seem to integrate multiple 
theoretical frameworks or methodological orientations and at that point how they 
generally approach the nature of protracted conflicts and their resolution will act as a 
reference point for their classification. (ex. Kelman’s Interactive Problem Solving 
approach that is inspired both from human needs theory, identity theory and 
psychodynamic theory)    
 
 
2.3.1 Human Needs Approaches 
 
 
The ICR processes that are based on “human needs theory” perceive protracted 
conflicts as deep-rooted conflicts in which “there are frustrations and concerns under 
the surface that are not negotiable and cannot be repressed, adjudicated by the courts, or 
negotiated”. (Burton, 1990: 13) Putting the unmet, or frustrated, core human needs at 
the centre of the causes of deeply-rooted (protracted) conflicts, the philosophical 
orientation of these ICR approaches is to surface, fully analyze and address these needs 
before any kind of bargaining or negotiation succeeds. (Azar, 1990; Burton, 1990; 
Fisher, 1997; Mitchell and Banks, 1996) In other words concerning the resolution of 
protracted conflicts, the supporters of human needs approaches claim that deep-rooted 
conflicts can be resolved only by the satisfaction of the basic needs through constructive 
conflict-regulation.  
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The methodological orientation of this theory of practice is based on analytical 
problem-solving workshops and analytic dialogues wherein the causes of conflict and 
the suppressed human needs of each group can be analytically understood and a 
traditional power bargaining does not take place. (Burton, 1990; Azar, 1990)  
Central to analytical problem-solving notion is the hypothesis: 
“once the relationships between the parties have been analyzed [sic] satisfactorily, 
once each side is accurately informed of the perceptions of the other, of 
alternative means of attaining values and goals, and of costs of pursuing present 
policies, possible outcomes are revealed that might be acceptable to all parties” 
(Burton, 1990: 205). 
Concerning the goals of these approaches Burton states that building a non-
threatening atmosphere in which the high-level representatives of the adversaries can 
discover shared goals and objectives; recognize the common needs; analyze perceptions 
towards the conflict and each other and explore avenues for resolving are the 
fundamental goals. (Burton, 1993) Similarly according to Azar the workshop format 
allows the participants to discuss their grievances with the immediate goal of assessing 
what is at issue; to differentiate needs from interests; analyse their identity- related 
needs through effective communication, leading to mutual discovery of and consensus 
on compatibility of competing goals. (Azar, 2002) Thus Azar also calls “problem-
solving workshops” as “citizens’ diplomacy” for their usefulness in initiating contact 
between parties or for bringing to light possible new solutions. (ibid.) Parallel to Burton 
and Azar, Mitchell and Banks state that a successful workshop does not resolve a bitter 
conflict by itself but clarifies options towards which the parties might work. (Mitchell 
and Banks, 1996) According to Mitchell and Banks the most important success may not 
be the specific understandings the parties achieve but: 
“a sense of reassurance about the possibility of reaching some mutually 
acceptable solution in the future; a deeper appreciation of the goals, constraints 
and obstacles faced by the other side; and an awareness of a range of mutually 
acceptable parameters within which a future solution might be sought. (Mitchell 
and Banks, 1996:146) 
From all these it becomes obvious that in human needs approaches the key is to 
translate the interests (and positions) of the conflict parties into their underlying needs 
for collective identity, security, and participation and make them recognize the shared 
and nonnegotiable character of those needs and how they are central to the 
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dispute(Burton, 1990) However, these approaches go beyond simple “process-
promoting” techniques for achieving greater trust at the interpersonal level whose 
primary aims are to influence the conflict in the long term and to work to improve 
relationships at the grassroots level.(Burton, 1993) Thus it should be stated that, human 
needs approaches attempt to influence leaders and representatives of the conflicting 
parties in the near or medium term by working with “influentials” to address conflict 
issues.  
 
     
2.3.2 Identity Approaches  
 
 
Although almost all ICR approaches take “threatened identity” as the central 
aspect for explaining the emergence and persistence of protracted conflicts, the 
theoretical framework of identity approaches and how they address the identity frame 
during an intervention processes is my differentiating point. For instance, in human 
needs approaches “identity” is treated as one of the fundamental human needs through 
which the participants could reframe their interests and the whole conflict. On the other 
hand, in the psychoanalytic approaches past atrocities, threats and fears that are 
incorporated in to the group identity are the focal points and mourning past losses as 
well as the fears appear as the fundamental tool through which the perceived threat 
directed to the identity of the parties is addressed. However, under the identity 
approaches whose theoretical framework depends on “identity theory” coming from 
social-psychology17  I categorize the processes that are highly inspired from social-
psychology and that put identity frame at the center of their approaches focusing not 
only on mourning but also on generating options for collective action and focusing on 
improving inter-group relationship instead of interpersonal one. To sum up, the most 
prominent character of these ICR approaches that differentiates them from 
psychoanalytic approaches is their cognitive focused and rationality based character that 
aim at changing the hostile thinking towards the other group.   
                                                 
17
 Theories of cognitive social-psychology assume that the individual finds psychological security and 
self-esteem through identifying self with positively valued groups, in comparison to perceiving self as 
not-like certain negatively valued groups. Thus during intense, damaging conflict, as much psychological 
distance as possible has to be maintained between in- and outgroups (Turner, 1987). All potential 
outgroup members are stereotyped (Tajfel, 1981) in the most hostile terms while the self is closely 
identified with an ingroup whose actions are necessarily just and honourable. Alternative identification of 
self and outgroup members as in any way similar is therefore threatening to that sense of self, and any 
sources of such identification are psychologically and bodily rejected (Hewstone, 1989). 
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Identity approaches define the causes of protracted conflicts in terms of threatened 
or frustrated identities that are expressed and maintained by group affiliations. 
(Rothman, 1997; Kelman, 1990) In this sense the satisfaction of basic human needs 
articulated through identity groups is perceived as the ultimate point for satisfactory 
resolution. For the resolution of identity-based conflicts Rothman, Chataway&Kelman 
indicate the importance of articulating and mutually engaging the fundamental identity 
issues as a precondition for interest-based bargaining. (Rothman and Olson, 2001; 
Chataway and Kelman forthcoming Cf. Rouhana and Bar-Tal, 1998) 
Concerning the methodological orientation of identity approaches, “reflexive 
dialogue” where needs and values are voiced and reconciled in the presence of 
adversaries and where roots of the conflict are dealt with can be given as an example. 
(Rothman, 1997) Having first expressed themselves and heard each other in this way, 
parties are encouraged to collaborate in setting new goals and restructuring their 
relationship through generating positive perceptions to each other. (Rothman et. 
al.2001) This suggestion of Rothman introduces us with the four phased ARIA model.18 
The macro-goals of identity approaches are based on transforming identity 
conflicts in order to create a ripe ground base for the implementation of traditional 
conflict resolution methods including negotiation, mediation and other problem-solving 
methods; and to produce change in larger social systems, in national policy and in the 
conflict system at large through participants’ writings, lecturing, political activities and 
advising of political decision-making. (Rothman 1997; Kelman, 2002) 
Accordingly the micro-objectives of the workshops conducted under identity 
oriented ICR processes (inspired from social-psychology) are confined to produce shifts 
in how participants view each other; help participants develop problem-solving skills so 
that common needs can be identified, and proposals that meet the basic needs and many 
common interests of all parties may be developed (Ross, 1993); produce change through 
                                                 
18
 Antagonism (digging out underlying values, needs through which parties articulate their animosity), 
Resonance (disputants reflexively articulate their core concerns sought, threatened, or frustrated within 
the conflict, first to themselves and then interactively. Having truly reframed the conflict in this way 
allows parties then to turn their attention to a functional focus), leading to Invention (of creative solutions 
by exploring collaboratively how the tangible issues – or ‘interests’ and objectives – of the conflict can be 
resolved without threatening the identity of the other.), and Action (to implement them, including 
negotiation planning or functional problem-solving). ( Rothman, 2001: 297-99) 
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new learning, in the form of new understanding, new insights, new ideas for resolving 
conflict in particular individuals who participate in the workshop. (Kelman, 2000: 280) 
Different from ARIA process, in Interactive Problem Solving (IPS) process there 
is relatively little effort to have the parties develop specific solutions to the conflict and 
little interest in the development of interpersonal bonds among the workshop 
participants. Thus, by engaging politically-active members of each society in 
compelling positive interactions with the other side, Kelman claims that their pro-peace 
attitudes and behaviours will be further developed, and through the activities of these 
participants, the discussion within each society will become more pro-peace (Kelman, 
2002). Concerning Kelman’s IPS approach it should be also underlined that it is highly 
inspired from Burton’s human needs theory and Doob’s training groups. However, since 
emphasis is given to identity needs and since education effect is integrated as one of the 
objectives but not as the main objective of the approach, IPS is classified under identity 
approaches.   
 
 
2.3.3 Psychoanalytic Approaches 
 
 
 Similar to identity approaches, psychoanalytic approaches explain the emergence 
of PSCs with threatened identity rooted in unresolved past loss and suffering, putting 
identity issues at the center. (Northrup, 1989; Volkan, 1988 cf. Tidwell, 1998) 
However, different from identity approaches their theoretical framework depends on 
psychodynamic theory 19 that identifies the “threatened identity” in different terms. 
Moreover, psychoanalytic approaches can be identified as more “affect focused” or 
emotion based approaches while identity approaches are more cognitive oriented. The 
fundamental principle of psychoanalytic approaches is based on the claim asserting that 
                                                 
19
 Similar to the theories of social-psychology, psychodynamic theory describes a ‘psychological gap’ 
between ‘good’ self and ‘bad’ other, founded on a developmental projection of good and bad images of 
self into suitable group targets. Thus, during conflict, any perception of self in the ‘enemy’ other, or of the 
other in the self, threatens that gap and a regressive crisis of identity follows. Consequently the enemy is 
‘dehumanized’ in order to both account for the enemy’s hostility, and to justifying the worst excesses of 
the in-group’s behavior towards that enemy. However, that the in-group and out-group are somehow alike 
in the way they behave towards each other - that the self and inhuman other are similar - cannot be 
escaped, and this continual threat to the self drives a dynamic of enmity. (Wedge, 1986; Kriesberg et. al., 
1989; Volkan et. al., 1990). 
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disputants should engage in interactions which first evoke mutual threats to identity and 
then should offer mutual assurances which communicate an acceptance of each other’s 
core identity and right to exist. (Ross, 2000) The underlying reason lying beneath this 
proposition is best described by Scimecca:  
“Threat challenges identity, which produce defense, which becomes integrated 
into identity. The end result is that conflict becomes profoundly embedded into 
the very essence of those engaged in it. Attempt at resolution, then, certainly must 
cut far more deeply into the collective psyche of the feuding parties than may 
originally be anticipated.” (Cf. Tidwell, 1998:136) 
Psychoanalytic approaches can be traced to the hypothesis of Volkan and 
Montville who claim that members of opposing communities might ‘walk through 
history’ and people from conflicting communities explain (and comes to understand) the 
other’s interpretations of emotionally meaningful historical events. (Montville, 1993) 
To put it in another way, as Volkan claims, until significant loss can be mourned, 
groups are unable to alter their positions and develop new relationships with former 
enemies (Volkan, 1988 Cf. Ross, 2000). By identifying four concepts from 
psychoanalytic psychotherapy, Volkan and Harris summarize the core assumptions of 
their approach as the following:  
[1-] the awareness that events have more than one meaning, and that sometimes a 
hidden meaning is more important than a surface one; [2-] that all interactions 
whether they take the form of overt or concealed actions, verbal or non-verbal 
statements, formal or informal gatherings are meaningful and analyzable; [3-] that 
the initiation of a process in which problems become the “shared problems” of 
opposing parties is more essential than the formulation of “logical” or “quick” 
answers. ; and [4-] that the creation of an atmosphere in which the expression of 
emotions is acceptable can lead to the recognition of underlying resistances to 
change. (1992:24 Cf. Tidwell 1998:99)  
Taking their notions from these assumptions, the supporters of psychoanalytic 
approaches claim that if the disputants engage in interactions through which mutual 
threats to identity are evoked and then communicate each other’s core identity and right 
to exist, a constructive resolution initiative for the resolution of protracted identity 
conflicts will be formed. (Ross, 1993)The theoretical base of this argument rests on the 
psychoanalytic defence mechanisms including externalisation, projection and 
identification, that individuals are seen as using to protect themselves from perceived 
psychological danger while exercising prejudice, discrimination or conflict. (Volkan 
1990 cf. Fisher 1997) Thus, in psychodynamic theory, encouraging the mutual 
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expression of emotion like sorrow for loss that allows each party to fully mourn them, 
becomes a necessary step for establishing new relationships.(Montville, 1993) 
Similarly, according to Ross some modification of hostile psychocultural interpretations 
of severe disputes must precede efforts to negotiate conflicts of interest since he claims 
that changes in psychocultural interpretations are sufficient to produce constructive 
management of most conflicts. (Ross, 2001) Moreover, Ross and Rothman suggest that 
psychocultural interpretations should be a prerequisite to joint-problem solving. (Ross 
and Rothman, 1999)  
By using ICR workshops as intervention techniques, the supporters of 
psychoanalysis aim to lower the emotional barriers that originate due to past loss or 
threats to identity. Since according to psychological perspective, outbreaks of conflict 
are claimed to be dependent on the appearance of particular perceptions, beliefs, 
attitudes and motivations, the change of those aspects is indicated as crucial for conflict 
resolution to occur.(Bar-Tal, 2000) The models based on psychoanalysis also try to 
change relations between the parties through mutual recognition, encouragement of a 
sense that agreement is possible, and lowering the parties’ fears so that they are able to 
explore alternatives to continuing confrontation.  
Related to the objectives of his psychodynamic problem-solving workshops, 
Volkan and Harris write: 
“… it is not designed to resolve the conflict, but to create an environment in 
which the psychological barriers that so often impede official diplomacy can rise 
to the surface, be discussed openly, and then be taken into account in the 
negotiations of “real world” political issues. (Volkan & Harris, 1992: Cf. Tidwell, 
1998: 97)  
Similarly Ross also claim that some modification of hostile psychocultural 
interpretations of severe disputes must precede efforts to negotiate conflicts of interest 
since changes in psychocultural interpretations are sufficient to produce constructive 
management of most conflicts. (Ross, 2001) 
 
 
2.3.4 Intercultural Communication 
 
 
 40 
  The framework on which this theory of practice is based emphasizes that it is 
when the parties are not especially aware of their differences, or of how members of a 
different community understand particular behaviours, tensions begin to mount. (Hall, 
1959 cf. Ross, 2001: 1018) Intercultural communication approaches base the causes of 
protracted conflicts to the inability of groups with very different cultural beliefs and 
practices to communicate effectively. (ibid.) In other words, intercultural 
communication treats cultural differences in communication styles as central in 
protracted inter-group conflicts. (Cohen, 1991) 
 One of the intercultural communication approaches is the relational approach 
introduced by Benjamin Broome. The fundamental objective in this process is the 
creation of new, shared meaning through relational empathy. (1991) Broome argues that 
almost all protracted conflicts revolve around dissimilarity in attitudes, perceptions, 
cultural values, communication style, needs or goals. In order to promote successful 
conflict resolution, he claims that these differences must be addressed constructively by 
the participants and he proposes “relational empathy” as a means for understanding how 
to effectively manage differences in conflict situations. Broome also claims that 
empathy is associated with many important aspects of communication behaviour, 
including formulating communicative intentions and goals, devising strategies to 
accomplish communicative purposes and constructing messages consistent with 
communicative strategies. (Broome, 1993:98) De-emphasizing similarities, Broome’s 
relational approach focuses on the creation of third culture between communicators that 
would provide bases for shared meaning in intercultural situation. Accordingly, the 
micro-objectives of this approach comprise improving common understanding; 
increasing participants’ understanding about how their own prejudices influence the 
development of understanding in the encounter; providing ground for participants to 
learn to work at merging their views with those of the others and adopt a set of “dialogic 
attitude” for use in conflict interaction. 
 The other scholar/practitioner who perceives the cultural differences in beliefs and 
behaviours as barriers to effective inter-group communication and sources of 
misperception and distrust, is Cohen (1991). Cohen indicates the cultural differences in 
communication styles as central in inter-group conflict, and claims that the conflict is 
exacerbated by the fact that each side has significant trouble in understanding what the 
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other is saying and as a result is unable to respond effectively on a number of occasions. 
According to Cohen intercultural miscommunication readily occurs when symbols and 
rituals which mark and celebrate identity for one group generates threat and fear for 
another. The basic principle of his approach involves third parties in the peacemaking 
process who can ‘translate’ between the parties even when they are apparently speaking 
the same language so that the third-party would contribute to intercultural 
communication. (Cohen, 1991)                                                
 Another approach that is based on communication theory is presented by Pearce 
and Littlejohn who focus on moral conflicts and claim that moral conflicts arise from 
moral differences that stem from different cultures, moral worldviews or social 
realities.(Pearce and Littlejohn, 1997) Concerning moral conflicts, Pearce and Littlejohn 
seek to develop new, more productive ways of expressing moral difference and 
managing moral conflicts. By drawing on the basic principles of communication, the 
fundamental objective of their approach is to transform moral conflicts and develop new 
communication patterns which may improve the quality of moral conflicts.(ibid.) 
 In this sense Pearce and Littlejohn propose “transcendent discourse” to approach 
the differences. “Transcendent discourse” aims to create a new shared language through 
which the parties can coordinate their differing world views. They assert that 
transcendent discourse will require a form of eloquence which bridges the communities. 
Pearce and Littlejohn argue that transcendent eloquence must be philosophical, 
comparative, dialogic, critical, and transformative. (Pearce and Littlejohn, 1997:157) In 
other words, they claim that as a methodological orientation “transcend eloquence” 
must uncover the communities’ basic assumptions, develop categories to compare 
differences, seek to explore rather than convince, assess the strengths and weakness of 
both worldviews, and seek to reframe the conflict into more productive terms. 
 All these examples that are based on intercultural communication theory of 
practice aim to enhance effective communication by increasing the parties’ knowledge 
of each other and by weakening negative stereotypes. More specifically, they try to 
improve intergroup communication through increasing mutual awareness of barriers to 
effective communication, emphasizing knowledge of each other’s culture, and 
developing new shared historical accounts. Accordingly, these approaches build their 
practice around increasing awareness of cultural barriers to effective communication, 
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such as increasing knowledge of other cultures, and developing less threatening 
metaphors and images of opponents. Concerning the vision of intercultural 
communication about the impact of these types of interventions on wider conflict, this 
theory of practice focuses on developing more effective communication between 
negotiators (and other group representatives) so that they stay on task and are able to 
arrive at good agreements, and asserts that if publics understood each other better, 
leaders would have greater support for peacemaking. (Ross, 2000: 1027) 
 
 
 
2.3.5 Communal Relations 
 
 
Regarding the vision of community relations theory towards root causes of 
protracted conflicts, it can be claimed that it does not especially concern itself with the 
root cause of any specific conflict; rather it begins with the reality of intergroup conflict 
characterized by hostility, polarization, distrust, an absence of cooperation, and that 
there are continuing incidents which perpetuate the conflict. (Ross, 2000: 1021) The 
core principle of these approaches asserts that effective conflict resolution requires 
significant changes in how people from different communities interact with each other 
at the local level. Fitzduff describes the overall aim of community relations as 
increasing ‘…understanding, respect, and cooperation between communities...in the 
belief that such development can assist communities in working together to develop a 
solution to...conflict that is both just and sustainable’ (Fitzduff; 1993:34 cf. Ross, 
2000:1010) Similarly, putting the conflictual relationships among the citizens at the 
centre, Saunders claims that communal dialogues aim to change relationships between 
adversaries as the core aspect for long term success in bringing peace even in the most 
intractable conflicts (Saunders, 1999)  
As the leading figure of communal relations approaches, Saunders indicates the 
methodological orientation in terms of “sustained dialogue” that is used by the citizens 
in reducing racial, ethnic and other deep-rooted tensions in their countries, communities 
and organizations. Saunders articulates a “five-stage model”20 that he believes is helpful 
                                                 
20
 1-Deciding to engage: identifying individuals willing to risk interacting with enemy, gaining official 
approval for initiative and creating safe public space   
2- Mapping the relationship together: participants need to learn to talk analytically about the relationship 
in underlying interests and emotions 
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in capturing the unofficial dialogue between conflicting parties. Moreover, Saunders 
advocates that these stages guide the work through a series of sessions over several 
years and in practice are not linear and sequential, but having a tendency to jump back 
and forth (Saunders, 1994 cf. Hubbard, 1999).  
Alternatively, Frazer and Fitzduff propose a two-stage theory of action which 
asserts that community development projects are needed to increase the control of the 
groups on decisions affecting their own lives, and then the resulting self-esteem will 
leave them less fearful and threatened, and therefore enable them to meet with 
representatives from other communities to pursue matters of common interest (Frazer 
and Fitzduff, 1994: 31 cf. Ross, 2000:1010). In this sense, the starting point for 
community relations work in this two-stage theory is the development of local 
organizations which will articulate the needs and concerns of their community in such a 
way that they can be addressed through institutional channels. The second phase of 
community relations work is developing constructive local-level interaction and 
cooperative relationships between people from different groups. The core assumption is 
that functional cooperation around substantive matters can contribute to the breakdown 
of negative images and diminish intergroup hostility. (Ross, 2000:1011) 
Concerning the objectives of communal dialogues it can be said that they aim to 
provide an experience (learning) in changing relationships and understanding 
underlying factors of the conflict within the dialogue group; changing relationships in 
the larger community; producing a shared sense of what kind of community or country 
current antagonists would like to build together to serve the interests of each other and 
designing together a scenario of interactive steps to be taken in the political arena to 
change perceptions and to increase the possibilities of working together toward 
objectives that meet shared needs.(Saunders, 1999) Similarly, Frazer and Fitzduff 
(1994: 25 cf. Ross, 2000:1010) emphasize three key aspects of community relations 
approaches in protracted conflict resolution including improving communications and 
understanding between communities; promoting a tolerant acceptance of the existence 
                                                                                                                                               
3- Probing the dynamics of the relationship: participants need to listen with greater     sensitivity to the 
other side’s hopes and fears to understand how the other’s mind works.  
4- Experiencing the relationship by thinking together (Building scenario): the challenge is to have the 
group experience how to generate change in the relationships by thinking together about how to deal with a 
particular problem    
5- Acting together: the purpose is to develop practical ways to implement scenarios so as to have concrete 
impact on the relationships (Saunders, 1999:97-135) 
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of a diversity of traditions and cultures; and encouraging structures which safeguard the 
rights of all members of society.21  
Concerning the transfer of the changes reached in communal dialogues to the 
wider conflict, Saunders asserts that involving parties who are not yet ready for 
negotiation but do not want a destructive relationship to continue is important. 
(Saunders, 1999) In order to indicate the relation of communal dialogues with formal 
peace process, he also writes: 
“Dialogue, mediation, and negotiation may each play appropriate, even 
simultaneous, roles in a larger political process for the resolution of deep-rooted 
human conflicts. The dialogue approach is potentially complementary to the other 
methods, not exclusive.”(Saunders, 1999:86) 
From this argument it becomes obvious that communal dialogues make both intangible 
and substantive contributions to the pre-negotiation stage. Similarly,  Knox and Hughes 
(1995: 57–59 cf. Ross, 2000:1012) suggest a number of ways in which communal 
dialogues have been successful, including the establishment of contact in a favourable 
social climate, the placement of community relations on to local policy agendas and in 
increasing power-sharing at the local level. It is claimed that the effect of these 
approaches are twofold including the direct effects they might have in local 
communities, and their potential impact on the ability to tackle the underlying divisions 
in the region. At the core of this approach is the hypothesis that ‘as community relations 
work operates to develop more inclusive communal relationships that will facilitate 
politics in working out more inclusive political settlements’. (Bloomfield, 1997: 185) 
 
 
2.3.6 Principled Negotiation 
 
Principled negotiation can be identified as an interest-based approach to 
negotiation and focuses on the incompatible positions into which groups are locked and 
altering their inability to devise solutions for mutual benefit. At the core of this theory 
of practice is the hypothesis claiming that once each side can articulate its core interests 
and understands those of the other parties, a creative solution to bridging differences 
                                                 
21
 One interesting way community relations work in Northern Ireland has tried to develop a tolerance of 
diversity among the different groups is by providing contexts in which contested identities could be 
affirmed, as Protestants and Catholics learn more about each other’s beliefs and traditions (Fitzduff 
1996:36–43,cf. Ross, 2000:1012).  
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can be generated (Fisher, Kopelman and Schneider 1994 cf. Ross, 2000:1012) Since the 
central points of principled negotiation (especially the notion of focusing on the 
interests which underlie seemingly incompatible positions) are widely seen as helpful in 
the ICR approaches that emphasize needs and motivations over interests. (e.g. Rothman, 
1997) Therefore, I include this approach under ICR categorization. Although, principled 
negotiation has been applied in many PSCs and in many problem-solving workshops, 
different from the general characteristics of ICR approaches, principled negotiation is 
relevant in distributional disputes – those which are about the allocation of resources – 
rather than value based disputes which focus on constitutional or legal rights. 
(Susskind&Cruikshank, 1987:17 cf. Ross, 2000:1013) Moreover, while principled 
negotiation seeks agreement which involves all stakeholders and addresses their key 
concerns, other ICR approaches in general do not always intend to achieve an 
agreement among the adversaries.   
The methodological orientation of the principled negotiation can be categorized 
under four parts including separating the persons from the problem; focusing on 
interests, not positions; inventing options for mutual gain; and insisting on objective 
criteria.  (Fisher and Ury, 1991:22) Separating people from the problem means 
separating relationship issues (or “people problems”) from substantive issues, and 
dealing with them independently. According to Fisher and Ury, “people problems” tend 
to involve problems of perception, emotion, and communication22. The second 
methodological principle is based on concentrating on interests and not on positions. 
Fisher and Ury differentiate interests and positions by stating that interests are things 
that people really want and need, whereas positions are what they say that want or need. 
                                                 
22
 Perceptions are stated to be important because they define the problem and the solution. While there is 
an "objective reality," that reality is interpreted differently by different people in different situations. 
When different parties have different understandings of their dispute effective negotiation may be very 
difficult to achieve. (This is what we have been calling framing problems.) People problems also often 
involve difficult emotions — fear, anger, distrust and anxiety for example. These emotions get 
intertwined with the substantive issues in the dispute and make both harder to deal with. Fisher, Ury and 
Patton consider communication problems to be "people problems" as well. They list three types of 
communication problems. First, disputants may not be talking to each other. While their comments are 
formally addressed to the opponent, they are actually addressing some outside audience. A second 
communication problem arises when parties are not listening to each other. Rather than listening 
attentively to the opponent, parties may instead be planning their own response, or listening to their own 
constituency. Finally, even when parties are both listening and talking to each other, misunderstandings 
and misinterpretations may occur. (Fisher and Ury, 1991:22-36) 
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Fisher and Ury claim that if participants are asked about why they are taking those 
positions, interests may arise and it can be found that both parties’ interests are actually 
compatible but not mutually exclusive so that an important step will be generated 
towards the resolution of the conflict. (1991) The third methodological principle of 
principled negotiation is based on inventing options for mutual gain so that negotiators 
should create new solutions to the problem that will allow both sides to win (win-win 
approach). The fourth principle focuses on parties’ search for objective criteria. 
Concerning this principle, Fisher and Ury present BATNA as Best Alternative to a 
Negotiated Agreement. They assert that if the parties do not know their BATNA before 
getting into negotiations, they may accept an agreement that is far worse than the one 
they may have gotten, or reject one that is far better than they may otherwise achieve. 
Being aware of BATNA is claimed also to create alternatives to the negotiation, which 
in turn increase your power at the table.  
 Concerning its vision towards spillover affect, principled negotiation theory 
believes that the skills needed to achieve mutual gains are transferable to others, and 
that when leaders of contending groups can reach agreements, they are building models 
for future intergroup cooperation. (Ross, 2000: 1026) 
 
 
2.3.7 Transformation-Oriented Approaches   
 
 
Transformation-oriented approaches see problems of injustice and inequality as 
the main causes of conflict to be understood through competing socially and culturally 
constructed meanings and attempts to change relationships among the parties through 
moral empowerment, justice, forgiveness, reconciliation and recognition. (Ross, 2000: 
1027) Thus, recognizing the existence of irresolvable conflicts, these approaches 
suggest replacing the term conflict resolution with the term conflict transformation. 
John Paul Lederach developed the most comprehensive transformation-oriented 
approach asserting that a solution cannot be “...pursued by seeking innovative ways to 
disengage or minimize the conflicting groups’ affiliations...” because “...relationship is 
both the basis of the conflict and of its long term solution...” (Lederach, 1997: 26) Thus, 
Lederach asserts that opportunity must be given for people to look forward and envision 
their shared future...” (Lederach, 1997: 26) In this sense, his recommended approach 
involves a complex process of reconciliation so that more complex but above all more 
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accurate images of “the enemy” can be developed. Together with relationship building, 
capacity building forms one of the major parts of Lederach’s transformational approach 
to conflict and peace building. 
Similarly, Bush and Folger (1994) argue that through transformative conflict 
resolution the parties are able to change their relationship into one which allows for 
moral growth ‘by helping them wrestle with difficult circumstances and bridge human 
differences, in the very midst of conflict’ (Bush and Folger, 1994: 2) They also 
designate that in the transformation –oriented approaches, the aim is not to solve the 
conflict but to help transform the individuals involved in the conflict, in terms of moral 
growth. (Bush and Folger, 1994: 82) Bush and Folger focus not only on the 
transformation of individuals, but also on the transformation of social institutions in a 
way that eliminates or reduces differences in power and class privilege (Bush and 
Folger, 1994: 24) Although Bush and Folger’s transformative approach is presented in 
the context of mediation practices, since it is generated as a critique towards mediation; 
it is relevant to a wide range of intergroup conflicts; and aims inter-group empathy that 
many ICR scholars see as necessary to settling protracted conflicts I categorize this 
process under an ICR theory of practice.  
Concerning the methodological orientation of transformation oriented approaches, 
Lederach articulates an elicitive, as opposed to prescriptive (one in which the trainer is 
the expert), approach in which ‘the participants and their knowledge are seen as the 
primary resource for the training’. (Lederach, 1995: 56) The prescriptive approach is 
based on the intervener’s understanding of the conflict, whereas in elicitive approaches 
participants develop their own understanding of conflict and are encouraged to develop 
local approaches to their problems. In this sense it can be argued that culture is at the 
core of elicitive practice because culture is treated as a critical resource, not as a barrier, 
to conflict transformation. According to Lederach, elicitive training requires particular 
attention to language and metaphors which reveal both how conflicts are understood 
and possibilities for their transformation. (Lederach, 1995: 73–83) Having participants 
recounting proverbs and engaging in storytelling helps them to understand how a 
conflict is framed and to identify possibilities for its resolution.  
Central to transformation is not just empowerment, but also ‘seeking resource and 
root in the cultural context itself’ (Lederach, 1995: 55). In other words, the ultimate goal 
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of such elicitive approaches is empowerment and ‘the development of appropriate 
models of conflict resolution in local cultural contexts’. (Lederach, 1995: 63) Moreover, 
transformation oriented approaches imply a process of changes in a conflict’s 
manifestation at the personal, relational, structural and cultural levels. (Lederach, 1997) 
At the personal level a transformational approach focuses on changes in perceptions and 
attitudes toward the conflict. This suggests an intervention strategy designed to lessen 
immediate suffering and other psychologically destructive effects of the conflict. At the 
relational level improvements in interaction and communication can increase mutual 
understanding and reduce fear and stereotyping.(ibid.) Transformation concerns not 
only psychological aspects of group relations but social, economic, political and 
military relations as well. The structural transformation focuses on the social 
environment necessary to fulfill basic human needs; access to religious, economic, 
political and administrative resources and opportunities to participate in decision-
making procedures. (Rassmussen, 1997) Transformation at the cultural level is about 
identifying and reshaping the patterns that contribute to increased incidents of violent 
conflict and promoting indigenous resources and mechanisms that are effective in 
responding constructively to conflicts.  (Lederach, 1995: 55) 
 
2.4 Theories of Practice of ICR and the Headscarf Conflict 
 
After stating the basic differences among the ICR approaches by classifying them 
under six theories of practice, the reference point for evaluating the applicability of 
these approaches to the headscarf conflict is formed. In the following chapters by 
analyzing the headscarf conflict in the context of CSOs, concerning the needs, identity 
and value aspects of the conflict; positions, interests and needs of the stakeholders; their 
interactions, relations and capability to act together as well as the strategic opportunities 
and limitations that have to be addressed for successful intervention the applicability of 
each theory of practice would be evaluated with the purpose of designating the most 
appropriate ICR approach(es).       
 49 
Figure 2.2 Major theories of practice of interactive conflict resolution 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
 
THE GENERAL OVERVIEW OF TURKEY’S HEADSCARF CONFLICT 
 
 
 
Before presenting the assessment of the headscarf conflict in the context of civil 
society organizations that have definite positions to the conflict, the general overview of 
the conflict will be presented in this chapter. While presenting the general picture of the 
conflict the aim is to discuss the context of the headscarf conflict including the 
chronology, context and escalatory dynamics of the conflict. Subsequently, after 
indicating the current stage of the conflict and the resolution attempts and propositions 
for the resolution of the conflict, the protracted character of the headscarf conflict will 
be evaluated. The main objectives of this chapter are to construct the general picture of 
the conflict; to provide the ground that will help to pinpoint the positions and interests 
of the Kemalist and Islamist CSOs within the larger conflict; and to authenticate that the 
headscarf conflict is “protracted inter-group conflict with identity and value aspects at 
the centre”.  
 
 
3.1 The Chronology of the Headscarf Conflict 
 
 
 
■ Tanzimat (Reformation) Period (1839-76): The dress codes of women start to be 
debated with the modernization efforts. However; at that time the issue turns around 
wearing “çarşaf”. (Aktaş, 1990:26)  
■ Republican Period: In 1925, the first legalization on the dress code requires civil 
servants to dress like in the civilized nations of the world. In the early years of the 
Republic there was no legal regulation on woman dress codes in particular.  
■ 196823:  The first veiling controversy happens. A student of Ankara University 
Theology Faculty, Hatice Babacan, is dismissed from the school since she is attending 
                                                 
23
 Until the 1960s the constitutional principle related to secularism, together with the laws on dressing 
was interpreted in such a way that religious covering was banned in public offices including schools. 
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the school with her headscarf. This is the first event on the headscarf debated in the 
press. (Aktaş, 1990:27)  
■198024: The military regime prohibits the use of head cover for civil servants, with a 
notice on the proper dress codes stating that headscarf is a symbol of certain ideology.  
■1981: The Ministry of Education puts into force the regulation that prohibits head 
covering of students and teachers at secondary educational institutions. (Arat, 2000:4)  
■1982:  The Council of Higher Education (YÖK) forbids female university students to 
cover their heads while attending classes. (Özdalga, 1998; Arat, 2000) Large scale of 
protests follows the decision. 
■1984: As a result of the increasing protests, YÖK allows türban, a kind of headscarf 
covering the head but neither neck nor shoulders, as an intermediary solution. Turban is 
introduced as “contemporary clothing”. (Özdalga, 1998: 40) 
■1986: The president Kenan Evren initiates a new sharpening of the regulations by 
sending a warning to YÖK in which he calls attention to the increasing influence of 
“reactionary tendencies” (irtica) in society in general and in the universities in 
particular. 
■1987: YÖK prohibits any clothing other than modern ones. Since the wording of 
regulation is not clear the term “modern” is interpreted differently by the universities. 
Thus the use of scarf is allowed at some universities and strictly supervised at others. 
(Aktaş, 1990:32) 
■1987: The Prime Minister Turgut Özal tries to pass a law to relax the dress codes in 
the universities. The proposal is vetoed by President Evren. 
■1988: Turkish Grand National Assembly (TBMM) passes a law permitting to cover 
head and body on the basis of religious faith. (Human Rights Watch Report on Turkey, 
2004:24) 
■1989: This law is annulled by the Constitutional Court on the grounds that it is a 
breach of principle of secularism threatening the unity of the state, security, and public 
order.  (Abadan-Unat, 1998; Özdalga, 1998). 
■1989: The right to decide on the issue is left to the individual universities that provide 
temporary solution while keeping the problem intact. (Özdalga, 1998:42) 
■1990: The Motherland government passes Law 3670 that provides that “dress is not 
subject to any prohibition in institutions of higher education, provided that it is not 
forbidden by law.”       (Human Rights Watch Report on Turkey, 2004:25) 
                                                                                                                                               
When this unwritten consensus was challenged, the authorities needed to formalize prohibitions legally. 
(Özdalga, 1998) No governmental regulation prohibiting the headscarf at universities in pre-1980 period. 
 
24
 The main controversies emerged with the 1980s when a considerable mushrooming in the number of 
veiled students attending universities, ‘the castles of modernity’. (Göle, 1996) 
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■1991:  The Constitutional Court states that covering head with turban or headscarf 
cannot be allowed since it is against the laws in force.  
■1993: The headscarf issue is taken to European Human Rights Commission by the 
application of two university students whose pictures are refused by the university 
administration to be used in diplomas. The Commission rejects the case on the grounds 
that a secular university can limit the freedom of performing religious beliefs in order to 
keep the public order and collaboration of the students who have different religious 
beliefs.(Özkan, 2005:37)  
■1995: The politicization of the headscarf issue and the accompanying polarization 
increases with the Islamist Welfare Party’s (WP) coming to power in the general 
elections.  
■1997: The WP claims that they would soon lift the ban on turban both for the 
university students and for the civil servants.  
■February 28, 1997: The National Security Council, with the initiative of the generals, 
declares that Islamic fundamentalism is the biggest threat to the security of the country 
and initiates a process to contain fundamentalist Islam. The process is called “post-
modern coup d’état.” (Arat, 2000:6) Stricter implementations of the headscarf ban 
follow.    
■1997: The closure of WP and the forced resignation of the then Prime Minister 
Necmettin Erbakan  
■1998: The headscarf is also forbidden in classes, except Koran courses, in Prayer 
Leader-Preacher High Schools (IHLs) and YÖK stiffens the ban. This leads condition 
leads to more than 1.000 legal cases in Turkish courts awaiting results. (Human Rights 
Watch Report on Turkey, 2004:24) 
■ 1998: Three million people perform the greatest massive civil disobedience act in 
Turkish history, human chain, all throughout Turkey, demanding freedom for education 
with headscarf. (Ak-Der, 1999)  
■1999: The turban issue politically escalates by Merve Kavakçı affair. In the general 
elections, Kavakçı as a veiled woman is elected as a deputy from VP that is also stated 
as a reason for closing her party by the Constitutional Court. After Kavakçı Affair the 
regulations against head covering are tightened more in universities as well as high 
schools. (Göcek, 2000)  
■2002: The headscarf ban is brought to European Human Rights Court with the 
application of Leyla Şahin who was a student in Medical Faculty of İstanbul University 
and had to leave the university because of her headscarf.(Özkan, 2005:48) 
■2003: With the triumph of Justice and Development Party (AKP) in the general 
elections, the headscarf conflict spreads to other areas. Since the wives of the deputies, 
the prime minister and of the assembly chairman are veiled, Turkish President Ahmet 
Necdet Sezer does not invite their wives to the receptions and official invitations. The 
concept “public sphere” once more begins to be questioned. (Özkan, 2005: 46) 
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■2004: The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) gives decision on Leyla Şahin 
case by stating that the headscarf ban in Turkey is not violation of human rights and that 
the state has the right to make prohibitions in order to protect public order, the pluralism 
in universities, gender equality and the respect to others.(Özkan, 2005: 49)    
 
 
 
3.2 The Context of the Headscarf Conflict 
 
 
 
Revealing deep cultural, social, political, and identity cleavages between Islamists 
and secularists, the headscarf appears as a politicized emblem reconstructing the 
“otherness”.  The identity of women in Turkey has always been shaped through the 
conflict between Islam and Kemalism which has been the “project of civilization by 
which the local patterns and the traditional values are dismissed and devalorized” (Göle, 
1997:46) to homogenize the society for the sake of the development of the nation-state. 
In this context, the headscarf began to highlight the tension within the core values of 
society ranging from secularism of the public space, the place of religion in education, 
and individual rights to multiculturalism. This controversy has historical origins going 
back to late nineteenth century when modernization reforms of the Ottoman state 
created reactions among the Islamic groups. (İlyasoğlu, 1998; Özdalga, 1998) 
The aim of the Republican founders was to create a homogeneous secular nation 
state in the Western forms and a public composed of secular minded, rational, 
modernized, Westernized, civilized citizen. In this sense the demands of different social 
groups that can be defined as “other” identities within the society were not taken into 
consideration. Islamic identity as one of these “others” was perceived as a threat to the 
secular, republican regime. Accordingly, although a considerable group of secular-
minded people have been created and secularized national identity dominated the public 
space, the tension within the “”other” identities to protect themselves has kept alive. 
(Alankuş-Kural, 1995:79; Göle, 2000:116)  
Secularism as a modernist ideology in Turkey is linked to the state’s control of the 
public sphere. (Göle, 1997: 48)  “Turkish secularism has meant the banning of religious 
orders, dress codes for the public servants and the imposition of certain types of audio-
visual programming at state radio stations and television channels”(ibid.: 49) The 
purpose was to teach and impose a modern way of life and thereby exclude and 
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marginalize the Islamic identity. The secularism understanding of Kemalism had two 
dimensions. First to keep religion away from politics and state mechanism; second as to 
put all the religious organizations and the religion out of the society, both as a cultural-
educational policy and as a political-ideological attitude. (Parla, 1993: 200) As a result 
the Kemalist reform movements, whose main target was the replacement of Islamic-
Ottoman culture with modern Western culture, tried to remove both the symbolic and 
the institutional structure of Islam. (Toprak, 1988: 122)    
To indicate the idiosyncratic context of the headscarf conflict, at this point the 
difference between Turkish secularism (laicism) and the Anglo-Saxon notion of 
“laicité” should be further indicated. The new Republic’s secularism was not based 
upon the separation of the state and religion. Rather, Islam as a religion had been 
“nationalized” and “secularized” by the state. In other words, the state not only refused 
any public manifestation of religiosity, but it also monopolized the right to organize 
religious life and to define the context of what a proper understanding of religion was. 
(Yılmaz, 2005: 387) Any interpretation outside the official definitions and any religious 
formation outside state control would therefore be seen as deviant and threatening. 
However, laicité that is redefined along more Anglo-Saxon lines forms a more neutral 
relationship between religion and the state arguing that the state should be neutral on the 
beliefs, faith, and philosophical orientation of society. (Yavuz, 2000:36)  
In this context, it can be said that the struggle between Republican elites and 
Islamist has taken place in the realm of cultural codes and life styles. It is not therefore 
surprising that women’s headdress was always and continues to be a major concern for 
both the Republican secular elites and Islamists since the dissemination of secularism 
into the daily lives of people is best illustrated by women’s visibility. For the initiators 
of the reforms unveiling of women was the symbol of women’s emancipation from 
religious bonds. In this sense woman issue symbolized the cleavage between the 
Western-oriented rulers and Islamists since dress codes and physical appearance, 
especially of women, have been significant indicators of the Republican reforms and the 
project of modernity. (Saktanber, 1994: 102; Arat, 2000: 3; Ilyasoğlu, 1991: 50) 
From the viewpoint of the modernity project the headscarf has been regarded as 
either backward or religious and the women were tried to be freed from religious 
practices such as veiling and sexual discrimination. Women in urban areas were 
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gradually adapted to Western types of clothing and left the headscarf in the public 
realm; but ones in rural areas were keeping on tying their heads with loose scarves 
under their chin as their traditional wearing. Since 1980s, some women in urban areas 
began to challenge the concept of secularism and demanded to participate to public 
realm with their heads covered. However, their style of head covering was distinctly 
different from the headscarves of rural women. This new type of covering over head, 
neck and shoulders were called “turban”.25 The demand that occurred among the 
university students spread out and the turban affair was turned to be the symbol of 
politicization of Islam in the 1990s. Emergence of these women in the metropolitan 
centers which are the most modernized parts of the country and at the most prestigious 
universities makes their protest even more significant. (Acar,1991: 285) In this sense 
Acar states that “For the first time in Turkish Republic history the conventional view 
which equated Islam with women’s imprisonment at home was being challenged by the 
appearance of these women demanding an Islamic way of life through open political 
struggle in which they used the weapons and tactics of modern democracy” (Acar, 
1991: 287) 
However, the politicization and turning of the headscarf debate to one of the major 
issues of Turkish politics is not independent from the political climate in relevant times. 
In spite of constitutional regulations against using religion for political purposes, Islam 
gradually integrated to the political system. In the 1990s, the veiling controversy 
erupted as a significant front within the confrontation between Islamists and military, 
guardians of the Turkish Republic who perceive headscarf as the ideological uniform of 
fundamentalism. (Çemrek, 2004:52) The veiled women became more and more visible 
through their sit-ins in demonstrations and even death-fasts. They were also the 
invisible hands behind the electoral victories of the Islamist Welfare Party (RP) in the 
1995 general elections. (Arat, 1999)  
                                                 
25
 As Kadıoğlu points out the distinction between “headscarf” and “turban” stems not only from the 
various styles of head-dress representing different currents but also from the different background 
education, public participation, and the militancy of the women who cover their hair. (Kadıoğlu, 1994: 
655) A headscarf is a smaller piece of cloth covering only the head and not the neck. It is worn by the 
women who follow traditional customs and behavior and whose activities are confined in the private 
realm usually without an active role in the public realm. Women who wear headscarf mostly reside in 
small towns and on the outskirts of of large cities in squatter settlements that were formed as a result of 
internal migration. As Kadıoğlu observes, women who wear headscarf include elderly women who were 
youngsters during the modernization reforms of the 1920s and 1930s and who never internalized the new 
dress codes initiated by Kemalists. To use Kadıoğlu’s terms their perceptions are “pre-Kemalist” rather 
than “anti-Kemalist”. (Kadıoğlu, 1994:648)  
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In 1998, the National Security Council, with the initiative of the generals, declared 
that Islamic fundamentalism is the biggest threat to the security of the country and 
initiated a process to contain fundamentalist Islam. (Arat, 2000:6) So called “the 28 
February Process” proved the invisible legitimacy of military interference on civilian 
authority and escalated arbitrary attitudes towards veiled women in the name of national 
security priority. Beside the ban on headscarf in the universities and the state offices, a 
further development deepened the conflict following the renewal of the Turkish 
Parliament after the 1999 elections when Merve Kavakçı attempted to take her oath of 
office with her headscarf.  
Consequently, it can be said that what is at stake about the headscarf conflict in 
Turkey is the clash between the secular nationalist identity as the bearer of cultural 
homogenization and the claims of difference in terms of Muslim identity. The female 
body in this context has been over politicized so that while the Kemalists evaluate the 
headscarf as the flag of fundamentalism rather than as a religious value of Muslim 
women, the Islamist political parties appear to use this aspect for generating questions 
in the minds’ of Kemalists.  
 
 
3.3 The Escalatory Dynamics26 of the Headscarf Conflict 
 
 
Concerning the conflictual relationship between the Islamists and secularists, the 
origins of the headscarf conflict can be traced back to the modernization project of THE 
early Republican period. In that period the dynamics between the parties can be 
identified in terms of discussion or debate. Before the revivalism of the Islamic 
movements in 1980s, covering head was practiced by rural and lower-class women and 
was perceived as symbol of illiteracy and lower social status. However, in 1980s, when 
the university students began to cover their heads as a symbol of their identification 
with the religious movement, the conflict among secularists and Islamist has become 
eminent. (İlyasoğlu, 1998) In this respect the revivalism of political Islam and 
subsequently the headscarf ban can be taken as important stages of the conflict, 
                                                 
26
 In this part the analysis of the escalatory dynamics of the headscarf conflict would be based on Fisher 
and Keashly’s (1991) four staged conflict escalation model: discussion, polarization, segregation and 
destruction. The analysis would be conducted on the basis of the chronology of the conflict stated in the 
first part. 
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escalating the polarization among the parties, intensifying their relations and opening a 
new chapter in the debate over women’s headdress.  
Inconsistent policies of the state authorities that kept changing between having a 
flexible standpoint and exerting strict control turned women’s headscarf into a 
controversial political conflict. In the mid 1990s when the Islamists have begun to shape 
their demands concerning fundamental human rights, some veiled girls applied to the 
European Human Rights Commission and in 2002 to the ECHR. At this stage the 
escalation of the conflict became visible since the issues began to shift from value based 
to needs based and with the involvement of ECHR as an external actor, the number of 
parties increased.  
The Welfare Party’s election in 1995, its policies and 28 February “post-modern 
coup détat” have further politicized and escalated the conflict. Over politicization of the 
conflict by Islamist political parties has even caused polarization among the Islamists 
since the wrong policies of WP ended in intensification of ban policies and increased 
the negative perception of the secularists towards the Islamists. Subsequently, the 
massive demonstrations organized by the Islamists to protest the ban and Women’s 
March against Sharia protest that was organized by the secularists visualized the 
polarization stage of the conflict. In 1990s, assassinations of the Kemalist intellectuals 
including Muammer Aksoy, Bahriye Üçok, Uğur Mumcu and Ahmet Taner Kıslalı by 
radical Islamists constructed another escalatory dynamic. In 1999, election of Merve 
Kavakcı as a deputy has further escalated the headscarf conflict since the fear and 
concern of the secularists increased claiming that Islamism began to penetrate the whole 
society, state and the political mechanisms. These events generated negative attitudes, 
perceptions, stereotypes, intolerance and “enemy” discourse among the parties towards 
each other.    
Concerning the general characteristics of dynamics/processes of “protracted 
conflicts” in terms of increased sensitivity to differences and threats (Deutsch, 2000); 
increased negative attitudes, perceptions, stereotypes and de-individuation (d’Estrée, 
2003); negatively affecting inter-group functioning, communications, relations, and 
interactions (Fisher & Keashly, 1991; Rubin et. al. 1994), it can be argued that the 
escalatory dynamics of the headscarf conflict definitely fit this characterization. 
Moreover, the whole process of the headscarf conflict can be defined in terms of a 
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“Conflict Spiral Model” where each party’s actions influence other party’s responses 
provoking another round of responses.  (Rubin et. al. 1994) This model obviously 
proves that the enemy is not the other side, but rather the process of escalation that takes 
conflicts out of disputants’ control, and pushes them to intensify extremism of their 
actions and sometimes this has been the case for the headscarf conflict. (Burgess & 
Burgess, 2003)  
 
 
3.4 The Current Stage of the Headscarf Conflict 
 
 
 Today, veiled girls/women are still deprived of their rights for education and work 
and this condition appears to create important psychological and economic problems. 
(Ak-Der, 1999) There are still some daily incidences and debates that keep the 
headscarf conflict on the agenda. As another outcome of the conflict it can be claimed 
that the relationship between the Islamists and Kemalists is torn apart still including 
fear, hatred, anger and antipathy. Additionally, because of the headscarf controversy the 
state, political parties and even universities had to spend much of their time dealing with 
the issues of the conflict instead of focusing on their primary goals. All these aspects 
affect development of the state and the civil society so that a social cohesiveness to 
work in unity cannot be fully generated.  
Although a serious polarization, clash or tension is not observed in the community 
and although majority of the society supports lifting the ban (TESEV, 1999; IMV-SAM, 
1997; TUSES; 1994-2004; AKART, 2002; LDT, 2003) the headscarf conflict is still in 
deadlock. Negative perceptions of the Kemalists towards the Islamists that can be 
defined in terms of fear, suspicion and de-individuation prevents emergence of 
communication channels and makes the secularists ignore existence of the headscarf 
conflict. Likewise, civilian governments’ hesitance to face military confrontation limits 
the action area and resolution attempt of current AKP government who opposes the 
headscarf ban. (Arat, 2000) However, the international pressure, especially the 
European Union (EU), triggers Turkey in promoting human rights standards and this 
prevents further escalation of the conflict. Nevertheless, Turkey still continues to 
struggle with problems in terms of finding some social and political formulas for having 
both religious people and a secular state.  
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Taking all these aspects into consideration, concretely indicating the current stage 
of the headscarf conflict would not be a very precise designation. The conflict seems not 
to escalate; the Kemalists and the state seem to take unilateral advantage of the current 
situation and ignore the existence of the headscarf conflict.  In this sense, the current 
stage can be defined rather as a “stalemate”27 (but not a hurting stalemate) in which the 
Islamists come to regard the conflict as intolerable and entered in a deadlock, generating 
high level of psychological costs for the veiled women.  Obviously, this stage affects 
many aspects of interpersonal and inter-group functioning so that communication 
between the Islamist and Kemalists is almost nonexistent, relations are seen as hopeless, 
the conflict is framed by the Islamists in terms of survival needs, and the outcomes are 
seen as win–lose. Moreover, it can be claimed that the psychological costs for the two 
parties are undeniable. The Islamists feel as oppressed, deprived from their fundamental 
rights, excluded from the society and reduced to second class citizen. On the other hand, 
the Kemalists have great concerns and fears related to the future in terms of being 
psychologically oppressed and that their liberties, identities, values and securities would 
be threatened. However, from the continuation of the headscarf ban that prevents the 
veiled girls/women to continue their education or work, it can be argued that the costs 
of the conflict are one sided.  
 
 
3.5 The Headscarf Conflict as a Protracted Inter-Group Conflict with Identity and 
Value Aspects at the Centre 
 
 
In this part, to relate the literature on PSCs with the general characteristics of the 
headscarf conflict, how the theoretical characteristics of PSCs epitomize themselves in 
the framework of Turkey’s headscarf conflict will be further elaborated. Concerning the 
general characteristics of the headscarf conflict, in this study I define it as a “protracted 
inter-group conflict with identity and value aspects at the centre”. With this definition, I 
try to denote the intractable cycle of the conflict; the intermingled and incompatible 
character of the issues that have value and need based importance for each party; and 
the negative perceptions and stereotypes that dominate the relation between the 
Islamists and Kemalists damaging the trust and cooperative potential for constructive 
ways of dealing with the conflict.  
                                                 
27
 The reference definiton of the “stalemate” is taken from Rubin et. al. (1994) 
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As it is the case in most protracted conflicts, Turkey’s headscarf conflict does not 
represent a pure type, but involve a mixture of conflict generating aspects combined 
with misperception and miscommunication. Therefore defining the headscarf conflict as 
pure “identity based”, “value based”, “needs based” or “power conflict”28 would not be 
an appropriate designation. Not to ignore or oversimplify the political, structural, 
historical and legal aspects of the headscarf conflict I define it as “protracted inter-group 
conflict with identity and value aspects at the centre”.  
Concerning the identity and value aspects of the conflict, it can be asserted that 
they are emphasized not only by the Islamists but also by the secularists, although the 
secularists seem to focus on political and legal aspects of the conflict more. On the one 
hand, the Islamists closely identify themselves with their strong religious beliefs so that 
they demand to enter the public places with headscarf that is claimed to be an 
indispensable part of their identities. For this reason it can be claimed that with the 
headscarf ban Islamists’ primary group affiliations are frustrated. In other words their 
identity needs in terms of “freedom for religious expression” and “respect for their 
religious identity” are violated. The other needs of the Islamists that are at stake include 
the need for recognition (not accepted in the public places as how they are) political 
participation (Merve Kavakçı case) and distributive justice (not able to enter the 
universities and public institutions with headscarf). 
On the other hand, if we define the social identity as something that: 
 “…consist of an individual’s self-image that derive from the social categories to 
which the individual perceives him- or herself to belong in; and to the value and 
emotional significance ascribed to that membership (Tajfel 1978:63 Cf. Brown, 
2000: 210)  
it can be easily stated that the secularists closely identify themselves with secularist 
identity of the state and Atatürkist principles. So that perceiving the visibility of the 
headscarf in public sphere as a threat to the secular identity of the state, makes the 
secularists internalize the threat as if endangering their future identity in terms of 
freedom, recognition and security.  
                                                 
28
 Fisher defines the power conflict as a condition when each party wants to maximize its influence over 
the other. The central issue in power conflict is not scarcity or incompatibility, but question of control and 
related items such as pride, recognition or other aspects that power may bring. (Fisher, 1989:34) In this 
sense Turkey’s headscarf conflict is highly epitomized by a power struggle comprising political Islam, 
state and the Turkish Military Forces as the protectors of the secularist regime.    
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Concerning all these aspects, it can be argued that Turkey’s headscarf conflict is 
not only about wearing the headscarf or not in public places. Comprising identity, value 
and needs based aspects, the “headscarf” is at the crossroads of the power based 
relationship between “modernity-tradition”; “civilization-backwardness”; 
“particularism-homogenization”; “secularism-religion”; “Islam-West”; “Kemalism-
Islamism”; “men-women”; “citizenship-pluralism”; “secular national identity-religious 
and cultural identity”; “political Islam-Islamic way of life”; “public sphere-private 
sphere” as well as “elitism-populism”. Not having a pure character but being generated 
by complex set of aspects causes an important challenge in theoretically defining the 
headscarf conflict and in approaching it with a view to develop ameliorative 
interventions.      
Looking at the characteristics of PSCs mentioned in the literature, it becomes 
obvious that it is difficult to resolve them in terms of breaking the intractable cycle of 
problematic issues. However, no matter how deep-rooted, widespread, and seemingly 
“endless” intractable conflicts are, they do end and even more are transformed.(Burgess, 
1996) The widespread opinion in the conflict resolution field, related to the constructive 
resolution of PSCs focuses on the need for a different, multi-faceted, more prolonged, 
interdisciplinary, innovative, creative means of analysis and resolution including 
different channels (e.g. using extended dialogue sessions, truth commissions, town-
meetings or individual psychotherapy) for transforming intractable conflicts into 
tractable ones, for re-framing and de-escalating intractable conflicts.(Burgess & 
Burgess, 1996; Lederach, 1997; Kriesberg; 2003; Burton, 1990; Fisher, 1997; Rothman 
1997) This was the notion that led to the emergence of the ICR field and the same 
notion would provide us with the vision in articulating an appropriate ICR approach(es) 
through which Turkey’s headscarf conflict can constructively addressed. 
 
 
3.6 Propositions for the Resolution of the Headscarf Conflict 
 
 
 Concerning the resolution of Turkey’s headscarf conflict, it cannot be mentioned 
of a real resolution attempt coming from the state or another internal or external party. 
“Avoidance” is the main strategy of the state as well as the secularists so that they 
prefer to ignore the negative affects of the headscarf ban on veiled girls/women arguing 
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that there is not a conflict within the society. Since the secularists interpret the headscarf 
issue as a problematic mentality, for a permanent resolution they propose expansion of 
scientific and secular education. (Behramoğlu, 1998) Having this objective in mind, the 
state reorganized the status of Quran courses and religious high schools and compulsory 
education has been increased to eight years. Moreover, some secularist civil society 
organizations began to organize many education campaigns (e.g. ÇYDD). 
 On the other hand, a group of Islamists propose holding a referendum to resolve 
the conflict since the nationwide surveys conducted in recent years conclude that the 
majority would vote for lifting the headscarf ban. (TESEV 1999; LDT, 2003; TUSES; 
1994-2004; IMV-SAM, 1997; AKART; 2002) Similarly, some liberals also support the 
referendum option claiming that the demand to wear headscarf is democratic right. 
(Altan, 2005) However, some Islamists and liberals reject the referendum asserting that 
the right to wear headscarf in public places is a fundamental human right not a 
democratic right. (Bulaç, 2005; Coskun, 2005) Despite all these insufficient 
propositions for the resolution of the conflict, the reality illustrates that individuals and 
groups having different identities and values need to live together politically. In this 
sense, resolving headscarf conflict by fulfilling the needs of both parties becomes 
inevitable.  
Concerning all characteristics of the headscarf conflict stated in this chapter, the 
intractable character of the conflict becomes obvious revealing how difficult it is to 
resolve it in terms of breaking incompatible cycle of the problematic issues. However, 
as Burgess argues no matter how deep-rooted, widespread, and seemingly “endless” 
intractable conflicts are, they do end and even more are transformed. (Burgess, 1996) At 
this point for the constructive resolution of the headscarf conflict the need for different, 
multi-faceted, more prolonged, interdisciplinary and innovative means of analysis and 
resolution comes to the fore. Evaluating the applicability of the ICR approaches to the 
headscarf conflict in the following chapters I will try to denote the appropriate ICR 
approach(es) that would provide promising step towards transforming this intractable 
conflict into tractable one in terms of empowering parties to re-frame and re-define the 
incompatible issues; generate a common language; eliminate the negative stereotypes 
and perceptions towards each other and the conflict; and to create alternative options 
and common ground for approaching the conflict.  
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CHAPTER 4 
 
 
  ASSESSMENT OF THE HEADSCARF CONFLICT 
 
 
 
 
Analyzing “protracted social conflicts” with “subjectivist approach”29 has great 
importance, since the escalation of these types of conflicts involve particular 
perceptions, beliefs, attitudes and motivations all of which need to be addressed for 
conflict resolution to occur. (Azar 1990; Kriesberg 1998) As Reimann (2002:4) claims, 
analyzing intractable conflicts from a pure objectivist approach, by seeking the origins 
of these types of conflicts only in the social and political structure rather than in the 
perceptions of the parties involved, leads to conservative and status quo oriented 
approach to conflict resolution. Therefore, in this chapter taking the civil society 
organizations as the crucial stakeholders in this study representing the parties of the 
“headscarf conflict” in Turkey, I analyze the conflict focusing on the perceptions, 
attitudes, identities, interests and unmet needs of the Kemalist and Islamist CSOs.  
The aim of this chapter is not to conduct a sociological or qualitative analysis of 
the Kemalist and Islamist CSOs but to conduct a preliminary assessment of the conflict 
in terms of providing a general introduction to the stakeholders of the headscarf conflict 
from which the ICR workshop will draw from while selecting participants. In this sense, 
classification and categorization of the CSOs in terms of their “pro” and “anti” positions 
towards the headscarf ban is indispensable. Through this dichotomous grouping the 
main difference between the adversary organizations will be easily revealed out. 
However, this dichotomous representation should not be seen as an attempt to 
underestimate the similarities that exist between these organizations. The ultimate 
                                                 
29
   The subjectivist approach to conflict focuses primarily on the perceived incompatibility of goals. The 
essential implication of this approach is that many goals are subjectively perceived as incompatible, 
whereas from an objective point of view they can be thoroughly compatible. This may be due to 
misinformation, cultural misunderstanding, or misperceptions such as stereotypes, mistrust and emotional 
stress. (Reimann, 2002) 
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objective of this stakeholder analysis30 is to provide the framework through which the 
applicability of the ICR approaches to the headscarf conflict can be evaluated in the 
following chapter.  
 For this stakeholder analysis31 three main sources will be used. These sources 
include secondary sources related to the headscarf conflict and to the concerned 
Kemalist and Islamist CSOs; publications, web pages, press releases, bulletins, monthly 
journals of the organizations, and semi-structured interviews with representatives from 
Islamist CSOs (Ak-Der, Mazlum-Der, Özgür-Der selsected as Islamist CSOs) and 
Kemalist CSOs (ADD, ÇYDD, Turkish Women’s Union selected as Kemalist CSOs).  
These interviews constitute an additional source of information for the analysis of 
attitudes, perceptions, and relations of the stakeholders. The numbers of interviewees 
for each organization are not selected with the concern of methodological representation 
but rather with the purpose of identifying potential participants for the ICR workshop.  
The terms interviewee and representative are used interchangeably and denote the 
executives or executive committee members of the organizations.   
 
 
4.1 Parties to the Headscarf Conflict 
 
 
4.1.1 Primary Parties 
 
 
Taking into consideration the headscarf conflict beginning from the early 
Republican era the primary parties can be collected under three groups. The first 
primary party is the state that is involved in the headscarf conflict through the decisions 
and prohibitions of the Council of State, Constitutional Court and the Council of Higher 
Education; the Turkish Military Forces that act as the ultimate arbiter of the Republican 
                                                 
30
   The “Stakeholder analysis” can be defined as an approach for understanding a system by identifying 
the key actors or stakeholders in the system, and assessing their respective interest in that system” 
(Grimble et al. 1995 cf. Ramirez, 1999). In other words, the “stakeholder analysis” refers to the 
identification and description of stakeholders on the basis of their characteristics, interrelationships, 
positions and interests related to a given conflict. Stakeholder analysis can help to discover existing 
patterns of interaction, analytically to improve interventions, to assess their capacities towards the 
resolution of the conflict. (Engel, 1997)  
 
31
  The number of interviewees for each organization is as the following: Ak-Der (1); Özgür-Der (1); 
Mazlum-Der (2); ÇYDD (3), ADD (3) and Turkish Women’s Union (2). 
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regime; and the government32. The other parties in this camp can be identified as the 
Kemalists, (conservative) secularists33, modernizing and western-oriented elites who 
can be also defined as the supporters of the headscarf ban. On the other hand, the 
traditional and reactionary conservatives that can be grouped under the term Islamists34 
construct the oppositionist primary party to the headscarf conflict.  
At this point it should be stated that neither Kemalists nor Islamists are 
homogeneous since they are comprised of moderate and extremist groups. For instance, 
Kemalists include a group that can be called as liberal-secularists who oppose the 
headscarf ban claiming that wearing it in public places is a democratic right. On the 
other hand, the Kemalist group that can be identified as “nationalist-conservative” 
oppose the democratic essence of such a right. (Kozat, 2003) Concerning these aspects, 
in this study using the term “Kemalists” I refer to the conservative secularists. On the 
other hand, although as a group the Islamists collectively oppose the headscarf ban, 
concerning their characteristics and goals the Islamists should also be differentiated 
among themselves. Among the Islamists there is a group that criticizes the state’s 
discriminatory regulation of the Islamic practices and suggests a political-legal 
resolution through non-violent means. The members of the Justice and Development 
Party (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi) can be given as an example for this group. On the 
other hand, there are radical Islamist groups such as Hizbullah whose goals can be 
defined in terms of violent struggle; or there are followers and believers of some 
religious sects as Fethullah Gülen sect or some other political and intellectual groups. 
(Tugal, 2002,) However, in this study without differentiating the Islamists among 
themselves or emphasizing the Islamist-Islamic differentiation, I will use the term 
Islamists to indicate their homogeneous position to the headscarf ban.   
                                                 
32
   Although “government” (hükümet) can be identified as an important institution of the state, not all the 
governments have political vision or ideology parallel to the official one. Especially concerning the 
headscarf conflict when political parties with Islamic tendency come to power considerable controversies 
have occurred among the government and the other institutions of the state.    
 
33
  Using the term “secularists”, I refer to those who do not consider Islam to be a major frame of 
reference in their social interactions. This is not to say that they do not believe in or practise Islam. 
Nevertheless, they find such practices to be cultural rather than political and argue that religion is a 
private affair, they always oppose to the public manifestations of religious symbols and practices. 
 
34
   The words “Islamic” and “Islamists” are different.  Islamic, from the perspective of secularist groups, 
denotes religious devotion and thus has a limited compatibility with secularism. The term Islamist implies 
a politicized and fundamentalist form of Islam that makes use of religion and has a strong opposition to 
the secular foundations of the Republic. To avoid such negative attributions, Turkey’s Islamists assert on 
every occasion that they are Islamic or Muslim people (Islami Müslüman kesim). 
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4.1.2 Secondary Parties 
 
 
One of the secondary parties to the conflict can be identified as “liberals” since 
they have the potential to affect the conflictual relationship between the adversary 
parties. This group consists of intellectuals, scholars, journalists, some liberal and 
human rights CSOs that argue that state does not hold any right to intervene in the 
private life of individuals and that everybody is free to dress in the way s/he wishes. 
They underline the “tolerant” attitudes, which are necessary to avoid exaggerating the 
question. Furthermore, although it has a very heterogeneous structure some of the 
feminist35 groups can also be taken as a secondary party. Emphasizing the 
discrimination against women because of their dress codes and indicating that men with 
same religious beliefs are not deprived of their rights, some of the feminist groups 
support the women rights concerning the headscarf ban. In the mid-1980s with 
introduction of human rights, democracy, liberalism and feminism concepts in Turkey, 
the secondary parties and their positions in the headscarf conflict began to crystallize. 
(Çakır, 2000) 
 
 
4.1.3 Interested Third Party 
 
 
The application of two veiled university students to the European Human Rights 
Commission in 1993 and Leyla Şahin’s application to the European Court of Human 
Rights in 2002 identified these foreign legal institutions as external third parties to the 
headscarf conflict. Moreover, the European Union that requires Turkey to promote 
universal human rights standards can be indicated as another external party. The 
international human rights organizations as Amnesty International and Human Rights 
Watch are also interested in the headscarf conflict concerning the violation of human 
rights issue of the conflict.   
 
                                                 
35
   The feminists do not have a homogeneous structure. Kemalist feminists, socialist feminists, radical 
feminists and civil activist feminists can be defined as some of the subgroups of the feminist movement in 
Turkey. In this study, with the concept “feminist” I refer to the feminist intellectuals of 1990s and the 
socialists feminists of late 1980s who were gathered around the journal Kaktüs. I do not categorize the 
Kemalist feminists as secondary party but classify them in the secularist group as a primary party. 
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4.2 Choosing the Kemalist and Islamist CSOs as Primary Stakeholders36 
 
 
 
From the abovementioned characterization of the primary parties to the headscarf 
conflict it becomes obvious that they are not homogeneous but composed of different 
sections organized under different institutions. All of these actors are important 
stakeholders to the headscarf conflict. However, my intention in choosing the CSOs as 
the level of analysis in this study is closely related to the ICR perspective that defines 
the executives of the organizations as important opinion leaders. (Lederach, 1997) It is 
claimed that once the relations between the participants (that would be the 
representatives of CSOs in our case) of the ICR process improve and their perceptions 
of the conflict change as a result of the contact and dialogue, it will spill over or 
“transfer” to a wider circle affecting the decision-making process. (Keashly and Fisher 
1996: 245) Another reason for choosing the CSOs as the stakeholders in this study is 
their capacity to form affective pressure group. Besides their ability to affect the macro-
process (official-decision making), the CSOs have the ability to affect public opinion 
through the writings and other activities of their representatives who work in academia, 
media, private sector, education or jurisprudence. Furthermore, through their campaigns 
the CSOs have the capacity to form close relations with the grassroots and this increases 
their efficiency in transferring the successful changes in the ICR approaches to the 
society.  
In this study the word “stakeholder” stands for the Kemalist and Islamist civil 
society organizations that have clear interests and positions in the context of Turkey’s 
headscarf conflict. Since our aim is to conduct a stakeholder analysis categorizing the 
CSOs according to their “pro” and “anti” positions towards the headscarf ban, not each 
CSO but the group that they form along the headscarf conflict will be analysed. The 
organizations that are chosen to represent these groups will illustrate also the “in-group” 
differences that will construct important strategic insights for choosing the appropriate 
ICR process.  
                                                 
36
 The definition of the word “stakeholder” is “a person with an interest or concern in something” 
(Ramirez, 1999)  However, “stakeholder” does not only refer to individuals, social entities as groups or 
organizations that have an interest or are active players in a system can also be defined as stakeholders. In 
the conflict resolution field, “stakeholders” can be defined as the groups that share a common interest 
towards the conflict or are affected by it in a similar way. Moreover, the stakeholders are also the central 
actors for the resolution of the conflict.  
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The stakeholder analysis will be conducted under four main parts including: 
identity and characteristics of the organizations; structure of the conflict; relationship 
among the stakeholders; societal context in which the stakeholders operate, and 
attitudes of the stakeholders for the resolution of the conflict. 
In the “identity of the organizations” the general group identity that the Islamists 
CSOs form around the headscarf conflict and in-group variations will be analysed. 
Concerning their in-group variations, the general characteristics of the organizations 
will be stated including their demographic structures, founding principles, objectives 
and activities. The aim of this part is to provide the framework through which the 
emphasized issues, needs, values, fears, concerns, objectives, perceptions and desired 
changes of the stakeholders towards the conflict and stakeholders’ relations with the 
adversary party can be easily understood.  
In the “structure of the conflict” part, stakeholders’ perceptions towards the 
conflict; and of the critical issues pertaining to the conflict will be analysed. Related to 
the issues emphasized by the organizations it should be underlined that the aim is not to 
analyze all of the mentioned issues by each CSO. Therefore although some issues are 
not mentioned by some of the organizations or if only mentioned during the interviews, 
but not in their publications or web sites, these issues will still be presented to illustrate 
a general stance on the issues important for the CSOs. Categorizing these issues 
according to the needs and values of the organizations concerning the headscarf conflict 
has strategic importance for two reasons. The first reason is to identify if there are any 
compatible issues among the adversary organizations. The second reason is to identify 
the most important issues for each party that should be addressed in an ICR workshop 
process. However, being aware of the fact that a third party’s prioritization of the 
conflicting issues is risky undertaking, I will categorize the issues according to the 
emphasis given to them by the CSOs and their needs based and value-based character. 
Since for the resolution of protracted conflicts the fulfilment of basic needs has great 
importance, the need-based issues will be prior in this categorization.  
In the “relationship among the stakeholders” part, the networks and other groups 
that the stakeholders belong to; interaction and communication between the 
stakeholders; the stakeholders’ perceptions towards each other and variation in their 
groups will be analysed. The relationship between the stakeholders have indisputable 
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strategic importance since it reveals information about the dynamics of the conflict; 
provides significant insight for the constraints and opportunities for the resolution or 
transformation of the conflict; and gives a hint for the vital aspects that should be 
addressed in an ICR process.  
In the “attitudes of the parties for the resolution of the conflict” part, the visions 
and proposed solutions of the stakeholders for dealing with the conflict will be 
analysed.  
In the “societal context in which the stakeholders operate” part, the relation 
between the civil society organizations and the state will be analysed. At this point it 
should be clarified that the term “state” will be continually used and it does not refer to 
the government or political parties in power, whereas it refers to the military-
bureaucratic elites and the representatives of this mentality. For instance, although the 
Islamist CSOs are sometimes very close to the political parties in power since they do 
not have a close stance to the official ideology they would be claimed not to have close 
relations with the state. The objective of analysing the CSOs-state relationship is to 
understand if the civil society organizations can be successful in affecting the decision-
making process. This analysis will be a central aspect in designating the capacity of the 
CSOs to produce spillover affect in terms of transferring the outcomes of the 
appropriate ICR process to the decision-making process.   
 
 
4.3 Islamist Civil Society Organizations 
 
 
I collect the CSOs that oppose the headscarf ban under the name of “Islamist 
CSOs”.  Throughout the study, the word “Islamist” is used to denote the Islamic 
tendency of the organizations and the strong Muslim identity of their founders, 
executives and members. By using the concept “Islamist” I do not try to construct a 
relationship with political Islam or fundamentalism. Although, in the study the two 
concepts are interchangeably used, the difference between the terms Islamic (Islami) 
and Islamist (Islamcı) should be clearly stated since it denotes an important 
restructuring in Turkey. From the perspective of Kemalist groups, the term “Islamic” 
denotes religiosity and devotion and thus is claimed to be more compatible with 
secularism and Kemalism. On the other hand, the term Islamist implies a politicized and 
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fundamentalist form of Islam that is claimed to make use of the religious sources and 
oppose to the secular characteristics of the Republic. To avoid such negative 
attributions, Turkey’s Islamists as well as the representatives of the CSOs with which I 
have conducted the interviews assert that they are Islamic or Muslim people (Islami 
Müslüman Kesim) not “Islamist” as Kemalist groups perceive.  
 
 
4.3.1 Identity of the Islamist CSOs 
 
 
The Islamist CSOs appear to form a group identity manifested by the strong value 
attributed to the headscarf and their strong religious beliefs. This identity formation can 
be traced back to the early Republican Period since the Islamist CSOs mentioned the 
modernization project starting in that period as the breaking point. Emphasizing how the 
secular ruling elites tried to externalize the visibility of Islam from the public places, the 
threatened identity of the Islamists comes to the fore. Accordingly, the identity of the 
Islamists appears to be shaped around strong religious values and the threat (perceived 
and actual) of being discriminated and excluded by the secular elites.  
After stating the positions of the Islamist CSOs towards the headscarf conflict 
their group norms become eminent. However, analysing the founding principles, 
demographic structure, objectives and activities of each organization will obviously 
reveal the variations among them. These structural variations among the organizations 
will provide the framework through which we can better understand their relations with 
the Kemalist CSOs and the state; their perceptions towards the Kemalists and the 
headscarf conflict; and their objectives and desired changes concerning the conflict. 
Although the objectives and interests of these Islamist organizations seem to be similar, 
they do not have the same identities. As Akşit et. al. indicate the variation among the 
identities of the Islamist CSOs can be epitomized by the demographic or gender aspects 
as well as the difference in their ideologies. (Aksit et. al., 2004: 664)  
Ak-Der: Ak-Der that was founded in 1999 is defined as a human rights organization 
founded by students who lost their education rights and lawyer, doctor, teacher, 
lecturer, other officials who were dismissed from their job just because of their 
headscarves. (AK-DER-Regulation Section 3, n.d.) Likewise, the executive of Ak-Der 
identifies the organization as a civil initiative formed by people who take the 
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responsibility to struggle towards the headscarf ban and against every kind of women 
discrimination. (26.05.2005, interview, Istanbul)  
Although Ak-Der is founded by women; all of its members are women and has 
some common projects with other women organizations in the context of gender based 
problems, it does not appear to define itself in gender based aspects.37 However, 
looking at the character of its members/founders as well as its area of interests that is 
confined to discrimination against women, child education, education of women and 
improving the women status in Turkey it can be presented as a women organization. 
Nevertheless, as Plagemann asserts, Ak-Der is an exception among the Islamist women 
organizations because of its activities concerning human rights violations. (Plagemann, 
2002:384) 
Özgür-Der: Like Ak-Der, Özgür-Der was also founded in 1999, when the headscarf 
conflict was in escalation; by a group of students who have suffered from the headscarf 
ban as well as journalists, lawyers, authors and representatives of some civil society 
organizations.(Pusch, 2002: 467)  Although Özgür-Der can be identified as a women 
organization since most of its founders and members are women, in its sociological 
analysis of the Islamist CSOs Akşit et al. define Özgür-Der as a “human rights 
organization” characterized by strong Islamic identity. (Akşit et. al., 2004: 670) Even 
though the organization is founded to take an action for equal rights to education, in 
terms of the headscarf conflict, Özgür-Der’s area of interest is not only confined to the 
headscarf conflict but includes various other fields of interests as F type prisons, Iraqi 
invasion, Palestinian conflict etc. (17.05.2005, interview, İstanbul) Moreover, 
concerning their demonstrations, activities, projects and press releases as well as the 
interview with its representative it becomes obvious that except for its actions with Ak-
Der, Özgür-Der does not work with any other women organization. All these factors 
confirm that Özgür-Der cannot be characterized on gender basis. Furthermore, Özgür-
Der’s strong relation with the journal Hak-Söz reveals another dimension of its identity. 
                                                 
37
   Identifying itself as a “human rights organization” and the executive’s clear rejection to define Ak-
Der as a feminist women organization reveals that Ak-Der does not emphasize its gender based character. 
Although, the representative rejected to define Ak-Der as a feminist women organization, concerning the 
headscarf conflict during the interview she indicated how women are affected from the headscarf ban 
while the men with strong religious beliefs were not affected at all. A similar argument is made by the 
previous executive of the organization. (“Tuba Akyuz ile Gorusme”, 2004) These statements have an 
implicit stance blaming men with strong religious beliefs and these kinds of statements are generally 
expressed by women who are defined as Islamic feminists.   
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In Ankara the organization is represented in the office of Hak-Söz and Hak-Söz is the 
monthly journal of the organization. The most important thing is that Hak-Söz can be 
identified as a Radical Islamist journal (Erkilet, 2004: 683) and this condition clarifies 
the identity of Özgür-Der; explicates its firm, conservative and pessimistic vision 
towards the headscarf conflict; and its highly critical attitude towards the state.     
Mazlum-Der: Mazlum-Der was founded in 1991 by lawyers, authors, publishers and 
businessmen with various Islamic tendencies. (Plagemann, 2002: 377) The 
representative of Mazlum-Der defines the organization as a civil institution that deals 
with human rights and indicates that regardless by whom and towards whom; any 
violation of human rights is placed on the agenda of Mazlum-Der. (02.05.2005, 
interview, Ankara) Consistently, in its web site Mazlum-Der is defined as an 
organization defending freedom of expression for all kinds of political views and 
thoughts; supporting all activities organized by anyone as long as they respect human 
rights; opposing all kinds of human right violations committed by anyone and 
struggling against the abuse of universal human rights for the sake of political benefits. 
(“Mazlum-Der’in Amacı”, n.d.)  
From the abovementioned aspects it becomes obvious that although Mazlum-Der 
is known as an Islamic-human rights organization, the Islamic characteristic of the 
organization is not so much emphasized. As Plagemann (2002: 382-384) argues it can 
be stated that Mazlum-Der has been experiencing a transition in recent years from an 
Islamist orientation to one which pays attention to human rights defined on a universal 
basis. This differentiates Mazlum-Der from the other Islamist human rights 
organizations including Özgür-Der. The effort for such a transition can be explicitly 
seen at the central office of the organization. While the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights is hung on one wall of the room; the veiled secretary and the Quran in the library 
of the chairman symbolize the characterization of Mazlum-Der which locates itself 
between Western and Islamic values.  
4.3.2 Islamist CSOs’ Identification of the Headscarf Conflict  
Ak-Der identifies the headscarf conflict as a political conflict claiming that it 
originates from a political, ideological, elitist mentality that generates discrimination 
against women. (Ak-Der, 1999: 210) Accordingly, the representative of the organization 
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asserts that the headscarf conflict should not be defined as a social problem since there 
is not an actual clash between covered and uncovered people who live together 
peacefully. (26.05.2005, interview, Istanbul) Designating the application of wrong 
policies as the source of the headscarf conflict, the organization rejects the definition of 
the headscarf conflict in terms of a religious problem since headscarf is stated to be 
worn not because of the misinterpretation of Islam but because of religious beliefs and 
religious necessities. (ibid.) Although the founding principle of Ak-Der is presented in 
terms of “struggling against every kind of discrimination against women” (Ak-Der, 
1999:5), its previous executive rejects to identify the headscarf conflict as a gender 
based conflict. Instead the ban is evaluated as a party line process directed towards all 
the people having strong religious beliefs. (“Tuba Akyuz ile Soylesi”, 2004)  
Similarly, Özgür-Der defines the headscarf conflict as a political conflict that has 
no legal basis and that originates from double standard state policies and problematic 
mentality of the state that violates the fundamental human rights. (“Double Standards”, 
n.d.; Şekerci, 2005) To denote the origins of the conflict, Özgür-Der also calls attention 
to the modernization project of the Turkish Republic as a process rejecting the old 
traditional values, creating new nation, changing the traditional clothing styles of 
women and perceiving the headscarf as a threat. (17.05. 2005, interview, İstanbul) 
Likewise, stating that the headscarf is not a new phenomenon for the Turkish society 
and that it goes back, in belief and traditions, as far as fourteen centuries, Mazlum-Der 
maintains that when the headscarf began to irritate the partisans of the state ideology, 
the propagation claiming that the regime is under threat has come to the fore. 
(Ensaroglu, 2004) Similarly, defining the headscarf ban as the continuation of the 
modernization project that started in the latest periods of the Ottoman Empire, Ak-Der 
also asserts how Islam has been evaluated as an obstacle to the modernization of the 
society and as the main reason for the backwardness of the society. (Ak-Der bulletin1/2, 
2004: 2-5) 
Concerning the headscarf conflict, Mazlum-Der defines it as a problem of freedom 
and a matter of human rights. (Mazlum-Der bulletin 63, 2004: 20) Accordingly, the 
representative of the organization argues that the headscarf conflict should be defined in 
terms of discrimination against women which brings restrictions to their work and 
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education rights; and intolerance against different dress codes. Going further, the 
interviewee also defines the headscarf conflict as an identity conflict stating: 
“I think that there is an aggression towards more than one identity. People’s 
beliefs, preferences and the way they choose to live are inseparable parts of their 
identity. Doubtlessly, there is intolerance towards this fact.”(02. 05. 2005, 
interview, Ankara) 
Consistently, in its web site stating that the headscarf conflict is not a legal conflict 
since it has no legal basis, it is affirmed that the students wearing headscarf confronted 
with an obligatory choice in terms of giving up either their beliefs that are part of their 
identities or their educational rights. (Yılmazoglu, 2004) 
 To sum up, Islamist CSOs perceive the headscarf conflict as one of the most 
important problems of Turkey that should be immediately resolved. Strangely, although 
Özgür-Der that is an Islamist CSO is built to struggle with the headscarf conflict, it 
appeared not to give an immense importance to the headscarf conflict claiming that the 
problematic mentality of the state is the real problem generating all other problems in 
Turkey. This reveals an important faultline among the Islamist CSOs. While Ak-Der 
and Mazlum-Der seem to separate the headscarf issue from the state regime, the main 
concern of Özgür-Der appears not to be the headscarf or its freedom but changing the 
regime. However, since these are some inferences deduced from the statements of the 
representatives, in a face-to-face dialogue with the Kemalist CSOs, Özgür-Der would 
have the chance to correct if there are some misinterpretations or obviously explicate 
what is meant by changing the problematic mentality of the state. 
 
 
4.3.3 Issues emphasized by the Islamist CSOs   
      
4.3.3.1 Need based issues  
4.3.3.1.1 Need for identity and recognition  
- Respect for and recognition of religious identity; freedom of religious expression:  
Veiled women’s demands to freely express their religious beliefs and their resistance 
against the headscarf ban as well as their withdrawal from education, career, and jobs 
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reveal the strong identity aspect within the headscarf conflict. Islamist women as well as 
a number of academicians document how covering their heads and leading Islamic lives 
allow veiled women to exercise autonomy and express their identities, at times in 
opposition to their parents who disapprove of their headscarves, at times against the 
state or social pressure (Arat, 1991; Göle, 1996; Özdalga, 1998). Taking into 
consideration sociological research on veiled women, it becomes obvious that they 
belong to recently urbanized and educated social groups who have broken away from 
traditional popular interpretations and practices. (ibid.) In this sense, the demand of 
these girls to cover their heads can be interpreted as an identity need rather than a 
cultural or traditional one and protecting their identities appears to be the central issue 
for them since the headscarf ban experience is perceived as a threat to their group’s 
survival. 
Accordingly, living according to the Islamic precepts, religious beliefs, 
preferences and wearing headscarf are defined by the Islamist CSOs as inseparable parts 
of the Islamists’ identity. To put it more specifically, concerning identity needs of the 
veiled women, Ak-Der argues that the headscarf is an indispensable part of the veiled 
women’s identity and claims that prohibiting their entrance to the public places 
threatens their survival in the social life. (Ak-Der, 1999:120) To indicate that wearing 
headscarf is a strong identity and religious need from which no concession can be given, 
the representative from Ak-Der stated: 
“By taking off our headscarves we could have continued our education and had 
job today. However, thousands of girls did not accept this because this is our life 
style, our religious belief and part of our identity. I was not forced to wear this 
headscarf and no one can force me to take it off.”(26. 05. 2005, interview, 
Istanbul) 
 Similarly, underlining the need for identity in the conflict, Mazlum-Der argues 
that people’s beliefs, preferences and the way they choose to live are inseparable parts 
of their identity. (Yılmazoglu, 2004) As a continuation of this statement, Mazlum-Der 
asserts that creating the “other” nourishes the stereotypes that are used to legitimize the 
state’s pressures on the “other”, generating hatred within the civil society towards the 
“other”. (02. 05. 2005, interview, Ankara) Although in this assertion the “other” is used 
by the organization to refer to all oppressed groups of the society, in terms of the 
 77 
headscarf conflict the “otherness” is used to refer to the people with strong religious 
beliefs. Accordingly, another interviewee from Mazlum-Der adds: 
“In Turkey a religious person is equated with the internal enemy, looking for an 
opportunity to rebel, making plans to take the state control, taking money from 
Iran to cover her head, traitor. Consequently, the victims of this identification will 
damage our own society. The growing hate and rage will harm the society” (12, 
06, 2005, Istanbul) 
These words obviously reveal the threatened identity aspect and its potential in creating 
social conflict.  
To sum up, in the context of the headscarf conflict the Islamist organizations argue 
that with the headscarf ban the religious identity is not tolerated, respected and 
recognized whereas it is attacked. The headscarf ban is defined by the Islamist CSOs as 
an attempt to eliminate the visibility of Islam in public places and freedom for religious 
expression is identified in the context of liberties and human rights. In this sense to be 
recognized as how they are, without trying to change them is specified as the main 
demand of the veiled women by the Islamist organizations.  
- Freedom to control her/his own way of life life: The headscarf ban is evaluated by the 
three Islamist CSOs as the state’s control on people’s dress preferences. For instance, 
Mazlum-Der identifies the headscarf ban as disrespect to dressing preferences asserting 
the needless, meaningless and ridiculous character of this application and claiming that 
the decision of a state about how the individuals should dress seems unreasonable and 
illegitimate. (Selamet, 2000) Accordingly, Ak-Der defines the way of dressing as a 
personal choice into which the state may not intervene even if it originates from 
religion, fashion or personal preferences. (26.05.2005, interview, Istanbul)  
 
4.3.3.1.2 Need for justice 
 
 - Economic well-being in terms of education and work opportunity: Since the headscarf 
ban prohibits entrance into public places (including the universities and the public 
institutions) with headscarf, the veiled women are claimed to be deprived of their rights 
to have education and work. Related to the field of education, Özgür-Der indicates that 
everybody has the right to take education service and because of a dressing code, 
depriving a girl of going to school or work is a real discrimination and violation that lies 
at the heart of the headscarf conflict. (Sekerci, 2005) Similar statements are also found 
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in the press releases, web sites and publications of Mazlum-der and Ak-Der. This need 
is presented by the Islamist CSOs in terms of violation of the human rights claiming that 
because of his/her wearing style, nobody can be deprived of the right to have education.  
- Equity: Generally the Islamist organizations appear to emphasize that the headscarf 
ban is a double standard policy discriminating against the veiled women. In Galtung’s 
term this can be stated as a “structural inequality” (2002) so that “discrimination against 
women” issue appears as a need based issue where the need for justice is at stake. In the 
context of the headscarf conflict, the central issue emphasized by Ak-Der is the 
discrimination that women have to live with. In its bulletins, web site and during the 
interview it has always been emphasized how women are discriminated and have to 
give up their jobs and educations as well as their social and insurance rights just because 
of their wearing styles. Defining the headscarf ban as a political, ideological and elitist 
mentality discriminating against women and by emphasizing the fundamental human 
rights, democracy and the citizenship rights, Ak-Der indicates that they oppose the 
discrimination against women due to their dressing styles and claims that the headscarf 
conflict should be immediately resolved by lifting the headscarf ban. (Ak-Der, 1999) 
Similarly, related to the discrimination against women Mazlum-Der argues that women 
and especially girls are the most affected group from the applications of the headscarf 
ban. It has been claimed that either the girls who continued their works or educations by 
taking off their headscarves or the girls who went on wearing the headscarf at the price 
of quitting their work or studies at the university are not happy and comfortable with 
their choices and have psychological problems caused by disassociated personality.  
(Ensaroğlu, 2004) In the context of the headscarf ban rather than indicating 
discrimination against veiled women aspect, Özgür-Der indicates the headscarf ban as 
an attack against the Islamic beliefs and all the people with strong religious beliefs.38  
 
 
4.3.3.2 Value based issues  
 
 
The abovementioned need based issues are indicated as common needs by the 
Islamist CSOs. In this part, value based issues mentioned by the Islamist CSOs in their 
web sites, publications as well as in the personal interviews with the representatives will 
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 For more information about Özgür-Der’s position to the headscarf ban look at : 
 http://www.ozgurder.net/cgi-bin/index.pl?mod=news;op=news_list;id=11 
 
 79 
be listed. These are values pertaining to human rights and liberty; democracy and 
citizenship Rights; values concerning women’s status; social peace; public sphere. 
4.3.3.2.1 Human rights and liberty 
 In a general sense the Islamists claim that wearing headscarf as a basic right and 
liberty can neither be removed by legislative organs, nor can be subjected to 
referendum, since head covering of a religious woman or her request to take part in 
public life with her headscarf is not a democratic right but an essential right. (Bulaç, 
1998) Indicating the headscarf ban as a violation of fundamental human rights, the 
Islamists also claim that people covering their heads as a necessity of their religious 
beliefs are becoming deprived of their educational rights and public services that limits 
their essential rights and liberties. (Koru, 1987) Emphasizing human rights aspect, some 
of the Islamists do even reject the proposition of referendum as a resolution for the 
headscarf conflict.  
Similarly, the Islamist CSOs perceive head covering of a religious woman and her 
request to take part in public life with her head cover as her essential human right. In 
this sense the headscarf ban is identified as the violation of fundamental human rights 
by the Islamist CSOs in particular. (Şekerci, 2005; Ak-Der, 1999; Ensaroglu, 2004) To 
put it more specifically, emphasizing the educational rights in the context of human 
rights, the headscarf ban in high schools, colleges, universities or in any educational 
settings is defined by the Islamist CSOs as a violation of educational rights. Likewise, 
Mazlum-Der asserts that everyone, without discrimination, has the right to have 
education and because of her/his clothing, nobody can be deprived of education. 
(Mazlum-Der Bulletin-63, 2004) 
 Besides human rights issue the aspect of liberty is also strongly emphasized by 
the Islamists who argue that wearing headscarf is a requirement of their religious faith 
which in turn is an inseparable aspect of their identity and that in secular states 
everybody should have right for religious freedom. (Bulaç, 1998) Accordingly, 
Mazlum-Der presents the freedom to believe or not to believe; to practice, profess, 
learn, search and teach their fate in the context of liberty and appear to have an 
important value for the Islamists. In this sense the interviewee identifies the ban as 
violation against the freedom for thought, religion, and conscience. (12. 06. 2005, 
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interview, Istanbul) By giving the argument of Kemalist CSOs that is: “headscarf is not 
a religious duty since it is not mentioned in Quran as a duty (farz)” as an example, 
according to Mazlum-Der discussing if wearing headscarf is a religious duty or not, is 
the attempt of the ban supporters to legitimize one of the interpretations of Quran 
leaving the other interpretations aside that is a complete violation of individual freedom. 
(02.05.2005, interview, Ankara) 
4.3.3.2.2 Values concerning women’s status 
 Although this issue is generally presented in the context of violation of human 
rights and liberties, since the woman is at the centre of this conflict and her veil is 
perceived as a battleground by the adversary parties, value related to women’s status is 
especially important to mention for both the Islamists and Kemalists in this conflict. For 
the Islamists in general and veiled women in particular, women’s status has an 
important role in the conflict since the headscarf ban discriminates “only” against 
women, deprives them of their fundamental rights, and forces them to give up their 
identities. (Barbarosoğlu, 2000) According to the Islamists, the veiled women define 
their headscarves as a symbol of their devotion to God not as an acceptance of the 
imprisonment of men and assert covering their heads as their personal choice not an 
external enforcement. (Ramazanoglu, 2001)  
The necessity for recognizing the veiled women without trying to change them 
and giving them equal rights is another value mentioned by the Islamists. Especially 
the Islamist women organization Ak-Der strongly emphasizes the women’s status issue 
by asserting that men with strong religious beliefs are not deprived of their rights. 
(Kaplan, 2004) Taking into consideration the headscarf ban, the Islamist women 
maintain that because of their wearing styles many veiled women lost their rights to 
work and be educated, whereas men with strong religious beliefs are not deprived of 
their rights for education or other liberties. (Ak-Der, 1999) 
4.3.3.2.3 Democracy and citizenship 
 For the Islamists, this issue has an important value since they claim to be 
deprived of their democratic rights in terms of political participation, freedom for 
education and work. Islamists define democracy as a regime in which different 
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ideologies are freely expressed and where there is no authority, order or principle above 
the preferences of people. (Bulaç, 1998) Freedom of speech, press, walk, association, 
dress and belief are stated as the main aspects of democracy. At this point it becomes 
obvious that Islamists closely relate democracy with the human rights and this 
relationship reveals the relative importance of human rights for Islamists compared to 
democracy. The liberty to wear headscarf is indicated as a democratic and citizenship 
right claiming that a person who gives taxes and completes his/her citizenship duty has 
the right to benefit from the services provided by the state. (Selamet, 2000) 
4.3.3.2.4 Social peace 
 Social peace is raised as another central value by the Islamist CSOs who fear that 
if the headscarf conflict cannot be resolved in the future, the social peace might be 
threatened generating polarization in the society. It is claimed that prejudices, 
generalizations, accusations and the “enemy” discourse directed towards the Islamists 
would damage the society since it would lead to growing hate and rage. 
Criticizing the double-standards, prejudices, stereotypes and generalizations of the 
state towards people having different life styles, the representative of Mazlum-Der says: 
“Of course among the veiled women and their supporters there may be some 
people who desire to impose their own beliefs to others as soon as they gain 
power. But the solution for this problem is not restriction of the beliefs. It is not 
right to regard all women who wear headscarf as a backyard of a certain political 
thought.”(02. 05. 2005, interview, Ankara)  
Concerning this situation, the organization asserts that an approach that accuses and 
charges all individuals of a group, harms the social peace and that it is not reasonable 
to block a group of people from living freely just because of the fear for future. 
(Ensaroğlu, 2004) 
To sum up, the Islamists point out the continuation of the headscarf conflict and 
the prejudices generated towards the Islamists as the fundamental aspects challenging 
their value related to the continuation of the social peace. Contrarily, the Kemalists 
indicate the over-politicization of the headscarf and the exploitation of religion as the 
main factors threatening their core values related to the social peace. 
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4.3.3.2.5 Public sphere 
 Although many controversial arguments have been stated about where the 
public sphere begins and ends, the absolute truth is that the public sphere is a battle 
ground representing the power relations between the parties to the headscarf conflict. As 
an indicator of the characteristics of the state and the society; and the power relationship 
between Islamism-Kemalism; modernity-traditionalism and homogenization-pluralism, 
both parties have very different values regarding the definition and use of public sphere.  
 Raising the public-private sphere issue; the organizations underline that the 
religious beliefs of veiled women order them to expose their identities not only in the 
private but also in the public places so that women with strong Islamic beliefs do not 
have the chance of not wearing headscarf in the public sphere.(Özgür-Der, 1999)  
Maintaining that not wearing headscarf in the public sphere is unacceptable for the 
veiled women it is claimed that Islam orders them to cover their heads especially in 
public place.(Şekerci, 2005) Besides the necessity of the religious orders, the Islamists 
also argue that the right to wear headscarf in public realm is a requisite of citizenship, 
civil rights, liberty and fundamental human rights and forbidding its usage is anti-
democratic and authoritarian.(Yılmazoglu, 2004) 
 
 
4.3.3.3 Other issues 
4.3.3.3.1 Politicization of the conflict 
The Islamist CSOs also indicate the historical context of the conflict in terms of 
the modernization project through which Islam has been evaluated as an obstacle for 
the modernization of the society and as the main reason for the backwardness. (Aksoy, 
2004) This mentality is presented as the political aspect that has initiated the conflict.  
4.3.3.3.2 Legal issue 
The Islamists who demand freedom for the headscarf, reveal their legal interests 
by referring to the “freedom of religious expression”; “discrimination before law due to 
religious belief”; “right to education” and “right to political participation” articles that 
are guaranteed and protected with 1982 Constitution. (Arat, 2000) Accordingly, 
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emphasizing the legal part of the conflict the organizations emphasize that the headscarf 
conflict is not a legal conflict since it has no legal basis and that the headscarf ban has 
been enforced de facto and based on decrees. In this sense the conflict is defined by the 
terms of “practical implication” and “despotism” affirming that the students wearing 
headscarf confronted with an obligatory choice in terms of giving up either their beliefs 
or their educational rights. (Ak-Der, 1999; Özgür-Der, 1999; “Meselenin Hukuki 
Boyutu”, n.d.) In this sense, it can be stated that the Islamists raise women’s right to veil 
themselves concerning the principles of liberty, while the state and the secularists refer 
to the principle of secularism when justifying the headscarf ban. In other words, it can 
be argued that although the legal principles through which the adversary parties express 
their interests are not necessarily contradictory, in the headscarf conflict they have come 
to clash. 
4.3.3.3.3 Giving service-taking service issue 
 Although this issue can be grouped under the public sphere issue, it appears to be 
the only issue on which consensus can be reached among the Kemalist and Islamist 
CSOs. Concerning this issue the executive of Mazlum-Der stated:  
“Although we support the freedom in every sense, at least the conflicting parties 
may reconcile on lifting the ban at the “taking service” level. People who argue 
that a police or a judge (people who give service) cannot wear headscarf may 
accept that the student can take education service or a patient can take health 
service regardless of her dressing style.” (02.05.2005, interview, Ankara) 
From this issue it can be inferred that even though the Islamist representatives supported 
the “complete freedom” for the headscarf, they indicated that in the short term the 
veiled women can be given the freedom to take service in terms of taking education or 
health service, whereas the ban may continue on those who are in the giving service 
field which prohibits the veiled women to become public officials as judge, police, 
teacher or doctor.39 Apparently, consensus on this issue would not solve the conflict 
since it is proposed by the Islamists as the initial step for the complete lifting of the ban.  
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 12.05.2005, interview with representative from Mazlum-Der, Istanbul;  
    17.05.2005, interview with representative from Özgür-Der, Istanbul 
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4.3.4 Relation with the Kemalist CSOs 
 
 
4.3.4.1 Networks and other groups that Islamist CSOs belong to  
The networks of the Islamist CSOs and their relations with the other civil society 
organizations reveal the potentials and obstacles for improving their relations with the 
Kemalist CSOs.  
Analysing the demonstrations, joint press releases and activities of Ak-Der it 
becomes obvious that, they work with Mazlum-Der and Özgur-Der among the Islamist 
organizations and with İHD as a non-Islamist organization.40 However, the common 
point of these organizations is their work in the field of human rights and their emphasis 
on the violation of human rights and educational rights. (Plagemann; 2002: 384-385) As 
it can be inferred from this network, having similar attitudes and positions towards the 
headscarf ban is the main reference point used by Ak-Der in choosing its partner 
organizations. 
Similarly the organizations with which Özgür-Der works in terms of organizing 
meetings, demonstration and joint actions can be stated as Mazlum-Der, Ak-Der, 
Hukukçular Derneği as well as İHD and TAYAD. 41 Concerning Özgür-Der’s 
difference from Mazlum-Der, the representative of Özgür-Der states that Mazlum-Der 
has a more universal character fighting with all types of human rights violations not 
only with the ones directed towards Muslims. (17.05.2005, interview, Istanbul) This is 
also stated by Plagemann in his analysis of the Islamist CSOs. (Plagemann, 2002:370-
378) TAYAD and İHD (Human Rights Organization) are leftist organizations with 
which Özgür-Der works not only in the context of the headscarf conflict but also in 
some other political issues.  
                                                 
40
  For more information about the CSOs with which Ak-Der works look at http://www.ak-der.com/; Ak-
Der bulletins 1(2)- 2004, 1(4)-2004, 2(5)-2004; Plagemann (2002)pp: 384-385; interview with the 
representative of Ak-Der on 20.04.2005, Istanbul 
 
41
 For more information about the CSOs with which Özgür-Der works look at Akşit; Serdar &Tabakaoğlu 
. (2004: 664-670); http://www.ozgurder.net/ ; http://www.savaskarsitlari.org/; 
http://www.mazlumder.org/; http://www.haksoz.net/;  interview with the representative of Özgür-Der on 
20.04.2005, Istanbul  
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Taking into consideration the relations of Mazlum-Der with the other CSOs, Ak-
Der, Özgür-Der, Başkent Women’s Platform and İlk-Der can be listed as the women 
organizations with which Mazlum-Der has some joint activities.42 Since these 
organizations are founded by women suffering from the headscarf ban, their work with 
Mazlum-Der is based on organizing meetings, demonstrations and press conferences in 
which the headscarf ban is protested, its negative affects are expressed and an 
immediate resolution is demanded from the state.  
Besides these women organizations, İHD (Human Rights Organization) is the 
primary leftist organization with which Mazlum-Der cooperatively works in the context 
of the headscarf conflict as well as in other human rights violations issues. (Plagemann, 
2002: 387) The representative of Mazlum-Der states that İHD’s definition of the 
headscarf ban in terms of “human rights violation” provides the ground for their 
cooperative work in relation to the headscarf conflict. (02.05.2005, interview, Ankara) 
Both of these organizations are working on the issue of human rights, and shelter people 
from different social groups who suffer from mistreatment of the state. (Plagemann, 
2002: 370) In this sense, it can be stated that discourse of suffering brings together these 
two CSOs despite their different political tendencies.  
Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch are the international partner 
organizations of Mazlum-Der. (20.05.2005, interview, Ankara) In its web site it is also 
indicated that these organizations strongly underline the “violation of educational 
rights” and the “discrimination of women” issues in the context of the headscarf ban. 
(“Insan Haklari Orgutleriyle Iliskiler Komisyonu”, n.d.)  
4.3.4.2 Interaction and communication with the Kemalist CSOs   
Concerning the relationship of the Islamist CSOs with the Kemalist CSOs, it can 
be stated that there is very poor interaction and communication between them. For 
instance, some of the Kemalist women organizations including Turkish Women’s Union 
are even not known by the executive of Ak-Der. (26.05.2005, interview, Istanbul) The 
well known Kemalist organization among the members of Ak-Der is ÇYDD since the 
founder of this Kemalist organization has been one of the most active supporters of the 
                                                 
42
  For more information about the joint activities of Mazlum-Der with women organizations look at 
http://www.basortusuneozgurluk.com/detay_03.asp?id=22; “Barış İçin Sürekli Kadın Platformu” 
Retrieved from: www.ihd.org.tr/kadin/cagri.html; http://www.savaskarsitlari.org/; www.ihd.org.tr/ana. 
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headscarf ban. (Ak-Der, 1999: 156-157) Although the representative of Ak-Der states 
that she does not have sympathy towards ÇYDD, in 2004 Ak-Der organized a picnic 
inviting many different CSOs, including ÇYDD and the representative indicates that no 
problem occurred during the picnic. (26.05.2005, interview, Istanbul; Ak-Der 
Bulletin(2), 2004)  
As an active member of Turkish Directorate General on the Status and Problems 
of Women (DGSPW), Ak-Der also had the chance to work and have meetings with 
other women organizations including ÇYDD, TKB and Ka-Der on gender based 
problems without experiencing any conflicts while working together.43 However, the 
general attitude of Ak-Der in terms of improving its relations with the Kemalist CSOs 
can be easily inferred from the statement below:  
“The Kemalists think that when we begin to look like them and think like them, 
we will be on the right way. They do not recognize and accept me as how I am. 
Since this is the case I do not think that we can meet on a common ground. I 
recognize them as how they are; therefore I want to be recognized as how I am. If 
they would accept us only by changing us, we have nothing to do with 
them.”(26.05.2005, interview, Istanbul)  
From this statement it becomes obvious that for Ak-Der working together or organizing 
a common project with a Kemalist CSO seems impractical and difficult.   
Concerning their relations with the Kemalist organizations, Özgür-Der emphasizes 
that neither Özgür-Der nor the Kemalist CSOs have had a demand for coming together, 
trying to solve the headscarf conflict or to find a common ground in other issues. 
(17.05.2005, interview, Istanbul) Looking at the bulletins, joint demonstrations, 
activities and press releases supports the claims of the representative who says that they 
had never had a joint action, project or meeting with the CSOs that have very opposite 
and contradictory positions and interests.44 
The representative of Mazlum-Der spells out their relationship with the Kemalist 
CSOs with the following words: 
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 For more information look at:  http://www.kssgm.gov.tr/liste.html 
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 Look at http://www.ozgurder.net 
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“We are not against for coming together with these Kemalist CSOs, we do not 
have any prejudices like we will never come together, talk or discuss with them. 
We sent invitations for our meetings and conferences to all CSOs but these 
organizations never came.”(02.05.2005, interview, Ankara)   
Mazlum-Der has worked together with ÇYDD in the Turkish Human Rights 
Consultative Committee although their joint work in the committee is based only on 
expressing their own thoughts. 45  
4.3.4.3 Perceptions and stereotypes 
In general the Islamists claim that by prohibiting some types of wearing styles 
neither a religious nor a modern and secular society can be constructed. (Aktaş, 1990) 
Resisting to be defined as backward, the veiled women also reject to define 
modernization in terms of Western clothes, life styles and tastes. (ibid.) Sharing the 
same classes, educations, and professions but asserting at the same time their aspirations 
for an Islamic identity the veiled girls are claimed to produce their own modernity that 
is different from traditional Islam. (İlyasoğlu, 1998; Gole, 1996)  
Accordingly, Ak-Der, Özgür-Der and Mazlum-der are completely against the 
mentality of the Kemalists who are claimed to perceive the enlightenment of the society 
and the modernization of the state in terms of wearing hat, listening to classic music or 
banning the headscarf.46 For instance, Ak-Der argues that the Kemalists try to 
externalize all religious aspects from the society, in order to modernize the state since 
they take the uncovered women as a symbol of modernity. (Ak-Der, 1999: 158) 
Consistently, highlighting the abovementioned arguments, the interviewee from Ak-Der 
perceives the education projects and campaigns of the Kemalist women organizations as 
the practical aspect of their attitudes towards women with strong religious beliefs.47 
Similarly, Özgür-Der underlines that modernizing Turkey in terms of banning the 
                                                 
45
 "Türkiye'de İnsan Hakları, Güncel Gelişmeler, Sorunlar ve Çözüm Önerileri Paneli” Retrieved from: 
http://www.ozgurpolitika.org/2002/12/12/hab01b.html; interview with the executive from Mazlum-Der 
on  02.05.2005, Ankara   
46
 (Ak-Der). “Near history of scarf ban by photographs: With pleasure” (1999) İstanbul: Değirmen 
Yayınları; (Mazlum-Der) “Bütün Yönleriyle Başörtüsü Sorunu” .(2001). İstanbul:Ekin Yayınları; (Özgür-
Der) “Şahitlik: 28 Şubat Sürecinde Başörtüsü Direnişi”, (1999) İstanbul: Özgür-Der Yayınları. 
   
47
 “They perceive us as a big problem and claim that we are in the wrong way. The Kemalist CSOs 
believe in the positive correlation between education and not wearing headscarf. In this context the main 
goal of their educational campaigns is to cure the young girls or to protect them from 
illness.”(26.05.2005, interview, Istanbul) 
 88 
headscarf and leaving aside the people having different life styles, beliefs, attitudes and 
thoughts, is the ultimate goal of the Kemalist CSOs. (Özgür-Der, 1999:56-63)  
Another perception of the Islamist CSOs towards the Kemalist CSOs reveals itself 
in the Islamists’ questioning of the civil structure of the Kemalist CSOs. Concerning 
this aspect Özgür-Der prefers not to define the Kemalist CSOs as real civil initiatives 
and claims that they have been founded and funded by the state in order to legitimize 
the headscarf ban among the civil society. (17.05.2005, interview with the executive of 
Özgür-Der, Istanbul) In other words, it can be stated that Özgür-Der perceives the 
Kemalist organizations as dependent structures that do not work for the benefit of the 
society but for the state. Similarly, Mazlum-Der states that the Kemalist CSOs cannot 
be defined as civil initiatives since they identify and perceive the “others” by identifying 
themselves with the state.48 
Another aspect revealing the perceptions of the Islamist CSOs towards the 
Kemalist CSOs is their “out-group generalization”. For instance, when the 
representative of Ak-Der was asked about the Turkish Women’s Union, after saying 
that she is not aware of the studies and founding principles of Turkish Women’s Union 
she generalized its activities in the context of the notion of Kemalism by closely 
relating it to ADD and ÇYDD. (25.05.2005, interview, Istanbul) This example 
explicitly illustrates the tendency of the Islamist CSOs to generalize the Kemalist 
CSOs. On the other hand, during the interviews the representatives of Özgür-Der and 
Mazlum-Der made a clear differentiation among the supporters of the headscarf ban.49  
Evaluating the attitudes of the ban supporters in terms of prejudices and double 
standards, Özgür-Der emphasizes that the mentality of perceiving the veiled women 
who have high educational level as a threat, is a paranoiac mentality that should be 
immediately changed. (Özgür-Der, 1999: 85) Accordingly, Mazlum-Der also defines 
the ban supporters’ fear that is based on perceiving the visibility of the headscarf in 
                                                 
48
“Turkey has a serious problem in terms of “civil thinking”. For instance if a person has Sunni-Muslim 
identity and while he tries to identify Alaouites as the “other”, this is done by identifying himself with the 
state and the “other” as “enemy of the state”. (02.05.2005, Interview, Ankara) 
 
49
 In this sense the group who claims that the girls/women with headscarves can take service but they 
cannot give service are defined by these Islamist CSOs as “half freedom” supporters. On the other hand, 
the position of the other Kemalist group is defined as “a bull that has seen the red and is preparing to 
attack immediately”(17.05.2005, interview, Istanbul)   
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public places as an uprising against the state regime, or threat towards the Republic as 
unreasonable and unjustified. (Ensaroglu, 2004) Moreover, the interviewee from 
Mazlum-Der claims that through this groundless fear, the supporters of the ban are 
actually restricting their future freedom by perceiving a threat to their own security. 
(02.05.2005, interview, Ankara) 
To sum up it should be stated that most of the Islamist CSOs’ representatives 
make generalizations about the Kemalist CSOs in particular and the Kemalists in 
general. Especially ADD and ÇYDD appear not to be differentiated by the Islamist 
organizations and they were generalized under their anti-headscarf positions although 
they have some important differences. Moreover, most of the Islamist CSOs 
representatives perceive the Kemalist CSOs not as civil initiatives but as dependent 
structures that do not work for the benefit of the society but for the state. It is also 
claimed that the Kemalist organizations are founded and funded by the state to denote 
that the civil society is also supporting the headscarf ban. Likewise, it is also asserted 
that the Kemalist organizations disturb the civil thinking since they identify themselves 
with the state and perceive all the differences in the society as a threat to the secular 
state.   
 
 
4.3.5 Objectives 
 
 
Considering that the headscarf problem mostly centre around women who want to 
attend public life, the main objectives of Ak-Der are based on struggling with the 
headscarf ban in every field; preventing every kind of discrimination against human 
rights; improving social consciousness in this matter, particularly about women rights in 
terms of education, work and career; educating its members; increasing solidarity 
among them and helping all the people suffering from discrimination. (“Gayemiz”, n.d.) 
In other words Ak-Der aims to solve the problems that prevent women to attend 
political, social, economical, and cultural areas; to decrease the obstacles resulting in 
problems in women’s career; and to provide work places that are useful and suitable for 
women. In this sense it can be claimed that Ak-Der has important commonalities with 
the other women organizations whose objectives also centre on pursuing women’s 
social and political integration as well as on women’s rights.  
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While identifying the objectives of Özgür-Der related to the headscarf conflict, the 
representative highlights the Islamic identity of the organization and states that Islam 
orders people to resist against injustice and oppression. (17.05.2005, interview, 
Istanbul) This motto appears as the main principle of Özgür-Der. In this sense, the 
objective of Özgür-Der is stated to be based on supporting works in the field of 
education, culture and thought; initiating a legal fight against the violations of the rights 
of Muslims in terms of free thought, and individual values; and working cooperatively 
with the human rights organizations in this struggle. (“Amacımız”, n.d.) 
Similarly, objectives of Mazlum-Der can be indicated as to struggle against every 
kind of human rights violation no matter what is the religious, ethnic, cultural or gender 
based identity of the oppressed people. (“Mazlum-Der’in Amacı”, n.d.)  The 
organization seeks to realize this objective through dialogue with other international 
human rights organizations and defenders all around the world. The aim of this dialogue 
is claimed to give an end to the human rights violations and expand freedom and human 
rights. (02.05.2005, interview, Ankara)   
 
4.3.6 Visions and Proposed Solutions for Dealing with the Headscarf Conflict 
 
Concerning the resolution of the headscarf conflict, Ak-Der stresses the 
importance of self–criticism and indicates that instead of solving the problem everybody 
is looking for a criminal. The organization also argues that as long as the state continues 
to avoid self-criticism, it will always find an inner or external enemy as a scapegoat for 
the situation of Turkey. (Ak-Der, 1999:234-237) Concerning these aspects the desired 
change of Ak-Der includes environment where all the basic rights are equal for ethnic 
groups, religions and sexes; where everybody has equal right for education and work 
and where people are not discriminated just because of their wearing styles. (Benli, 
2004) Likewise, Mazlum-Der emphasizes its aspiration for a free environment where 
everybody can express his/her thoughts without having fear. The platforms in which 
people can freely express their thoughts, demands and opinions are also stated as 
necessary aspects from which the whole Turkish society would benefit.( Ensaroğlu, 
2004)  
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Concerning the change related to the headscarf conflict, Özgür-Der indicates that 
resolving the headscarf conflict does not mean very much since the mentality of the 
state is claimed to be the main source of all problems in Turkey that should be changed. 
(17.05.2005, interview, Istanbul) This hardline statement of the organization appears to 
create an important divide line among the Islamist CSOs. While Ak-Der and Mazlum-
Der seem to separate the headscarf ban issue from the state regime, the main concern of 
Özgür-Der appears not to be the headscarf or its freedom but changing the regime.  
In terms of the practical resolution for the conflict, Ak-Der indicates the necessity 
of recognizing the veiled women without trying to change them. Respecting the 
differences among the people is also underlined as a crucial point for the resolution of 
the headscarf conflict. (“Tuba Akayüz ile Gorusme”, 2004) In addition, as the urgent 
resolution for the discrimination towards women in social, economic and political 
arenas, the representative of Ak-Der underlines the need for giving women equal rights 
for education and work by lifting the ban.(26.05.2005, interview, Istanbul)   
Indicating that the headscarf conflict cannot be resolved only by consensus among 
the CSOs, Özgür-Der also argues that the CSOs should increase their effectiveness by 
taking the support of the grassroots. (Şekerci, 2005) Stressing the role of the CSOs in 
terms of motivating the society for action, the organization claims that for the resolution 
of the headscarf conflict the grassroots, the community itself and the pressure coming 
from it is indispensable. (“Double Standards”, 2004) Moreover, strengthening the 
relationship between different CSOs is indicated as another important factor by the 
representative, although what is meant by “different” is the leftist organizations not the 
Kemalist CSOs. (17.05.2005, interview, Istanbul)  
 “Mutual confidence among different parts of the society” and “the social 
compromise” is indicated by Mazlum-Der as the main approach that would lead to 
absolute resolution of the conflict. 50 In other words Mazlum-Der spells out the 
“respectful” manner as the necessity for mutual confidence and co-existence. However, 
the interviewee underlines “empathy” as the starting point for mutual respect and claims 
                                                 
50
 “I believe that this compromise does already exist, though it is not expressed explicitly. The uncovered 
people should not be afraid of the ones who wear headscarf. Similarly, the veiled women should not 
judge the unveiled ones in the frame of concepts like morality or integrity. The two parts should respect 
each other’s way of dressing and beliefs.” (02.05.2005, interview, Ankara) 
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that if the supporters of the ban could have put themselves in the place of the veiled 
women, they would have certainly seen how they exaggerate their fear. 
  Going further, Mazlum-Der also asserts that contradictions originating from 
differences in belief and opinion, should be prevented through a dialogue process that 
need to be based on tolerance before turning into a destructive conflict which might 
threaten the social peace. In this respect the representative argues that in order to 
overcome the impasse that has occurred because of lack of communication and 
prejudices, the European and especially the Turkish human rights organizations have 
great responsibility.51 In this context, Mazlum-Der perceives the resolution of the 
headscarf conflict not only taking into consideration the top level leadership but all 
societal levels.   
To sum up, it can be claimed that the fundamental desired change of the Islamist 
CSOs concerning the headscarf conflict is based on the change in the mentality of the 
state and the supporters of the headscarf ban. For the Islamist CSOs the desired social 
structure is where people freely express their thoughts, beliefs and demands without 
having fear, where all the basic rights are equal for ethnic groups, religions and sexes 
and where the state does not interfere in people’s dressing preferences. Related to the 
realization of all these visions it was also claimed that the unity and synergy among the 
Turkish citizens would be strengthened leading to the maturity of the state. High level 
of education and equal education opportunities for everybody is another future desire of 
the Islamist representatives which seems compatible with the one emphasized by the 
Kemalist CSOs, especially ÇYDD, who dreams of high level of education leading to 
social enlightenment.  
 
 
4.3.7 Relations with the State  
 
 
In order to find out if reconciliation is possible among the CSOs related to the 
headscarf conflict and if this reconciliation can be affective in shaping the decision 
making process, indicating the character of the relationship between the decision 
                                                 
51
  “As much as targeting political powers, a human rights organization has to stand against oppression 
and violations committed by non-governmental organizations, groups, or persons. Human rights struggle 
must not contain only forcing political powers to justice and protection of rights but it should also 
pressure all layers of society to respect human rights.”(02.05.2005, interview, Ankara) 
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makers and the CSOs gets importance. Moreover, in their sociological analysis of the 
Islamist CSOs Akşit et. al. (2004:678) indicates that the relationship of the CSOs with 
the state is very important in denoting their antagonistic or reconcilable identities. More 
specifically Akşit et. al. point out that Özgür-Der and Mazlum-Der define the function 
of the civil society in terms of forming a pressure group towards the state and perceive 
the state as a constraint. On the other hand he claims that Ak-Der defines the civil 
society with non-political terms and defines the function of the civil society in terms of 
sharing the burden of the state. In terms of these aspects Akşit et. al. assert that while 
Mazlum-Der and Özgür-Der have adversary identities, Ak-der has a reconcilable 
identity. (Akşit et. al. 2004: 668-675)  
Parallel to the arguments of Akşit et. al. (2004), the representative of Ak-Der 
emphasized how the state is willing to work cooperatively with the CSOs and give 
importance to the civil society projects by giving the example of women organizations. 
The interviewee stated that the women organizations have been very active during the 
Turkish Penal Code (TPC) campaign by forming a successful pressure group through 
which they have managed to change some articles in TPC. (26.05.2005, interview, 
Istanbul) From these aspects it can be asserted that compared to Özgür-Der and 
Mazlum-Der, Ak-Der has relatively better relations with the state and previously 
worked to influence the policy making in issues related to women.  
Similar to the findings of Akşit et. al. (2004) the representative from Özgür-Der 
claimed that the state does not have good relationship with the civil society 
organizations in general and human rights organizations in particular indicating that she 
does not believe in the capability of the CSOs in affecting the decision making 
processes. (17.05.2005, interview, Istanbul) Accordingly the representative of Mazlum-
Der said that there are some issues including human rights, religious rights, ethnic 
rights, cultural rights and political rights in which CSOs cannot be so effective on the 
decision-making process. In terms of these issues the state is claimed to be closed to 
civil pressure since accepting the demands of cultural, religious or identity groups is 
perceived as giving concession to them or being defeated. Relating this argument to the 
headscarf conflict, Mazlum-Der claims that as long as the people supporting the 
headscarf continue to be perceived as insurgents and fundamentalists, the state would 
not be eager to bargain with these people. (02.05.2005, interview, Ankara)   
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4.4 Kemalist Civil Society Organizations 
 
 
 
I collect the CSOs that support the headscarf ban under the name “Kemalist 
CSOs”.  In general terms, I characterize these organizations as “Kemalist” for two 
reasons. The first reason is to denote their founding principles and objectives that 
depend on Kemalist ideology, Atatürkist principles and reformations. The second 
reason for classifying these organizations under the name “Kemalist” is to indicate the 
general attitude of their executives and members who do not consider Islam to be a 
major frame of reference in their social interactions. This is not to say that they do not 
believe in or practise Islam. However, they find such practices to be Islamic and 
“cultural” rather than Islamist and “political”. Arguing that religion is a private affair, 
they always oppose the public manifestations of religious symbols and practices. 
 
 
 
4.4.1 Identity of the Organizations 
 
Concerning the identities of the Kemalist CSOs it can be said that they are 
founded on the themes of secularism, modernization and nationalism as the reflections 
of the Kemalist project. (Erdoğan, 2002:235) In this sense the Kemalist CSOs appear to 
closely identify themselves with the secular identity of the state and Atatürkist 
principles by indicating complete loyalty and gratitude to these aspects. In this sense, 
perceiving the visibility of the headscarf in public sphere as a threat directed to the 
secular identity of the state, most of the Kemalist CSOs representatives’ implicit 
identification of the Islamists as their enemies becomes meaningful. This enemy 
discourse and negation seems to be an important aspect for the formation of identity and 
it is theoretically stated by Mouffe as “definition of the social identity with its 
diametrical opposite”. (Mouffe, 1999:754) Indicating their founding principles in terms 
of fighting with political Islam, reactionary movements, fundamentalism and 
backwardness the Kemalist CSOs appear to identify themselves with their “diametrical 
opposite” that seems to be the Islamists.  
If we take the organizations’ activities, objectives and demographic structures as 
part of their identity, it can be argued that the differentiation among Kemalist CSOs is 
 95 
not only confined to gender based characterization (TKB-woman organization) but also 
to their areas of work (ADD-wide area of interest including politics vs. ÇYDD-limited 
area of interest that is based on cultural activities including educational campaigns). 
Most importantly, this differentiation highly affects their relations with the Islamist 
CSOs and their positions towards the headscarf conflict. For instance as a women 
organization TKB had the chance to work with some Islamist women organizations, 
whereas strongly emphasizing the political aspect of the headscarf conflict ADD has 
almost no interaction with the Islamist CSOs.  
ÇYDD: Emphasizing its loyalty to Atatürkist principles and reforms, ÇYDD was 
founded in 1989 by Türkan Saylan who has been an active supporter of the headscarf 
ban. Since most of its members are women it has been defined as a women 
organization. (Saktanber, 2002; Simel and Cindoğlu, 1999) However, the interviewees 
from ÇYDD did not appear to identify ÇYDD on gender based characteristics.  ÇYDD 
identifies its realm of actions as cultural not political and locates them in Kemalist 
boundaries. (ÇYDD Tanıtım Brosuru, 1999) Moreover, in the context of civil society, 
the organization defines itself as a civil initiative having the responsibility of supporting 
the state in terms of providing education opportunities to the young generation and by 
this way supporting the modernization, civilization and the development of the society. 
(CYDD Regulation: article 3-4, 1999)  In this sense the mission of ÇYDD is stated to 
enlighten and lead the public with a motivation to reach the level of “contemporary 
civilization”. (Cumhuriyet, 13 Mayıs, 1998 cf. Erdogan,2002: 249) Concerning the 
internal structure of ÇYDD it can be stated that in recent years some signs of 
polarization have begun to appear since the chairman of the organization has been 
accused of controlling the organization in her own by even dispelling the opponent 
members. (Uçan News, 12 March 2004) However, the interviewees did not criticize the 
hierarchical structure of the organization, whereas they emphasize their loyalty and 
respect to their chairman.  
ADD: Parallel to ÇYDD, ADD was also founded in 1989 under the leadership of M. 
Aksoy and by the Kemalist intellectuals as H.V. Velidedeoğlu, B. Uçok, S. Gürsoytrak 
and Özer Ozankaya. (Erdogan, 2002: 248) ADD defines itself as a Kemalist CSO that 
has brought all people who believe in Atatürk and Atatürkism together to protect the 
Turkish society from the backward-looking attempts, support and protect the 
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independence, freedom, national solidarity and the secular Republic with Atatürkist 
attitude and thought.(Özden, 1999:3-4) In addition to the Kemalist principles and legal 
ideology on which the organization is founded, it is also argued that ADD defines itself 
in relation to the threat that is perceived to be posed by the supporters of the headscarf. 
(Erdogan, 2002:250) In other words self-identification of the group in relation to the 
adversary group becomes obvious.52 Similar to ÇYDD, the self-definition of ADD 
reveals that the organization perceives the civil society to be the monopoly of the 
enlightened people whose mission is to enlighten the rest of the society with their 
actions that are limited to the context of Kemalism. (Tabakoglu, 2002) 
Turkish Women’s Union: The foundation of Turkish Women’s Union goes back to 
1924 when its founder Nezihe Muhittin founded the organization with the order of 
Atatürk. TKB is identified by its executive as a Kemalist women organization whose 
members are Kemalist-secular-modern-Republican-Turkish women and whose 
objective is to support the development of Turkey in accordance with Atatürkist 
principles and reforms. (02.06.2005, interview, Ankara) The “Kemalist women” 
identity is the main attribute emphasized by the organization and is based on a deep 
feeling of “gratitude” and “loyalty” to Atatürkist principles and reforms that is a 
common aspect for all Kemalist CSOs. (13.06.2005, interview, Istanbul)  
 
 
 
4.4.2 Kemalist CSOs’ Identification of the Headscarf Conflict 
 
 
 Taking into consideration the Kemalist CSOs’ definitions of the headscarf conflict 
it should be primarily emphasized that they do not agree on the term “headscarf 
conflict”. For these organizations the problematic issue is not the “headscarf” since they 
claim that headscarf is a cultural head cover worn by village women, housewives and 
old women. However, the Kemalist organizations prefer to name the problematic head 
cover as “turban” since it is claimed to symbolize series of systematic politics opposing 
Kemalism and the Islamist fight for founding a state governed by Sharia rules. 
                                                 
52
 This enemy discourse and negation seems to be an important aspect of the identity formation and it is 
theoretically stated by Mouffe as “definition of the social identity with its diametrical opposite”. (Mouffe, 
1999:754) In other words the identity of the Kemalist CSOs appears to be closely related with their 
“diametrical opposite” that seems to be the Islamists. Similarly most of the Islamist organizations also 
identify their founding principles and objectives in terms of fighting with the headscarf ban and the 
human rights violations so that implicitly putting the secularists and the state on the adversary side. 
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(Gürsoyatrak, 1997)  The second tendency of the Kemalist organizations is to avoid 
defining the “headscarf conflict” as a “conflict” since Turkey is claimed to have more 
important problems than a “scarf”. This argument is generally used by the Kemalist 
CSOs as a justification for their unwillingness for participating in a dialogue with the 
Islamist CSOs.  
Defining the headscarf conflict as “turban issue” or “turban affair”, ÇYDD tries to 
indicate that there are some groups who try to problematize the issue in order to make 
use of it as a political mechanism. Accordingly, ÇYDD strongly indicates that the unity 
of the state, its full independence, unique education, equality between genders and 
peace are the main principles from which no concession can be given. (15.05.2005, 
interview, Istanbul) Thus, the organization’s main interest in the headscarf conflict is to 
protect these principles from “regressive” political movements that the headscarf is 
claimed to symbolize.53 
Likewise, ADD defines the headscarf conflict as politicization and use of religion 
by the groups who try to motivate the illiterate masses to take action threatening the 
regime. (Kışlalı, 1999:16) In other words, the headscarf conflict is defined as a chaos 
generating demand threatening the unity of the society.(Ozankaya, 2002: 8-11)  Going 
further, ADD defines the headscarf conflict as a legal problem since wearing turban in 
public places is indicated as a violation of the principle of secularism stated in the 
constitution. (Gürsoyatrak, 1997) Consistently, the interviewee from ADD perceives the 
headscarf conflict as power struggle between secularism and Islamism; and defines the 
visibility of the headscarf in the public sphere as the defeat of secularism.54  In this 
                                                 
53
 During the interviews with the three representatives from ÇYDD, I observed an important variation 
among the representatives and the formal position of the organization. Although the interviewees were 
trying not to oppose the policies of the state explicitly, by giving examples most of them indicated that 
prohibiting the headscarf did not work and that not giving the veiled girls the right to have education will 
not solve the problem. Even though the underlying assumption of this position appears to depend on 
supporting deep-rooted and long-term policies to fight with visibility of the headscarf, it can be still 
claimed that ÇYDD in the “rights for education” issue has a relatively moderate position. However, since 
this observation is relatively different from the analysis of the web site, bulletins and publications of 
ÇYDD this variation among the members of the organization can be constructively used in the ICR 
process.    
 
54
 “The problem is not the subject of turban. The problem is whether Turkey is going to choose the model 
of republic and democracy to live or is going to convert to Iran, Saudi Arabia or Ottoman model. Is the 
public going to be ruled with the laws of its own making or is it going to be dictated by a group who 
claims to be the practitioners of religious laws on earth. The essence of argument lies here.” (29.06.2005, 
interview, Istanbul) 
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context, the general attitude of ADD appears to be based on protecting the secular 
character of the Turkish Republic and to prevent the coercion of religions over each 
other the state has the right to intervene actively even if it is limiting the liberties or 
democracy. (Ozankaya, 2000)  
Looking at the conflict from a gender perspective, TKB defines the struggle for 
wearing turban in the public sphere as a consequence of coercion applied to women by 
men whose doctrine is political Islam.55 Opposing the definition of the headscarf 
conflict as a struggle for individual liberty or women’s rights, concerning the 
problematic mentality that is claimed to lie beneath the turban issue, the representative 
from TKB states: 
“The Taliban mentality that wants to make women invisible by putting them in 
sacks is similar to the mentality of people who want to make women invisible by 
putting them in turban.” (02.06.2005, interview, Istanbul) 
. Accordingly, TKB rejects to identify the headscarf conflict as women’s right 
question since it includes other aspects like politics and presents the Kemalist woman as 
a model claiming that “Turkish” women had realized her dress reform and emancipated 
herself. (“Öncelikli Hedef İlkokullar”, 2000) In this context, calling themselves 
enlightened, modern, dutiful and progressive, the Kemalist women in general appear to 
reject the existence of multiple womanhoods that has always been the reality of the 
country. As Saktanber says ‘Kemalist women’ who defined themselves in terms of 
being against the Islamist women speak from a pro-Western, pro-state, secular-
nationalist and gender egalitarian position. (Saktanber, 1994: 99)  
Taking all these aspects into consideration it can be concluded that although the 
Kemalist CSOs have common points while defining the headscarf conflict, there are 
differences in their perceptions towards the headscarf conflict parallel to the identity 
and structure of the organization. For, instance while the representatives from ADD 
emphasize the political aspect of the conflict, TKB prioritizes the woman aspect of the 
conflict, and ÇYDD underlines the education aspect.   
 
                                                 
55
 Sancar, S., Ü. “Otoriter Türk  Modernleşmesinin  Cinisiyet Rejimi Retrieved on20.08.2005 
from:http://kasaum.ankara.edu.tr/gorsel/dosya/1097132326otoriter_turk_modernlesmesinin_cinsiyet_reji
mi.doc 
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4.4.3 Issues Emphasized by the Kemalist CSOs   
 
 
Although the headscarf conflict does not frustrate the actual needs of the Kemalists, 
by indicating their fears and concerns about the headscarf conflict, the Kemalist CSOs 
appear to internalize the threat that is perceived to come from the headscarf and 
mentality lying beneath. In this sense, the Kemalists’ future needs in terms of identity, 
freedom and security are indicated to be endangered. Therefore, modern character of the 
state, secularism, unity of the state, endangered freedom and psychological pressure as 
well as revivalism of political Islam will be listed as need based issues emphasized by 
the Kemalist CSOs. Going further the values from which the Kemalists claim that no 
concession can be given are classified as: values concerning the status of women, public 
sphere, secular education and democracy.   
 
4.4.3.1 Need based issues 
 
4.4.3.1.1 Need for identity  
- Modern character of the sate: Taking into consideration the historical context, it can 
be argued that Westernization, presuming the possibility of a civilization shift was 
perceived by the Kemalists as abandonment of Islam. (Mardin, 1971 Cf. Dağı, 2005) In 
this sense, the Islamists’ rejection of the West and westernization appears as an 
objection to the Kemalist design aiming to reform the society and politics along a 
secularist and modernist line, eroding the influence of Islam in society and politics. In 
this sense, modernization appears as an important need for the Kemalists since it is 
closely related with the identity of the state. Defining the headscarf as backward; 
uncivilized; representing shame and inferiority in relation to the West and damaging the 
modern character of Turkey, the Kemalists oppose the visibility of the headscarf in 
public sphere. (Arat, 1997) Thus, the Kemalists construct strong relation between 
education and not wearing headscarf thinking that secular, scientific education would 
make tradition and religion disappear while advancing the modernity. (Gole, 1996)  
Accordingly, in the context of the headscarf conflict, one of the central issues 
emphasized by the Kemalist CSOs is the civilized and modern character of Turkey. In 
this sense, the Kemalist organizations claim that the headscarf is challenging and 
threatening the modern and civilized character of the state since it symbolizes political 
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Islam, inferior worldview and opposition to reason and science.(02.06.2005, interview 
TKB, Ankara; Denk, 1996; “Ertugrul Kazancı ile Röportaj”, n. d.)  
- Secularism56: For the Kemalist elite, the process and eventual success of secularism 
became a matter of political survival in the face of the challenges put up by the Islamist 
periphery. (Dağı, 2005) In this sense secularism can be identified as need for identity 
since it is internalized by the Kemalists as one of the most important characteristics of 
the Turkish state and their self-identity. Thus, the disagreement on secularism is part of 
an inter elite fight for political power in which the Kemalists look to the Turkish Armed 
Forces as the ultimate arbiter that has assumed a guardian role in maintaining 
secularism, not only as a constitutional order but also as a political/ideological discourse 
against the Islamic periphery. (Dağı, 2005)  
Accordingly, secularism can be identified as a need based issue for the Kemalist 
CSOs since they appear to closely identify themselves with the secular identity of the 
state. (Erdoğan, 2002: 244) They perceive “secularism” principle to have indispensable 
importance for the survival of the Republic, and any threat directed towards this 
principle is interpreted as engendering the survival, security and recognition of a 
Kemalist person and the whole identity group. (Gürsoyatrak, 1997:1)  
 For instance, defining themselves as strong supporters of the secular character of 
the state, ÇYDD indicates that turban threatens “secularism”, since it symbolizes the 
use of religion for political or personal interests. (Saylan, 2004) Similarly, the central 
issue emphasized by ADD is “secularism” and the organization obviously claims that 
wearing turban in public places violates secularism and represents a reactionary 
movement that has the aim to alter the secular regime with religious one. (Serim, 1996) 
Although the concept of secularism is differently interpreted by the supporters of the 
headscarf, ADD gives special attention to highlight the “right” identification and 
meaning of secularism. In its annual journal “Atatürkçü Düşünce”, Özer Ozankaya who 
is one of the founders of ADD clarifies the meaning of secularism with the words: 
                                                 
56
 The Kemalist CSOs closely identify themselves with the official ideology, Ataturkist principles and 
reformations and Republican regime and define themselves by emphasizing their loyalty and gratitude to 
these aspects. (Erdogan, 2002:237-260) Thus, in addition to secularism all of these aspects are raised as 
need based issues (identity needs) claiming that visibility of the headscarf in public places poses threat to 
all these aspects. 
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“Secularism does not only mean ‘I would not interfere in people’s beliefs and 
thoughts so that nobody should interfere in mine.’ In addition secularism means ‘I 
would not live my life in accordance to religion.’ The secular person prefers 
modern life. The secular individual cannot interfere with, try to affect or demand 
secular attitudes from the non-secular people.”(Ozankaya, 2002:9)   
Accordingly, one of the representatives of ÇYDD underlines the misinterpretation of 
the concept by the words:  
 “It is not enough for the state to separate worldly and religious affairs and direct 
the public life in accordance with the rule of science and civil laws in order to 
become secular; also the state has to interfere actively to inhibit the beliefs 
applying force over each other from dominance.” (11.05.2005, interview, Ankara) 
From these assertions of the Kemalist representatives it can be concluded that for them, 
secularism has two meanings. The first is to separate the religion from politics and state 
mechanism (passive meaning) and the second is to put all the religious organizations 
and the religion out of the society, both as a cultural-educational policy and as a 
political-ideological attitude (active meaning). However, stating that the headscarf 
conflict should be resolved not through prohibitions but through constructive means, a 
representative from ÇYDD reveals the difference within the Kemalist CSOs. 
(15.05.2005, interview, Istanbul) 
 4.4.3.1.2 Need for security  
-Unity of the state: Revealing the Kemalists’ need for security, “unity of the state” issue 
can be identified as need based since the ban supporters explicitly assert that they view 
the turban as an effort to divide the country and as a sign of separatism. (Kışlalı, 1999) 
Claiming that the visibility of the headscarf psychologically oppresses uncovered 
people and reveals the religion, sects and groups that people belong to, the Kemalists 
indicate that by this way the communication, unity between people and harmony in the 
public places is threatened that in turns would lead to mutual enforcement and 
threatening of the brotherhood among the people. (Ozankaya, 2002) 
- Endangered freedom and psychological pressure: The greatest concern of the 
Kemalist CSOs is related to the threat that is supposed to be directed towards uncovered 
women in case the headscarf becomes free. This concern turns into an important need 
based issue since the Kemalists’ need for security is stated to be at stake. Parallel to this 
issue the representative of ÇYDD states: 
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“If the headscarf becomes free in public places and if the number of the veiled 
women increases, would the supporters of the headscarf tolerate uncovered 
women? I think that they would insert a great psychological pressure on the 
women who do not cover their heads.”(15.05.2005, interview, Istanbul) 
As this statement illustrates, especially the women representatives of the Kemalist CSOs 
perceive the headscarf as a future threat endangering their freedom. However, they do 
not mention that they fear of being forced to wear headscarf but they fear of 
psychological pressure. (02. 06.2005, interview with the representative from TKB, 
Ankara). This differentiation is very important since it reveals out the Kemalists’ 
perception towards the Islamists and their objectives. 
The Kemalists’ concern about their future security and freedom also comes to the 
surface while they claim that the main target of turban is to order all fields of life with a 
totalitarian perspective and achieving this by interfering in all these fields using an 
authority above. Related to this aspect the representative from ADD states: 
“Today turban, tomorrow mosques and in the future efforts aiming to change our 
lifestyle. Turban is dangerous. Turban is the symbol, and the target is to enslave 
the society and regime step by step.”(29.05.2005, interview, Istanbul) 
From this statement, it can be inferred that in general the Kemalist CSOs think that if 
the students with turban are allowed for their actions in the universities, the events 
would not stop.  
- Revivalism of political Islam: In general the Kemalists state the headscarf to be a 
vehicle for veiling political Islam that has the aim of building a “religious state” and to 
loosen the rules of the state to jeopardize its effectiveness. (Adem, 2002:22-24) In this 
context although the threat that is perceived to be posed by political Islam can be 
indicted as a need based issue for the Kemalists since it challenges their secular group 
identity, it mainly reveals the Kemalists’ need for security. Merve Kavakçı affair is one 
of the examples that have been used by the Kemalist CSOs to indicate their concern 
about the rise of political Islam. In this sense Ahmet Taner Kışlalı who was one of the 
founders of ADD states: 
“Ms. Kavakçı is made deputy intentionally. In other words they have found a 
woman with head cover in order to use her to loosen the rules of the state. 
(Kışlalı, A. T., 1999:6) 
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Not giving importance to the Islamists’ emphasis on political, citizenship or 
democratic rights, the secularists state that the headscarf is a political symbol of 
Islamists who fight for founding a religious state by using aspects of freedom and 
human rights as vehicle. (Toker, 1998; Sirmen; 1997)  
 
 
4.4.3.2 Value based issues 
4.4.3.2.1 Values concerning the status of women 
The woman question has an important value for the secularists since as Kandiyoti 
states the “new woman” of the early years of the Turkish Republic became the symbol 
of a break with the past. (Kandiyoti, 1991) In this sense the women in Western clothes 
has been remarked by the Republican elites as well as by today’s secularists as the 
symbol of Turkey’s modernity. (Saktanber, 1994; Arat, 1997) The Kemalists and the 
Kemalist women in particular, oppose the visibility of the headscarf in the public places, 
since they perceive the headscarf as backward; a sexist religious tradition that denies 
women full access to the public sphere and as a symbol that makes woman accept she is 
a second class person who has to obey her man. (Saylan, 2001) In this sense the 
Kemalist feminists perceive the headscarf as a symbol of sexism and imprisonment 
blurring the clear-cut oppositions between religion and modernity and as an offence to 
contemporary notions of “gender emancipation” and “universal progress”. (ex. 
Özsoyeller, 1995) 
Likewise, underlining the women question of the headscarf conflict, the Kemalist 
CSOs claim that turban has a humiliating character. For instance one of the interviewees 
from ÇYDD defines the headscarf as a symbol of women’s acceptance of being inferior 
to men and second class “creature” and says: 
“Turban is the symbol of the perspective which suggests that woman does not 
conceive her as an equivalent of man, that she attributes holiness to this imbalance 
and she supposes herself as provoking man sexually and forcing him to commit 
sins.” (15.05.2005, interview, Istanbul) 
 Similarly, the executive of Turkish Women’s Union claims that covering women is 
gender discrimination and violation to human rights and that wearing headscarf cannot 
be supported in terms of freedom of belief. In this framework, the organization argues 
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that women have been exploited by the supporters of Sharia since women are less 
educated and already have many problems.  (“İnançların Hukuka Etkisi”, n. d.) The 
main concern and fear of Turkish Women’s Union is that some anti-secularist political 
approaches that are symbolized with “turban” are getting stronger threatening the 
women’s rights. Related to this aspect, one of the interviewees maintains: 
“For gender equality and for the liberation of women, Sharia mentality cannot be 
tolerated. Otherwise it would be betrayal for the women.” (02.06.2005, interview, 
Ankara)  
Equally, the executive of ÇYDD states that she does not blame the girls who wear 
headscarves but rather the Muslim men who use the girls and their head covers as a 
political mechanism for their political interests and who try to draw these girls into the 
darkness of the backwardness. (Saylan, 2001) 
 From these statements it can be concluded that the Kemalists in general perceive 
the veiled women as passive people who can be easily deceived. Moreover, it can be 
inferred that the Kemalists do not perceive the headscarf struggle as an identity struggle 
taken by veiled women but rather as a political mechanism that is used by some interest 
groups.  
4.4.3.2.2 Public sphere 
Concerning the public sphere issue, in general the Kemalists maintain that 
religious beliefs should be confined to the private life and should not be visualized 
publicly. They closely relate allowing head covering in public places with allowing 
religion to influence the secular and democratic public space of the Republic. (Arat, 
1997) For Kemalists the public sphere has an important value since the image of the 
public sphere represents modernity, civilization and the secular character of the 
society.(ibid.) It can be also claimed that although many controversial arguments have 
been stated about where the public sphere begins and ends, the public sphere occurs is a 
battle ground representing the power relations between the parties to the headscarf 
conflict. As an indicator of the characteristics of the state and the society; and the power 
relationship between Islamism-Kemalism; modernity-traditionalism and 
homogenization-pluralism, the public sphere is an issue that the two sides have very 
strong and dichotomous values.    
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4.4.3.2.3 Secular education 
The Kemalist CSOs assert that the headscarf is contradictory to the secular 
education where reason and ration prevails. (Saylan, 2004) Likewise, they argue that the 
only way to completely solve the headscarf conflict is to increase the knowledge and 
awareness of the people, improving education and eliminating the unscientific education 
that is given in Quran courses and religious high schools. (“Oncelikli Hedef Ilkokullar”, 
2000) Related to this argument Ozankaya says: 
“If the human beings have reason and mind, then the aspects as religion and belief 
should be analyzed and recognized from the filter of reason. The real freedom of 
religion and conscience should be in accordance with mind. This ability of the 
human beings can be nurtured by scientific education.” (Ozankaya, 2002:10) 
In this sense the Kemalist CSOs assert that only through education social enlightenment 
can be reached, girls can be saved from becoming voluntary servants so that positive 
correlation is perceived between education and not wearing headscarf. 57 
 4.4.3.2.4 Democracy 
 Kemalists put considerable value on democracy and even claim that sometimes 
prohibitions and restrictions are needed for the protection of democracy. Concerning 
democracy principle, the main fear of the Kemalists is that if headscarf is permitted, 
some anti-democratic forms and actions would follow so that democracy might be 
replaced with Sharia order. (Akbal, 1998) Perceiving the headscarf as a threat towards 
the Republic and democracy and as a symbol of regressive action, the secularists also 
state that for the protection of democracy from the takeover of possible repressive state 
regimes, the ban has to be implemented. Related to this issue ÇYDD indicates that 
democracy does not mean that everybody can do whatever he wants. (Saylan, 2004) 
Likewise, rejecting the Islamists’ arguments claiming that the headscarf ban is a 
“violation of freedom and democracy”, ADD argues that freedom and democracy have 
some boundaries. (“Ertuğrul Kazancı ile Roportaj”,n.d.) Parallel to this statement one of 
the interviewees from ADD maintains:  
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  14.05.2005, interview with a representative from ADD, Istanbul; 
   11.05.2005, interview with a representative from ÇYDD, Ankara; 
   02.06.2005, interview with a representative from TKB, Ankara   
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 “We do not agree that democracy includes the freedom of pulling down the 
democracy. Democracy cannot be pulled down by using the aspects of 
democracy. If we provide all the conditions to the people who want to abolish 
secularism and imprison our country into a dark theocratic regime, this cannot be 
defined as providing democracy but as betrayal to democracy.” (09.06.2005, 
interview, Istanbul)     
Not giving importance to the Islamists’ emphasis on human rights, the secularists state 
that the headscarf is a political symbol of Islamists who fight for founding a religious 
state by using aspects of freedom, human rights and democracy as vehicle. (Toker, 
1998; Sirmen; 1997)  
4.4.3.2.5 Turban-headscarf differentiation  
The Kemalists define the headscarf worn by the girls and women living in villages 
and squatter areas as traditional and innocent cover, whereas they define turban that is 
worn by university students as “flag of Sharia” threatening the secular character of the 
state. (Denk, 2002) Likewise, the representatives of ADD, ÇYDD and Turkish 
Women’s Union denote that they are not against the “headscarf” since it is a traditional 
covering. However, they identify the turban worn by young girls as a political uniform 
not a traditional headscarf.58 During the interviews an example from the Turkish 
Independence War was also given by the women representative from ÇYDD claiming 
that during the war women used their headscarves to protect the guns from rain. By 
giving this example, the sacred and dear meaning given by the Kemalist women to the 
headscarf can be stressed. However, this example also reveals the creation of the 
adversary concept of the “headscarf” that is “turban”.  
 4.4.3.2.6 Human rights and liberties 
Not giving importance to the Islamists’ emphasis on human rights, in general the 
Kemalists state that the headscarf is a political symbol of Islamists who fight for 
founding a religious state by using aspects of freedom and human rights as vehicle. 
(Toker, 1998; Sirmen; 1997) Accordingly, some scholars claim that, although the 
Kemalists who could be identified as hard-line Westernizers, came to see western 
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  10.05.2005, interview with a representative from ADD, Ankara; 
     15.05.2005, interview with a representative from ÇYDD, Istanbul; 
     02.06.2005, interview with a representative from TKB, Ankara   
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political values of democracy, human rights and rule of law as ill-fitting the “realities” 
of Turkey and threatening its integrity. (Dağı, 2005) 
4.4.3.3 Other issues 
4.4.3.3.1 Giving service-taking service 
Although the Kemalist CSOs do not appear to support veiled women’s taking 
service aspect, during the interviews, some moderate representatives 59  implicitly 
criticized the headscarf ban in universities and this gave the impression that they are 
prone to support the freedom of the veiled women to take public service in terms of 
education or health service. To denote this important in-group variation this limitedly 
emphasized issue has great importance since this tendency of some of the Kemalist 
CSOs representatives can be used as an opportunity during the ICR process through 
which the relationship of the adversary parties may be reconstructed.   
 
 
4.4.4 Relation with the Islamist CSOs 
 
4.4.4.1 Networks and other groups that Kemalist CSOs belong to 
Concerning the relationship between ÇYDD and ADD, Erdoğan states in his work 
that the two organizations have very close relationship.60(Erdoğan, 2002: 236) 
However, from the interviews it seems that this aspect is not valid for today. During the 
interviews, almost all ÇYDD representatives criticized ADD for being too conservative 
and for dealing only with political issues while they differentiated themselves for not 
interfering in or make declarations related to politics. Moreover, rejecting the criticisms 
that are directed towards ÇYDD, the representatives criticize ADD for not organizing 
any campaigns and activities but only criticizing the constructive activities. Going 
further one of the interviewees stated that as she has lost her enthusiasm in religion 
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  These moderate representatives were from ÇYDD and they asserted that their thoughts on taking 
service issue do not represent the official policy of the organization.  
     03.07.2005, interview with a representative from ÇYDD, Istanbul; 
     15.05.2005, interview with a representative from ÇYDD, Istanbul; 
60
 campaigns for increasing the compulsory education to eight years; demonstrations against the 
REFAHYOL government and the Susurluk Affair; common membership to the Civil Society Union 
(CSU) together with other 189 CSOs ; signing a common declaration against anti-democratic, anti-secular 
policies of REFAHYOL government and against the reactionary movements towards the principles and 
revolutions of the Turkish Republic; “friendship and brotherhood” plaquette given by ÇYDD to the 
chairmen of ADD. (Erdoğan, 2002:239) 
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because of the Islamists, she has lost her enthusiasm in Kemalism because of ADD. 
(15.05.2005, interview, Istanbul) Similarly, ADD raises some criticism against ÇYDD 
claiming that ÇYDD takes money from private and foreign organizations for the 
educational campaigns and that this is contrary to the Ataturkist principles. (02.06.2005, 
interview, Ankara) Going further ADD criticizes the chairman of ÇYDD for signing the 
minority rights declaration prepared by the Prime Ministry Human Rights Consultation 
Board since it was supporting) the language rights of the Kurds. (11.06.2005, interview, 
Istanbul) This specific criticism stated by the interview from ADD is also very 
important since it reveals the conservative and nationalist character of the organization 
that opposes religious, linguistic, cultural or identity demands claiming that they 
threaten the unity of the state. Concerning all these statements the recent polarization 
among these two Kemalist CSOs becomes obvious.  
While ÇYDD has improved relations with the other CSOs including the women 
organizations and the organizations interested in educational and cultural activities, 
from the interviews and publications of ADD it seems to have closed structure not 
having many common activities with the other CSOs. Its poor interaction with other 
CSOs that generally work related to social and cultural issues can be explained with the 
conservative character of ADD as well as its strong attention on political issues.  
 The relations of TKB with the other Kemalist CSOs as ÇYDD and ADD, appears 
to be based on supporting each other’s campaigns, making collective demonstrations 
that ranges from visiting Atatürk Mausoleum to show their solidarity; to symbolically 
complaint to Atatürk the politicians who do not protect the women rights from Islamist 
movements. (TKB Bulletin, 15-22 March, 1998). The headscarf conflict, the Sharia 
threat directed towards the contemporary life and rise in political Islam are the main 
issues that bring the Kemalist CSOs together. (Erdoğan, 2002: 240)   
 In terms of TKB’s relations with other women organizations it can be said that 
Turkish Women’s Union has an enhanced network. The organization is member of 
many civil platforms and groups including the committee of preparing reports for 
CEDAW committee (the United Nations’ Convention on the Elimination of 
Discrimination Against Women);  “For Ever Peace Forever Woman Platform” (Barış 
İçin Sürekli Kadın Platformu); “Turkish Penal Code-Ankara Platform” (TCK-Ankara 
Platformu); and “Turkish Directorate General on the Status and Problems of Women” 
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(Başbakanlık Kadının Statüsü ve Sorunları Genel Müdürlüğü) provides an important 
potential for TKB to work cooperatively and build relations with different women 
organizations. 61 The cooperative action in these networks is based on working against 
the violation of women’s rights, honour killings, blood feuds and all other aspects 
leading to the discrimination of women. 
4.4.4.2 Interaction and communication with the Islamist CSOs   
Because of their opposing ideologies, it can be easily concluded that the Kemalist 
CSOs do not have close relations or attempt to work with any Islamist CSO on the 
headscarf conflict. From the interviews with the Kemalist CSOs it became obvious that 
some of the representatives are even not aware of the activities, objectives and founding 
principles of the Islamist CSOs that they were asked.62  
However, the only field that brings the Kemalist CSOs together with some 
Islamist organizations is the platforms that deal with women problems in Turkey. For 
instance ÇYDD has some joint activities with different women organizations including 
Islamist women organizations, in the Turkish Penal Code Platform (TCK Platformu).63  
Although this joint work can be defined as “issue specific”, the member organizations 
of the platform have succeeded to form a civil pressure changing some of the articles in 
the Turkish Penal Code. However, an interviewee from ÇYDD asserts that during the 
platform meetings, when the discrimination of women issue has been raised by the 
Islamist women organizations, many divergences have occurred. (18.05.2005, 
interview, Istanbul) Likewise, the central office of TKB that works with the 
abovementioned platforms and groups had the chance to improve its solidarity, 
cooperation and friendship and work with many different women organizations that are 
also active members of the same groups. 
                                                 
61
 For more information look at: “CEDAW Gölge Raporu” (2005), Retrieved on 28.07.2005 from:  
http://www.ucansupurge.org/index.php?option=content&task=view&id=1344 
“TCK icin Mucadeleye Devam!”, 2005 Retrieved on 28.07.2005 from: 
http://www.ucansupurge.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=2392&Itemid=87 
 “Fatih Altaylı'yı Şiddetle Protesto Ediyoruz!” 20-04-2002 Retrieved on 21.07.2005 from:   
 http://www.savaskarsitlari.org/arsiv.asp?ArsivTipID=9&ArsivAnaID=6837 
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 15.05.2005;  18.05. 2005 interviews with representatives from ÇYDD , Istanbul-Ankara 
    20.06.2005, interview with the representative from TKB, Istanbul 
    10.05.2005, interview with a representative from ADD, Ankara; 
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 “TCK icin Mucadelye devam!”, 2005 Retrieved on 28.07.2005 from: 
http://www.ucansupurge.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=2392&Itemid=87 
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  In this sense, the interaction among the Kemalist and Islamist CSOs can be 
defined in terms of limited communication that is confined to specific issues. In other 
words, both the Islamist and Kemalist CSOs unintentionally come together as members 
of the same groups or platforms and their temporary interaction in these groups is only 
confined to the expression of their own opinions on a specific issue. However, this 
limited communication does not appear to be valid for all organizations. Concerning 
ADD and its relations with the Islamist CSOs it can be claimed there is no 
communication and this situation appears to nurture the stereotypes and negative 
perceptions further destructing the relations. At this point it should be underlined that 
the women organizations of the two adversary groups appear to be the only exception 
for the poor interaction between the Kemalist and Islamist CSOs. 
To sum up, the capacity of the Islamist and Kemalist CSOs to act together in a 
great extent depends on the prejudices that they have towards each other, their 
characteristics (close identification with the state and differences in area of works), their 
unwillingness and the structure of the civil society in Turkey64. All these factors 
construct important obstacles on their capacities to act together and they should be 
carefully taken into consideration while designing the ICR process. However, among 
the CSOs in Turkey there are some organizations and platforms that may act as a 
capacity generating resource in terms of building bridges among the Islamist and 
Kemalist CSOs.   
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 Taking into consideration the argument of Habermas who defines the public sphere as a communication 
structure which has been rooted in the realm of personal relationships, and at its best “communicative 
action” through the associational network of civil society, Tabakoğlu claims that the CSOs in Turkey 
cannot be considered to be a participant of such a network of communication of Habermasian sense. 
(Tabakoğlu, 2002) Although there are series of CSOs Symposiums organized for nearly ten years by 
Tarih Vakfı, several e-mail groups including various CSOs trying to form a communication network 
among civil actors and important platforms that bring many different CSOs together. However, at this 
point the relation of the member organizations of these platforms should be questioned. As it has been 
stated previously in our study, not all the offices of a member organization correctly know the other 
members of these platforms. Additionally, most of these platforms are constructed for specific issues and 
when their task is finished the platforms dissolve. (XI. STK Sempozyumu-Tarih Vakfı, 2002) Going 
further it can be argued that, even the CSOs having the same ideology do not have structured and 
permanent relationships. (ibid.) For instance ÇYDD and ADD representatives maintained that they do not 
regularly organize joint campaigns or projects and even some representatives harshly criticized the other 
Kemalist CSOs. Likewise, the Islamist CSOs declared that they only come together for joint press 
declarations or demonstrations in the context of the issues on which they share similar opinions. 
Therefore, it is very difficult to claim that the civil society in Turkey has a communication structure 
within a Habermasian perspective.  
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4.4.4.3 Perceptions and stereotypes 
Although most of the representatives of the Kemalist CSOs are not familiar with 
the Islamist CSOs, from the interviews it became obvious that they have a tendency to 
attribute negative perceptions they have towards the Islamists to these organizations as 
well. In other words, overgeneralization and prejudice is observed among the Kemalist 
organizations. The most important thing is that the representatives (ex. one from TKB 
and one from ÇYDD) who have previous experience with Islamist organizations or a 
chance to work with them on other issues tried to avoid making generalizations.65 From 
this aspect it can be concluded that interaction with the adversary party has an impact in 
transforming the attitudes and perceptions towards the adversary group.   
The most notable negative perception of the Kemalist CSO’s towards the Islamists 
reveals itself in Kemalists’ differentiation between the “headscarf” and “turban”. Most 
of the Kemalist representatives defined the “headscarf” as traditional, innocent head 
cover, whereas the “turban” as political uniform, symbol of ideology and flag of Sharia. 
However, even within a single organization there are different visions towards 
headscarf and turban differentiation. For instance one of the representative from ADD 
states that he does not blame the girls wearing turban but the groups that make use of 
them by exploiting religion.66 On the other hand, another interviewee with a firmer 
position states that she perceives women wearing ideological turban as “enemies of 
Atatürk and the Republic”; “counter revolutionaries”, “fundamentalists” and who try to 
reach their aims by problematizing a piece of cloth.67 This differentiation among the 
representatives from the same organization reveals that there are different levels of 
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 Although both of the representatives from TKB have similar perceptions towards the Islamist CSOs in 
general and Islamist women organizations in particular, the representative that had the chance to work 
with Başkent Women’s Platform that is an Islamist women organization was trying to avoid making 
overgeneralizations. Although she was criticizing some of the Islamist women organizations for being 
founded with the intention to simplify the turban issue by presenting it only in terms of discrimination 
against women, she also underlined that some of these organizations are aware of the women’s 
exploitation by the people who use the religion for their benefits. (02.05.2005, interview,Ankara) 
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 “There are many girls who wear turban since they are forced to.  These girls did not have economic 
opportunities and had to use the dormitory, scholarship and education opportunities provided by the 
groups that forced them to cover their heads. I do not blame the girls who economically need the help of 
these groups.” (14.05.2005,interview, Istanbul) 
 
67
 “The people who wear turban that has ideological meaning are country traitors. Covering head but at 
the same time having a make up and wearing some fashionable clothes has nothing to do with religious 
dress codes.”(10.05.2005, interview, Ankara) 
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empathy among the Kemalists towards the “other”. Thus, this theme would construct a 
key aspect in selecting the participants for the appropriate ICR process.    
From all these negative perceptions it can be concluded that most of the Kemalist 
representatives identify the Islamists as a threat against the secular character of the 
state and as “enemies”. Past losses in terms of the assassinations of some Kemalist 
intellectuals by radical Islamist groups can be indicated as one of the reasons for such 
“enemy” discourse.68 (Erdoğan, 2002:244-250) Another reason might be close 
identification of the Kemalist CSOs with the state since identifying with the official 
ideology and the secular character of the state, every group of the society that threatens 
these aspects is defined as “enemy”. (“Ege Bolge Toplantısı”, 1998:31)At this point it 
can be argued that most of the Kemalists do not perceive the Islamists as “adversary” 
but as “enemy”.  The vital difference between “adversary” and “enemy” is precisely 
denoted by Chantal Mouffe (1999) as: 
 “ [adversary is]… somebody with whose ideas we are going to struggle but 
whose right to defend those ideas we will  not put into question….Adversary is 
legitimate enemy, with whom we have in common “shared adhesion to the 
principles of democracy”.… [Whereas enemy is]… somebody who is tried to be 
destroyed and eliminated…. (Mouffe, 1999:755) 
Making a differentiation between “adversary” and “enemy” brings the necessity to 
differentiate the relationship between the conflicting parties who perceive each other as 
“enemy” but not as “adversary”.  The identification of these two different types of 
relations again comes from Mouffe who entitles them as “antagonistic relations” that is 
between enemies and “agonistic relations” that is between the adversaries. (Mouffe, 
1999) She defines these relations as:   
“In “agonistic relations” the sides see each other as adversary and both the 
conflict and the differences are legitimized and recognized by the adversary 
parties…[In “antagonistic relations”]…the parties see each other as enemy trying 
to eliminate, destroy and suppress the “other” by imposing authoritative order.”  
(Mouffe, 1999: 756) 
                                                 
68
 During the interviews, in the bulletins and monthly journal of ADD, the assassination of its founders 
and some of its members including Muammer Aksoy, Bahriye Üçok, Ahmet Taner Kışlalı and Uğur 
Mumcu is always emphasized by ADD condemning the radical Islamist groups that have committed these 
assassinations. (see also Erdogan, 2002:267) In this sense, ADD declares a complete struggle with 
regressive movements, Sharia supporters and political Islam. It becomes obvious that ADD has generated 
the “enemy” discourse and by making overgeneralization it seems to perceive all supporters of political 
Islam to be responsible for these assassinations.  
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In the context of the headscarf conflict, particularly the Kemalist and Islamist women 
identities appear as another important factor blocking the relations since polarized 
womanhoods delineate a category crystallizing the relationship between the adversary 
parties. Especially TKB and the other women representatives of the Kemalist CSOs 
identified themselves as enlightened, modern, dutiful and progressive, whereas the 
Islamist women were implicitly identified as backward, imprisoned and as the 
supporters of Sharia.  
 
 
4.4.5 Objectives 
 
 
Perceiving the headscarf as a symbol of political Islam that threatens the official 
ideology of the state, Atatürkist principles and reforms, the main objective of ÇYDD is 
stated to protect, broaden and improve the rights that have been given and provided by 
the Atatürkist principles and reformations; and to support Turkey’s modern character 
through contemporary education. (ÇYDD, Regulation-3, 1999) In this context, ÇYDD 
can be defined as a civil resistance aiming to strengthen and reactivate Kemalism to 
prevent the religious movements which have come to the scene with the “turban affair”. 
ÇYDD organizes many activities by opening schools, courses, dormitories, youth 
and children clubs, camps, competitions, awards, festivals, concerts; making some 
suggestions related to the legislations; and initiating state wide education campaigns. 
From all these activities it can be concluded that ÇYDD figures out all of its works as a 
“reaction” and “defence” plan towards the Islamic threat that has been visualized with 
the headscarf in public places. (Erdoğan, 2002: 236-237) 
Likewise, the objective of ADD is to fight with these approaches that threaten 
secularism, the Atatürkist principles and reformations in the context of legal rules, to 
protect the Turkish nation from the backward-looking attempts and initiatives by 
“providing service in terms of enlightenment and awakening to the society and by 
creating synergy among the people who believe in Atatürk and Atatürkism.” (Erdogan, 
2002:236-237) Claiming that these anti-modern movements nourish from the illiteracy 
of the people, the representatives of ADD indicate their objectives in terms of 
supporting the enlightenment of the society however they do not give a specific method 
for this. (Cumhuriyet, 13 Mayıs, 1998) 
 114 
Fighting with the headscarf and supporting the spread of modern dress code can 
be indicated as the main objective of the Kemalist women organizations from the 
beginning. (Saktanber, 2001) Accordingly, Turkish Women’s Union perceives fighting 
with the headscarf problem as the necessity of progress, reformation and Atatürkism 
and as ÇYDD, TKB sees the resolution of the conflict in educating girls so that they 
would be saved from becoming “voluntary servants”. (02.06.2005, interview, Ankara; 
Esim and Cindoglu, 1999) As Esim and Cindoglu assert, like the other Kemalist women 
organizations TKB and ÇYDD try to build up their own alternative “help networks”, 
signifying that they perceive secular political regime and life style as the indispensable 
prerequisite for the freedom of women; and the contemporary education as the only 
approach for the protection of that freedom. (Esim and Cindoğlu, 1999: 185) 
To sum up, taking into consideration the objectives of the Kemalist CSOs in the 
context of the headscarf conflict, their main objective appears to be confined to struggle 
with the wrong mentality lying beneath the headscarf and in the long run to eliminate 
that mentality. In this sense the general objectives stated by the Kemalist CSOs 
representatives can be summarized as “protective” and “reactive”. Since the headscarf is 
perceived as a threat the protective objectives include: protecting, broadening and 
improving the rights that have been given and provided by the Atatürkist principles and 
reformations; protecting the Turkish society from the backward-looking attempts; 
supporting and protecting the independence, freedom, national solidarity and the secular 
Republic with Atatürkist attitude and thought. On the other hand the “reactive” 
objectives of the Kemalist CSOs can be defined with their alternative networks in terms 
of providing education opportunities to the students in need; giving some seminars on 
topics such as legal and political rights of women, birth control and courses in sewing 
and carpeting that would increase the welfare and independence of women living in the 
squatter areas. Although the civil activities of both Islamist and Kemalist CSOs seem to 
have compatible objectives they appear not as “complementary” but as “alternative” 
revealing out the competitive relationship between the adversary parties.69 The only 
exception related to the incompatibility of the parties’ objectives can be found among 
the Islamist and Kemalist women organizations that focus on improving the status of 
women in Turkey.  
                                                 
69
 The most important issue that was underlined by the Kemalists is that the Islamists choose the 
grassroots population as target and for that reason all the Kemalist CSOs representatives indicated the 
importance of reaching the grassroots and providing them educational, financial and health service. 
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4.4.6 Visions and Proposed Solutions for Dealing with the Headscarf Conflict 
 
 
  In general terms, the Kemalist CSOs see the resolution of the headscarf conflict in 
changing the “problematic” mentality of the supporters of the headscarf. In this sense 
the Kemalist organizations emphasize the importance in increasing the knowledge and 
political awareness of the people as well as improving education and eliminating the 
unscientific education that is given in Quran courses and religious high schools. 
  Parallel to this emphasis, ÇYDD underlines that a permanent solution to the 
turban issue and for the problematic mentality lying beneath is secular education. 
(Saylan, 2001) This argument reveals out that ÇYDD makes a positive correlation 
between education and not wearing headscarf so that all activities and campaigns of 
ÇYDD are closely related to this argument having the aim to increase the literacy rate of 
the girls and help them to have education that is supposed to prevent them from wearing 
headscarf in the future. (“Gençlerimizi Tarikatlarin Kucağına Biz Atıyoruz”, 1997) 
Accordingly, ADD also emphasizes the importance of “social enlightenment” as the 
only approach that would lead to contemporary civilization level through which 
backward-looking mentality would be eliminated from the Turkish society. (Şengül, 
1997) Social enlightenment aspect is indicated by ADD as “…the domination of the 
suspicious and curious mentality that is based on observation and evaluation and open 
to research and discussion.”(Ozankaya, 2002:9) Similarly, the representative from TKB 
supports the notion of secular education as an approach towards the resolution of the 
headscarf conflict by the words: 
“Only by spreading the secular education, we can fight with the problematic 
mentality lying beneath the headscarf issue. Uneducated society cannot be 
civilized. For the equality and freedom of the women, civilized society in other 
words secular and democratic environment is the main precondition. And this can 
be achieved only by secular education.”(02.06.2005, interview, Ankara) 
 In addition to improving the educational level of the girls, in terms of the 
headscarf conflict the Turkish Women’s Union also stresses some other networks that 
can be adopted by the civil society organizations. According to TKB the mission of civil 
actors is to enlighten and lead the public. (13.06.2005, interview, Istanbul) As a 
Kemalist woman organization TKB claims that women are the productive members of 
the society and believes that by enlightening women with Kemalist ideals, the secular 
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nature of the state will be secured. (Esim and Cindoğlu, 1999: 180) This can be stated as 
the main approach of the organization to fight with the mentality lying beneath wearing 
turban and the exploitation of women. 
 The other argument raised by the Kemalist CSOs concerning the resolution of the 
headscarf conflict is related to reconciliation of the conflict by reasonable 
interpretations. Accordingly, ADD emphasizes that taking the conflict from the 
“secularist” perception stated in the constitution and from the “religious rules” 
perception stated in Quran, would help to transform the controversy into diversity and 
multiplicity. (Denk, 2002: 33-35) Similarly one representative from ÇYDD says: 
“For the resolution of this conflict the two parties should be ready and mature 
enough to discuss their beliefs. The women wearing headscarves and their 
supporters claim that religious beliefs cannot be discussed and questioned whereas 
we claim that no matter what kind of beliefs they are they should be questioned.” 
(15.05.2005, interview, Istanbul)   
However, these propositions implicitly suggest that in the context of wearing 
headscarf, Quran is misinterpreted by the Islamists. Concerning this proposition, the 
Islamists CSOs strongly emphasize that religious rules cannot be interpreted, questioned 
or discussed claiming that the objective of Kemalist CSOs in proposing this resolution 
method is to open the religious rules in Quran into discussion. (Akşit et. al., 2004: 667) 
 Another desired change stated by the Kemalist CSOs is about the environment 
where the headscarf is not questioned and discussed anymore and where other problems 
of Turkey can be addressed claiming that the headscarf polemics and its politicization 
prevent Turkey’s concentration on its other social, cultural, political and economic 
problems (Adem, 2002:23; Şengül, 1997:41-42) Concerning this specific desired 
change of the Kemalists as well as their desire for high level of education it can be 
claimed that these desired changes are compatible with the ones stated by the 
Islamists.70 However, the implicit assumptions and values that the parties have for these 
similar desires are completely different.71  
                                                 
70
 High level of education and equal education opportunities for everybody is one of the fundamental 
future desires of the Islamists. 
 
71
 While the Islamists desire for high educational level and equal opportunity for everybody, they 
implicitly demand the allowance of the veiled girls to go to universities. On the other hand the underlying 
assumption of the Kemalists’ desire for high level of education is their beliefs asserting that through 
increased secular, scientific education and high level of literacy the society would be enlightened and this 
in turn would eliminate the problematic and backward-looking mentality of the headscarf supporters. 
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4.4.7 Relations with the State 
 
  
According to Yaresimos, the CSOs in Turkey that have a pro-modernization 
attitude have closer relationship with the state, whereas the conservative organizations 
that try to lessen the state control on the civil society have adversarial position towards 
the state. In this categorization the former group obviously comprises the Kemalist 
CSOs while the latter includes the Islamist CSOs. (Yerasimos, 2001:20)  
Accordingly, since the founding principles of ÇYDD are closely related with the 
official ideology, ÇYDD appears to have close relationship with the state. Identifying 
itself as a civil actor who shares the burden of the state ÇYDD performs its activities in 
order to support the state. (ÇYDD tanıtım brosuru) Despite these positive aspects of 
ÇYDD-state relationship, when the state and its devices appear to be weak in their 
actions to maintain the Kemalist political project, the state may turn into an opposition 
for ÇYDD as well as for the other Kemalist CSOs. (Erdoğan, 2002: 244-255) From the 
demonstrations of ÇYDD to drop the REFAHYOL government and to protest the 
Susurluk Affair by supporting the “The One Minute Darkness for Permanent 
Enlightenment Action”, it can be concluded that the opposition of ÇYDD to the state 
and the necessity to affect the political administration come into view as a reaction to 
the Kemalist insufficiencies of the state. (ibid.) Similarly since ADD has conservative 
ideological position and its area of interests focus on political issues sometimes it has 
important problems with the governments. (Tabakoğlu, 2002)  
 As a Kemalist organization that supports the legal ideology of the state and 
defines itself as a civil actor working for the benefit of the state and of the nation, TKB 
also has unproblematic relation with the state. Moreover as a women organization, the 
activities of TKB are confined to the gender problems and discriminations against 
women so that its field of activity is not threatening its relations with the governments. 
Concerning the CSO’s capacity in affecting the decision-making process, the 
representative of TKB indicates that in recent years the most successful CSOs in terms 
                                                                                                                                               
Concerning “the environment where the headscarf is not questioned and discussed anymore” seemingly 
compatible future desire the underlying assumptions are again controversial. In their visions, the Islamist 
CSOs actually want to indicate the immediate need for the resolution of the conflict that would create 
suitable social and political environment for the successful resolution of the other problems. Contrarily, 
by the same vision the Kemalists tend to ignore the importance of the conflict or to indicate that the 
headscarf issue is finished and that it should not be raised anymore.  
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of affecting decision-making process are the women organizations and their joint 
activities. (02.06.2005, interview, Ankara) Turkish Women’s Union is member of 
many civil platforms and groups as: “Turkish Penal Code-Ankara Platform” (TCK-
Ankara platformu); “Turkish Directorate General on the Status and Problems of 
Women” (Başbakanlık Kadının Statüsü ve Sorunları Genel Müdürlüğü) and “the 
United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women” 
(CEDAW committee) (Birleşmiş Milletler Kadınlara Karşı Her Türlü Ayrımcılığın 
Önlenmesi Komitesi). Being member of these networks, TKB constructs close relation 
with the state in terms of providing observations and propositions to the government 
concerning the status of women in Turkey.   
 To sum up, it should be stated that the Kemalist CSOs’ founding principles that 
are very close to the legal ideology; the organizations’ close identification with the 
state and their campaigns that are defined in terms of “sharing the burden of the state”, 
form the essential basis for their good relation with the state that in turn shapes their 
relation with the Islamist CSOs.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 119 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 5 
 
 
 BUILDING STRATEGY FOR CHOOSING THE APPROPRIATE ICR 
APPROACH(ES) 
 
 
 
 
After evaluating the assessment of the headscarf conflict in the context of the 
Islamist and Kemalist CSOs, based on this assessment, in this chapter the strategy for 
designing an appropriate ICR process will be discussed. Strategy building will be based 
on the general perceptions of the Kemalist and Islamist CSOs’ interviewees towards the 
applicability of the ICR approaches in Turkey’s headscarf conflict; identifying strategic 
opportunities and constraints for the applicability of the ICR processes in general; 
identifying the strategic resources; and identifying strategic objectives that should be 
taken into consideration in an appropriate ICR approach. The results of each step will 
give an important insight for evaluating the applicability of the ICR approaches in the 
headscarf conflict which will be the topic of the following chapter.    
 
 
 
5.1 The Islamist and Kemalist CSOs’ Visions towards the ICR Approaches 
 
 
 
The aim of this part is to illustrate the general vision of the Kemalist and Islamist 
CSOs towards the ICR method if applied to the headscarf conflict. The ultimate aim of 
this part is to provide information for indicating the strategic constraints and 
opportunities towards the applicability of the ICR method rather than conducting a 
thorough sociologic analysis of the CSOs.       
Although neither in the literature nor in the publications, bulletins and web sites of 
the organizations there is information about their visions towards the ICR processes, 
organizations’ perceptions towards solving the headscarf conflict through dialogue can 
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be analysed as part of their visions towards the ICR processes. Thus, besides the 
interviews72 conducted with the representatives of Ak-Der, Özgür-Der, Mazlum-Der 
(Islamist CSOs) and ÇYDD, ADD, Turkish Women’s Union (Kemalist CSOs), the 
publications and web sites of the CSOs are used as information source. 
 
 
5.1.1 The Islamist CSOs 
 
 
As an Islamist CSO, Ak-Der supports the resolution of the conflict through 
dialogue and claims that the two parties of the headscarf conflict can better understand 
each other only through dialogue. (Ak-Der, 1999: 280) However, the main obstacle for 
the dialogue process is stated to be the attitude of the Kemalist CSOs who do not want 
to listen and understand, but only try to change the thoughts opposite to theirs. (Ak-Der, 
1999: 221) It is also claimed that as long as the Kemalist CSOs do not change their 
objectives, attitudes and perceptions towards the people having strong religious beliefs, 
the dialogue platform will enter into impasse so that ICR is likely to fail. (26.05.2005, 
interview, Istanbul)   
According to the interviewee, another limitation for a possible ICR process is the 
tendency of some Kemalist organizations to give suggestions and advice to the veiled 
women in terms of wearing hat or wig instead of headscarf. Although such advice can 
be evaluated as attempts to find a resolution to the problem, Ak-Der perceives them as a 
total disrespect. Likewise, claiming that the ICR process should not be based on 
negotiation since some issues like religious beliefs and necessities cannot be negotiated 
and that in the headscarf conflict there is not an issue open for negotiation, Özgür-Der 
also underlines the Kemalists’ willingness to propose solutions that only suits their 
interests as a limitation for the dialogue process. Claiming that the principles shape the 
dialogue, the representative from Özgür-Der also points out that respecting the beliefs 
and thoughts of the other party is crucial aspect for the initiation and successful 
implementation of an ICR process.(17.05.2005, interview, Istanbul)  
                                                 
72
 During the interviews after briefly introducing to the representatives of the adversary organizations, the 
main principles and goals of the ICR in general, they were asked about their thoughts on the applicability 
of ICR on Turkey’s headscarf conflict as well as their perceptions, objections, recommendations and 
concerns related to this conflict resolution method. 
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Another potential obstacle emphasized by the representatives is the unwillingness 
of the Kemalist CSOs in entering a dialogue with the Islamist organizations. In this 
context Ak-Der claims that the designers of the ICR process should study very hard in 
order to persuade the Kemalists for attending a dialogue effort. (26.05.2005, interview, 
Istanbul) Similarly, the representative from Mazlum-Der signified the unwillingness of 
the parties to come together as a possible practical obstacle on the dialogue process. In 
this sense he asserted that because of their prejudices the parties who never came 
together may think that a dialogue would not be effective, or that it would escalate the 
conflict polarizing the society. (11. 06.2005, interview, Istanbul) 
 Additionally, the “use of words” is also indicated as a potential obstacle by the 
organization saying: 
 “For long years everybody was complaining that people do not talk and discuss. 
Today everybody has begun to talk. However this dialogue is like a dialogue 
between deaf people. Everybody has different words. The words sound the same 
however their meanings are completely different. Islam, democracy, secularism, 
freedom, human rights, public space…there are many other concepts that are 
being discussed in media and press. However, there is not a result yet because 
everybody talks behind his own wall. Intellectuals cannot provide common terms 
and concepts that will lead all these discussions to resolution. Turkey now suffers 
from not finding a common dictionary.”(Ak-Der, 1999: 210) 
In this respect Ak-Der emphasizes that coming to a mutual agreement on the meanings 
of certain concepts is a crucial step for a successful dialogue process.        
On the other hand, Özgür-Der has a very pessimistic vision towards the ICR 
processes and asserts that both the initiation and the success of a dialogue process 
between the organizations having adversarial positions towards the headscarf conflict 
would be very difficult due to the sharp mentality lying beneath the conflict. 
(17.05.2005, interview, Istanbul) Although the representative states that as an 
organization they are not so compassionate for a dialogue with the adversary 
organizations, she makes a list of preconditions for a future dialogue including: 
 “… the supporters of the headscarf ban should admit their mistakes and say that 
girls with headscarves can go to the universities and all other public places with 
their headscarves. I know that we are on the right way so they have to come to 
this point.” (ibid.)  
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Going further, the executive of Özgür-Der argues that before participating in such a 
dialogue, she would investigate the aim of the dialogue process as well as the objectives 
and identity of the process designers. Concerning the concessions that can be given in a 
future ICR process, Özgür-Der strongly identifies itself with the Quran principles and 
claims that no concession can be given from this. (Özgür-Der, 1999) From all these 
aspects it becomes obvious that Özgür-Der has a very strong position that would 
threaten the dialogue process before it even starts.   
Contrary to Özgür-Der, Mazlum-Der remarks the initiation of a dialogue process 
between the adversary parties as a possible intervention method that should be 
implemented as soon as possible. However, some limitations and conditions are 
positioned also by the interviewee from Mazlum-Der. (02.05.2005, interview, Ankara) 
The first condition for such an ICR process is claimed to be “empathizing with the 
other” and “be able to look in the mirror”. In this sense it can be claimed that for 
Mazlum-Der “empathy” is the vital condition for a successful dialogue. Taking into 
consideration, the possible limitations that may threaten the successful implementation 
of ICR methods; Mazlum-Der highlights the lack of knowledge, prejudices, stereotypes 
and fears of the parties. (02.05.2005, interview, Ankara)  Complementarily, the 
language that would be used is also defined as an important aspect and it is claimed that 
antagonistic, polemical, and offensive language should not be used in the ICR 
processes.  
In terms of the perceived conclusion of the ICR processes, the representative 
argues that the parties do not have to reach a common decision since some differences 
would inevitably prolong. (ibid.) Concerning reconciliation among the parties and the 
limits of the concessions that can be given, Mazlum-Der also signifies that the 
communal relations should depend on mutual respect to have minimal tolerance for co-
existence, although people do not have to love each other. (Ensaroglu, 2004) This 
example reveals that Mazlum-Der is ready to respect the adversary party and has a 
cooperative attitude in finding a common ground.  
To sum up, although they indicate some limitations that may threaten the dialogue 
process with the Kemalists, in general sense the Islamist CSOs strongly support the 
initiation of a dialogue process. 
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5.1.2 The Kemalist CSOs 
 
 
Concerning the Kemalist CSOs’ perceptions towards ICR processes and 
dialogue with the adversary Islamic organizations, it can be said that  they have a very 
similar stance in terms of unwillingness to participate in a dialogue, avoiding the 
existence of the conflict and perceiving entering into a dialogue with the adversary as 
giving concessions from their core values.  
Accordingly, on the one hand the interviewees from ÇYDD agree that talking, 
discussing and holding a dialogue for resolving a problem are very important 
mechanisms. On the other hand they indicate that ÇYDD has nothing to negotiate, 
debate or talk with the Islamists since the objectives of Islamist CSOs are claimed to 
threaten the Turkish society. Moreover, one of the representatives states that for her 
there is not a headscarf conflict that should be resolved. (14.05.2005, interview, 
Istanbul) Similarly, the representatives from ADD reveal out their unwillingness to 
participate in a dialogue with these types of organizations stating that they have nothing 
in common and nothing to talk. (10.05.2005, interview, Ankara)  
The interviewee from ÇYDD suggests that the ICR process should be designed as 
a scientific discussion platform where the necessity of wearing headscarf could be 
scientifically discussed and the purpose and the context of the beliefs questioned. 
Related to this the representative says: 
“If some religions and religious precepts order the women to cover their heads, I 
would question this. You have to ask what are you protecting the woman from 
and what is the right, necessary and needed amount of covering and protecting 
her.”(11.05.2005, interview, Ankara)  
Indicating that the Turkish society is not mature enough for discussing and 
questioning these kinds of aspects, the best solution in making people discuss and 
question everything is claimed to be the education of the society. (Saylan, 2001) To 
sum up, emphasizing the need for outlining the endurable and tolerable aspects in a 
dialogue, ÇYDD claims that rejecting to discuss an aspect since it has been perceived 
as an unquestionable religious belief would harden every dialogue process. (ibid.) 
Moreover, the organization asserts that in the context of the headscarf conflict, the ICR 
process should be carefully investigated in terms of its aim; objectives of the designers; 
 124 
and the financial supporters of the dialogue process claiming that such a dialogue 
process may serve the interests of the groups that make use of the headscarf and exploit 
religion. The representatives also emphasized their concerns indicating that such a 
dialogue may create monologue instead of dialogue or sharpen the positions of the 
parties and polarize the society. (11.05.2005, interview, Ankara)  
The representatives from ADD mainly perceive the ICR methods as processes 
trying to find a common, satisfactory agreement for both of the parties. In this sense one 
of the interviewees claimed that a common agreement cannot be reached by saying: 
 “It is impossible to rule half of the state with Sharia and half of the state with 
Republican regime. People cannot cover half of their heads and the other half 
staying bare. We would either prepare our çarşafs 73for the Sharia order or be 
Republican women.”(10.05.2005, interview, Ankara) 
From the abovementioned statement it becomes evident that the organization perceives 
common agreement as one in which the parties have to give some concessions and 
where compromises dominate. However, in the ICR processes an integrative agreement 
in which the needs of the primary parties are fulfilled can be the ultimate outcome. 
Taking into consideration the organization’s perception towards ICR methods and its 
unwillingness to enter into a dialogue with Islamist CSOs, it can be argued that ADD 
perceives participating in a dialogue with the adversary group as giving concession 
from its interests. Similarly, Turkish Women’s Union perceives the dialogue process as 
a method where negotiation and bargaining would prevail and where the parties would 
try to impose their objectives in order to reach compromise. For that reason the 
representative of TKB asserts that when some important issues are at stake bargaining 
cannot be acceptable. (13.06.2005, interview, Istanbul) 
Related to implementing the ICR methods on the headscarf conflict, one of the 
interviewees from ADD also claimed that without evaluating the conflict in its own 
reality, the resolution cannot be found in foreign systems or in the resolution methods 
proposed by scholars having different social and religious backgrounds. (14.05.2005, 
interview, Istanbul) He states that without comprising analysis of the turban question 
                                                 
73
 çarsaf is a type of veil that completely covers the body and sometimes the face with the exception of 
the eyes. 
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within its historical and sociological realities Western resolution methods may lead not 
to constructive resolution but to a destruction or even disaster.  
 
 
 
5.2 Strategic Opportunities and Constraints for the Applicability of the ICR 
Method 
 
 
 
In this part the aspects that provide opportunity and limitation for the successful 
implementation of Interactive Conflict Resolution method to the headscarf conflict will 
be elaborated. To define it more precisely, the “strategic opportunities” refer to the 
aspects that have promising character for the successful implementation of an ICR 
process. Contrarily, the “strategic constraints” refer to the aspects that challenge the 
success of an ICR process. The opportunity and constraint generating aspects are 
identified by the contributions coming from the assessment of the conflict in the context 
of Kemalist and Islamist CSOs as well as from the literature concerning the general 
context of the headscarf conflict. These aspects provide an important insight for 
indicating the conditions that should be addressed in the appropriate ICR process and 
for evaluating the applicability of the ICR approaches in the headscarf conflict.  
 
 
5.2.1 Strategic Opportunities  
 
 
1) In some platforms and groups the Kemalist and Islamist women organizations had 
the chance to work together. The representatives who participated in these work 
groups appeared to have a tendency to avoid “out-group” generalization. This 
condition poses a promising reference point for the success of ICR processes where 
the adversary parties would have the chance to know each other and build a more 
complex perception of the other group rather than a stereotyped and simplistic one.  
2) The assessment has identified that there are moderates in both parties who can act as 
bridge builders in an ICR processes. Among the Islamist CSOs, Mazlum-Der 
appears to have a more moderate position since it has the capacity to make “in-
group” criticism; identify itself both with Islamic and Western discourses and has a 
cooperative attitude to find a common ground with the adversary. Likewise, Ak-Der 
does not have conflictual relations with the official ideology and has previous work 
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experience with some of the Kemalist women organizations. Among the Kemalist 
CSOs, ÇYDD appears to have more moderate positions on the freedom for 
education issues. 
3)  In each group there are different levels of “empathy” towards the “other”. For 
instance while some Kemalist representatives perceive the veiled women as enemy, 
others perceive not the veiled women but the groups who make use of them as a 
threat. On the other hand while some Islamists generalize all the Kemalists claiming 
that they are against the headscarf regardless of where it is worn, some Islamist 
representatives differentiate the Kemalists as “half freedom supporters” and “the 
ones who completely rejects the visibility of the headscarf”. All these aspects have 
strategic importance in selecting the participants for an appropriate ICR workshop. 
In other words, participants with a range of differences do exist and can be included 
in an ICR process.      
4) Although both parties agree that in the context of the headscarf conflict there is not 
an actual tension in the society, both of them have common concerns and fears 
about the further polarization of the society threatening the communal peace, in case 
the headscarf conflict does not come to an end. Despite the means envisioned by the 
parties to end the conflict are different, this shared vision provides an important 
ground and common goal for the parties to work together in an ICR process. 
5) The attitudes of Islamist representatives provide another opportunity since they are 
all willing to have a dialogue with the Kemalist CSOs and believe that conflicts and 
problems can be resolved only through dialogue. (Özgür-Der appears to be more 
sceptical about ICR and its effectiveness) In general this aspect reveals that the 
Islamist CSOs renounce violence.  
6) Some of the representatives from both Islamist and Kemalist CSOs indicated that 
during the ICR process the parties do not have to reach a common agreement 
claiming that some differences would inevitably prolong. In this sense, the 
stakeholders who have this kind of mentality would not perceive “understanding of 
the adversary’s demands or needs” as giving concessions so that the dialogue 
process would not be endangered. Since the headscarf conflict is a value and need 
based conflict and people cannot compromise on their values, the parties will have 
the chance to understand each others’ needs, values, fears and concerns.     
7) The Islamist representatives indicated the “giving service-taking service” issue as an 
issue on which the parties may come to an agreement. Among the Kemalist 
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representatives especially the ones who implicitly criticize the headscarf ban in 
universities are defined as “half freedom” supporters by the Islamists and addressing 
this issue in the ICR process may be an initial step for the resolution of the conflict. 
This issue might construct a zone of possible agreement in an ICR workshop.  
8)  Concerning the transfer of the ICR results to the decision making process, the close 
relations of the Kemalist CSOs with the state may provide an important opportunity 
for the long-term success of an ICR process.  
9) During the research it became clear that both the Kemalist and Islamist CSOs talk 
referring to the same concepts such as democracy, secularism, freedom, human 
rights, Islam and public space. However, these concepts were defined differently by 
the representatives and they attached different values to them. Lack of common 
language would be an important point of entry since it provides a convenient base 
for the application of a communication based ICR process. Trying to form a 
common language and generating common definitions to these concepts can be used 
as an important activity during an ICR process. However, this opportunity may turn 
into a serious obstacle in case the parties cannot manage to generate a common 
language.  
10) Most of the Kemalist CSOs’ unwillingness to participate in a dialogue with the 
Islamist CSOs appears to be because of their perception of the ICR processes as a 
method where negotiation and bargaining prevail; mutual agreement is seen as 
ultimate objective; and where the parties try to impose their views on each other. 
Moreover, having strong prejudices, the parties who never come together appear to 
think that a dialogue would not be effective, or that it would escalate the conflict 
further polarizing the society. Since the CSOs in Turkey are not familiar with the 
ICR processes they should be well informed about its aims, principles and 
methodologies before a workshop. In this sense, preceding the dialogue process, 
private meetings with each participant and with the adversary parties should be 
organized. In these pre-workshop activities their unwillingness will probably be 
reduced and this seemingly restrained condition may turn into an opportunity. 
11) The internal tensions and differences among the organizations that have similar 
position on the headscarf conflict (ex: ADD and ÇYDD or Mazlum-Der and Özgür-
Der) may come to the surface during an ICR process and this can lead to the parties’ 
differentiation of in-group variation and thus, decrease the generalizations and 
stereotypes towards the out-group. This aspect appears as an important opportunity 
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since the participants will gain a more complex view of the conflict and of the other 
side that is necessary for cross-conflict alliances.     
12) The common identity of the representatives of the adversarial CSOs is another 
opportunity since the stakeholders can realize the similarities with the adversary 
party and generate complex perceptions towards and relations with the “other”. The 
commonality between the representatives cannot only be stated in terms of their 
organizations’ civil agent role but also in terms of their Turkish citizenship, 
common history, common sex, common culture and tradition and even common 
future. Moreover, being representatives of the CSOs would give them a similar 
status in an ICR process that would form another opportunity to build relationships. 
13) Concerning the status of women in Turkey, objectives of the women organizations 
from the adversary parties appear to be compatible. These objectives inevitably 
seem to provide a common ground among all types of women organizations, 
although they differ along the means through which these objectives can be 
achieved and the values attributed to these means. This compatibility forms an 
important opportunity for an ICR process since it can be used as a “superordinate 
goal”74 helping to create a joint action among the women organizations including 
Kemalists, Islamists and feminists. However, past experiences among the women 
organizations should be clearly stated at this point since they prove that only acting 
jointly towards a superordinate goal do not lead to reconciliation among the 
Kemalist and Islamist women.75 These experiences reveal that without addressing 
deep fears, concerns and negative perceptions of the parties, only working towards a 
superordinate goal does not seem enough to improve the understanding of the 
parties towards each other. In this respect it can be concluded that “improving the 
women’s status in Turkey” or another common goal can be used as a “superordinate 
goal” in an ICR process to improve the capacity of the parties to act together. 
However, the preceding activities in which the psychological aspects of the conflict 
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 Superordinate goal can be defined as a common goal. In the literature it is claimed that if there is 
contact and cooperative interdependence between groups in the pursuit of common and superordinate 
goal, inter-group relations can be improved. (Cf. Maoz, 2000) 
 
75
 The joint works of women organizations in CEDAW that have the aim to improve the status of women 
and indicate the violations of women’s rights, is one of these experiences Related to the experience, the 
representative from TKB who worked with an Islamist women organization in CEDAW committee 
stated: “In our joint works related to the status of women in Turkey the Islamist women organizations try 
to raise the headscarf issue in every occasion. Bringing this issue to the agenda really jeopardize the other 
issues that we have to work on.” (02.06.2005, interview, Ankara) 
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(needs, values, prejudices, fears of the parties) should be addressed and precisely 
chosen not to put the joint work in deadlock. In other words for contact to result in 
favorable outcomes, it needs to fulfill the four essential conditions including 
equality in status; cooperation towards common goals; interdependence between the 
parties; and a social climate that supports the inter-group contact.  (Pettigrew, 1998 
cf. Maoz, 2000) Since all the participants will be from the CSOs, they will have 
equal status.  
14) During the stakeholder analysis, concerning desired changes of the parties about the 
social structure in which the headscarf conflict is situated, some compatibility is 
identified. For instance, high level of education and equal education opportunities 
for everybody is emphasized both by the Islamist and Kemalist CSOs (especially by 
ÇYDD, who dreams of high level of education leading to social enlightenment). 
However, the implicit assumptions and values that the parties have for these similar 
desires are completely different.76 Another seemingly compatible desired change 
among the Kemalist and Islamist CSOs appears to be the environment where the 
headscarf is not questioned and discussed anymore and where other problems of 
Turkey can be addressed. So, there is a sense being worn out, a kind of “hurting 
stalemate” which is important to make the parties to the table. Both parties assert 
that the headscarf polemics and its politicization prevent Turkey’s concentration on 
its other social, cultural, political and economic problems. Nevertheless, the 
underlying assumption in this desire is again controversial.77  In this sense although 
these desires seem compatible, the underlying values and assumptions are different 
so that they cannot be used directly in an ICR approach. However, after addressing 
the underlying assumptions, these desires may provide a ripe ground for joint work.  
 
                                                 
76
 While the Islamists desire for high educational level and equal opportunity for everybody, they 
implicitly demand the allowance of the veiled girls to go to universities. On the other hand the underlying 
assumption of the Kemalists’ desire for high level of education is their beliefs asserting that through 
increased secular, scientific education and high level of literacy the society would be enlightened and this 
in turn would eliminate the problematic and backward-looking mentality of the headscarf supporters. In 
other words for the Kemalists high level of education represent a society where everything can be 
discussed and questioned including religious beliefs and where modern looking women (uncovered 
women) dominate the public places. 
 
77
 In their visions, the Islamist CSOs actually want to indicate the immediate need for the resolution of the 
conflict that would create suitable social and political environment for the successful resolution of the 
other problems. Contrarily, by the same vision the Kemalists tend to ignore the importance of the conflict 
or to indicate that the headscarf issue is finished and that it should not be raised anymore. 
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5.2.2 Strategic Constraints 
 
 
1) The intractable and complex character of the headscarf conflict that is centred on 
identity and deep-seated values that oppose each other forms a serious limitation for 
the resolution of the conflict. All issues emphasized by the stakeholders involve 
needs or values that both the Islamist and Kemalist CSOs representatives perceive as 
critical to their groups’ survival that cannot be negotiated. Although the public 
sphere and women issues seem to be related with identity and values, they also 
appear to be closely related with power since the parties have a zero-sum 
perspective of these issues. For instance, the visibility of Islam in the public sphere 
appears to be perceived by the Kemalist representatives as the defeat of secularism; 
and the head cover is accepted as embarrassment for modernization and civilization. 
From these aspects it becomes obvious that the issues emphasized in the context of 
the conflict have a complex and intermingled character that justifies our 
identification of the headscarf conflict as a “protracted conflict”. In this sense, the 
need for an ICR process that has to address all these need and value based issues 
comes to the fore.  
2) Poor interaction and broken relationships; high level of negative perceptions, 
stereotypes and essentializing the other provide another constraint for the resolution 
of the conflict. Apparently, all these aspects will challange the success of an ICR 
process. However, taking all these aspects into consideration an ICR approach 
appears as the most appropriate intervention strategy for the headscarf case in 
comparison to other traditional methods as mediation, arbitration, or formal 
negotiation.  
3) The power asymmetry between the Kemalists and Islamists poses another limitation 
towards the resolution of the headscarf conflict. Holding the key institutions of the 
state in their hands including the military, the Kemalists benefit from the current 
situation. Although the Islamists with strong religious beliefs are not minority and 
are able to come to political power, from the continuation of the headscarf ban it 
becomes obvious that the state78 and so that the secularist elites are dominant in 
terms of political power. In other words, the state apparatus assigns more power and 
                                                 
78
 By the word “state” what is meant is not the government or the political parties in power, whereas it 
refers to the military-bureaucratic elites and the representatives of this mentality who situate themselves 
at the “centre”.  
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privilege to the Kemalist group. In this sense, the notion of power asymmetry has 
considerable impact on the dynamics of conflict; on the parties’ views on strategies 
concerning the conflict and its resolution. To put it more specifically as a high-
power group the Kemalists have interest in maintaining statusquo and preserving 
their own power and see any significant change in power relations as contrary to 
their interests. In this context, the unwillingness of the Kemalist CSOs to participate 
in a dialogue with the Islamists; the Kemalists’ preference to avoid/ignore the 
headscarf conflict; and the incompatibility of the stakeholders’ objectives become 
meaningful  Therefore, in an ICR approach addressing the power asymmetry among 
the parties appears as an important undertaking since overriding this strategic 
constraint is crucial for providing a forum for examining alternative perspectives on 
conflict and strategies for its resolution. (Rouhana and Korper, 1997: 4) 
4) The unwillingness of most of the Kemalist CSOs to come together with the Islamist 
CSOs is another practical obstacle on the dialogue process. Stating that they have 
nothing to negotiate, debate or talk with the Islamists, most of the Kemalist CSOs 
representatives appear to block the implementation of an ICR approach in the 
headscarf conflict. However, by indicating that ICR is not about negotiation, debate 
or coming up with an agreement this constraint can be partially eliminated.  
5) Some of the Kemalist representatives perceive the Islamists as insincere and claim 
that in complex conflicts where the interests and objectives of one of the parties are 
not clearly stated, dialogue is not an appropriate method for resolution. In this sense 
during an ICR process approaching the Islamists’ demands and their needs with 
suspicion would to a great extent challenge the process and this condition should be 
successfully addressed. Organizing informal pre-workshop activities especially 
designed to build trust will give the participants a chance to construct interpersonal 
relations with the adversary and will make trust-building as an important part of the 
ICR process.  
6) Another important obstacle for the success of the ICR process is the tendency of 
most of the Kemalists who try to discount the existence of the headscarf conflict in 
Turkey claiming that Turkey has more important problems than “a piece of cloth”. 
This aspect reveals Kemalists’ low awareness of the conflict that can be closely 
related to their willingness to protect the status quo. Stating that they have not a 
problem to resolve, this condition leads to representatives’ unwillingness to 
participate. Since the stalemate is to their advantage, how should they be convinced 
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to engage in talks with the other side has great importance. This situation can be 
defined as establishing experience of ripeness among disputants where the parties 
make a commitment to change the direction of the normative social processes of the 
relations towards de-escalation. (Coleman,1997) 
7) The tension that was observed to exist between ADD and ÇYDD may prevent the 
representatives of these organizations to adopt a flexible attitude during the 
dialogue. Since ÇYDD is criticized by ADD for giving up some of the Ataturkist 
principles, ÇYDD may adopt a rigid attitude not to appear as if giving concessions 
from its Kemalist character in order not to loose face.  
8) Almost all the Kemalist and some of the Islamist representatives approach the ICR 
processes with suspicion claiming that it should be carefully investigated in terms of 
its aims; objectives of the designers and the financial supporters. In this sense, a 
very clear, detailed and explanatory document should be prepared and sent to the 
participants as well as private meetings should be held with each party separately 
before the dialogue process begins. Otherwise, the neutrality of the designers, the 
objectives and characteristics of the dialogue may begin to be questioned during the 
process endangering all dialogue.    
9) The proposition of some Kemalist CSOs to design the ICR process as a scientific 
discussion platform where the necessity of wearing headscarf, the purpose and 
context of the beliefs could be scientifically discussed reveals out the probable 
attitude of the Kemalists that may come to the surface in the dialogue. This kind of 
attitude would really harden the process since the Islamists explicitly reject 
discussing and questioning their religious beliefs. 
10) Most of the Kemalists and Islamists appear to perceive the headscarf conflict as a 
power struggle, but not as a conflict that should be resolved in a mutually 
satisfactory way. This poses an important obstacle that should be carefully 
addressed during an ICR process. However, since Mazlum-Der does not conceive 
the resolution as a power struggle and bases it on mutual empathy and consensus it 
can act as a facilitator from the inside.  
11) In the context of the headscarf conflict, neither the Kemalist CSOs nor the Islamist 
CSOs locate “improving their mutual relationship” among their objectives or 
desired changes related to the future.  This reluctance appears to be an important 
obstacle for the dialogue process since it affects their willingness to participate and 
to understand the adversary party.   
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12) Most of the Kemalist CSOs’ perception of the Islamists as “enemy” and their 
“antagonistic relationship” pose another constraint since in antagonistic relations the 
parties try to eliminate, destroy and suppress the “other” by imposing authoritative 
order. (Mouffe, 1999: 756)  
13) Taking into consideration the objectives of both parties in terms of the headscarf 
conflict, it should be underlined that neither of the Kemalist and Islamist CSOs 
indicated their objectives in terms of reconstructing their relations with each other. 
In other words neither of the parties sees the resolution of the conflict or the 
elimination of threat posed by the adversary in improving its relations with the 
adversary party. This forms an important constraint to an ICR approach since the 
desire to reconcile the conflictual relationships and to solve the conflict is a vital 
aspect to bring the parties together and for the success of an ICR approach. 
 
 
 
5.3 Strategic Resources 
 
 
 
“Strategic resources” can be identified in terms of organizations or people who 
have the capacity, and ability, and who already have the vision to play a role of “bridge 
builders”. Identifying these actors as “moderates”, Lederach strongly emphasizes the 
importance of working with moderates in resolving conflicts by suggesting that 
moderate individuals and groups within society have the capability in maintaining 
peaceful relations and can be the strongest allies for conflict resolvers. (1997: 94-97) 
Likewise, focusing on the weak relationships among the adversarial parties Ury (2000) 
argues that the bridge-builders can prevent the escalation of the conflict through 
creating cross cutting ties and forging relations across lines of conflict via joint projects 
and genuine dialogues. According to him such cross-cutting ties can build trust and 
establish natural avenues for communication where mutual understanding is promoted 
and relationships are build that can prevent escalation into violence.(Ury, 2000: 132-
138) Accordingly, we argue that moderate groups who are potential bridge builders can 
reveal the shared identity of the adversary parties; create a common ground within the 
context of the headscarf conflict and be strategically important in generating consensual 
norms that would minimize hostile attitudes between the primary parties. In this sense, 
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including these moderate organizations would provide an important strategic resource 
for the appropriate ICR approach. 
 Concerning the abovementioned assumption in choosing the moderate 
organizations, the most important thing related to these bridge builders is the necessity 
for their existence in the conflict setting that is the “civil society in Turkey” in our 
study. In the context of the headscarf conflict the civil society appears to be polarized 
and due to the limited contacts between the organizations this situation seems very 
desperate. Nevertheless, the women organizations that have a relatively neutral stance 
towards the headscarf conflict and have contact with organizations from either side 
generate an important resource rooted in the civil society. Although the following three 
women organizations have different characteristics, their potential capacity for being 
“bridge builders” during an ICR process is undeniable. On the other hand, human rights 
organizations also appear as an important strategic resource although their capability in 
acting as bridge builders is a problematic issue and this will be discussed in the 
following part. 
 
 
5.3.1 Women Organizations as Strategic Resource   
5.3.1.1 Uçan Süpürge (Flying Broom)79  
 Flying Broom was founded in 1996 by a group of women coming from the 
feminist movement whose aim was to provide communication and network between 
women’s CSOs and to function as an information and documentation centre. By 
promoting women’s empowerment, the organization defines its long term goal as to 
contribute to the process of democratization and development of civil society in Turkey, 
in accordance with the international gender equality norms.  
 The main objective of the organization is identified by its representative as to 
build a network between the women organizations and by this way to provide common 
ground to know each other and to have joint works. (Sivil Toplum, 2004) Defining the 
Flying Broom as a communication centre, it is even stated that the organization does not 
only try to provide communication with women organizations but also with other 
different CSOs. Believing that by sharing experiences, the CSOs can create a synergy, 
                                                 
79
 Most of the information about the Flying Broom are taken from its web page: www.ucansupurge.org 
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improve their relations and strengthen the civil society in Turkey, the role of the 
organization is stated to be “mediator” among the CSOs to open up their knowledge to 
share. (ibid.)  
 In this sense Flying Broom organizes many projects in order to realize these 
objectives. For instance, the “Database of Women’s Organizations in Turkey” project 
aims to establish an efficient, easily accessible database for national and international 
women NGOs, groups and initiatives to meet the pressing need to access the 
information of these organizations and to intensify the interaction and communication 
between them. On the other hand the National Meetings of Women CSOs that were 
organized by Flying Broom managed to bring the Islamist and Kemalist women 
organizations together and gave them the chance to work together for the improvement 
of the women’s status in Turkey. As it has been previously stated, these meetings were 
arranged for the preparation of “Shadow Reports”80 to be handed in to the United 
Nations CEDAW Committee.  
 Moreover, the political neutrality of the organization reveals itself in the 
representative’s statement claiming that the organization is not a member of a political 
party or a political group. In other words staying neutral and with equal distance to 
every political opinion and being objective is defined as the fundamental principles of 
Flying Broom.(Sivil Toplum, 2004) However, the neutrality of the organization is 
claimed to be abandoned only in the issues related to the discrimination and violation of 
women’s rights. It is also claimed that in the social movements that have been realized 
through civil initiatives the women organizations have unifying and bridging role.(ibid.) 
In this sense, the representative of the organization claims that the women organizations 
are candidates to change and reconstruct all the politics related to women and assert the 
importance and necessity for close interaction between women. Concerning the stance 
of Flying Broom on the headscarf conflict, it can be said that its commitment to 
secularism illustrate its closeness to the Kemalist women organizations. However, their 
strategies for dealing with Islamist groups differ considerably from those of the 
Kemalist CSOs. While Kemalist women organizations like TKB have an exclusionary 
attitude with respect to Islamist women organizations, as a feminist women organization 
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 The Shadow Reports was a supplement to the official Country Report, giving a voice to the women of 
the country and reporting important shortcomings in the government policy. 
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Flying Broom looks for common platforms on which to discuss issues and reach a better 
understanding with Islamic women’s groups. 
 Taking all these aspects into consideration, it can be argued that the capacity of 
Flying Broom to build bridges between the secularists and the Islamists in an ICR 
approach lies in its actual projects, founding principles and organizational objectives. In 
this sense, it can be concluded that with its practical capacity the organization can really 
play a facilitative role among the adversary Islamist and Kemalist organizations. 
5.3.1.2 Başkent Kadın Platformu [BKP] (Başkent Women’s Platform)81 
Although Baskent Women’s Platform can be defined as an Islamist women 
organization, its self identification; criticisms towards Islam from the inside; wide 
networks with different groups; closeness to feminism; structure that is criticized by 
most of the Islamist women organizations and work experiences with the Kemalist 
women organizations gives the platform an important strategic potential in building 
bridges among the Kemalists and Islamists in the context of the headscarf conflict. BKP 
was built in 1995 as a union of civil institutions comprising many women branches of 
civil society organizations and women groups. Generating solutions for the problems of 
the religious women and detecting the barriers on the progression of the religious 
women by organizing conferences, meetings and education activities are the main 
objectives of the platform. (Çubukçu, 2004:115) Like other feminist organizations they 
also act against domestic violence, “honour” killings and other problems of women 
through joint actions with other women organizations. The most important point related 
to BKP is that unlike the other Islamist women organizations they accept to be defined 
as “feminist” and claim that they have many common points with liberal feminists. 
(Pusch, 2004:484) 
 The platform also tries to form a bridge between “secular” and “religious” women 
organizations and to improve the relations between the two parties. In terms of the 
headscarf conflict they aim to transform (for the two poles) the status of women from a 
                                                 
81
 Most of the informations related to the platform are taken from the chairman’s speech in the conference 
organized by TESEV: “Muslim Woman in Western Societies” (“Batı Toplumlarında Müslüman  Kadın”, 
11 June, 2004, İstanbul). Retrived from: 
http://www.tesev.org.tr/etkinlik/basortusu_kitap_tanitim_konusmalar.php 
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docile to an active actor of of resolution. (Çubukçu, 2004:120) According to the 
representative of the platform the activities like HABITAT, Pekin+5 that are organized 
by the United Nations are affective in improving the dialogue between different women 
organizations. BKP participated in all these activities and even in the preparation of the 
“Shadow Report” that was handed in to the United Nations CEDAW Committee and 
organized by the Flying Broom.  
The self identification of the platform is a very important aspect to denote its 
difference from the other Islamist women organizations. The representative of BKP 
opposes the identification “Islamist women” or “women wearing turban” and defining 
Islamism as an ideology. She asserts that they are not Islamists. Furthermore, 
emphasizing the concept of “Muslim woman”, the representative argues that the 
majority of the uncovered women in Turkey are also Muslim so that she prefers to 
define herself as a “religious woman”. The representative also rejects the definition 
“women wearing headscarf” claiming that they also worship, have a world view, life 
style, obey the rules of religion and internalize the philosophy of religion. 
Making a very similar argument to the Kemalist CSOs representatives, the 
chairman of BKP claims that the society is not mature and ready enough to discuss 
everything calmly and asserts that for a healthy discussion people should wait for the 
problems in which deep-rooted values are at stake to calm dawn. She points out that in 
the headscarf conflict people do not discuss to find a solution but rather to sharpen and 
make a position. Indicating that if a person feels herself/himself to belong to a group, 
inevitably the person will take a side in a discussion and discuss some aspects and 
issues from that side. Related to the headscarf controversy the main issue is emphasized 
to be this type of discussion among the adversary parties. All these statements reveal the 
equal and impartial stance of the representative to the whole headscarf debate since she 
does not blame one of the parties but criticizes both of them. 
On the one hand, with the statement indicating that without providing people the 
appropriate ground for discussion but by only trying to impose something on them 
would not lead to success, the platform criticizes the Kemalist elites and the state. 
Unlike the other Islamist organizations the representative of the platform does not find 
the Turkish modernization project as a complete product of problematic mentalities and 
indicates some of its successful concepts. However, at the same time she criticizes its 
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method and claims that if the modernization project was realized by taking into 
consideration the needs and values of all identity and cultural groups of the society, it 
could have been more successful, not problematic, not generating today’s problems in 
Turkey and convey more liberal context.  
On the other hand the representative strongly criticizes the interpretations of 
religion that originate from the traditional and masculine structure of Islam. In the 
context of the headscarf conflict, the Islamist men are also criticized by the platform 
because of their unwillingness in solving the headscarf conflict for their own political 
and economic interests. Strongly criticizing the religious communities and their leaders 
for using the veiled girls without taking care of their psychologies, the platform appears 
to have a very different character than the other Islamist women organizations. 
Indicating that the Islamists should make self evaluations, self-criticisms and 
questioning, the chairman of the platform also indicates that without taking into 
consideration religious knowledge, the religious groups produce religiosity with their 
feelings, adherence and religious communitarianism (cemaatcilik). In this sense, like the 
Kemalists, the platform maintains that not questioning these religious types is the most 
important handicap of the Islamists so that they have many problems related to the 
liberty and pluralism. However, at the same time she criticizes the secularists by stating 
that since they are in power they have to first perform their own duties and then to 
question the others.  
From all these aspects it can be concluded that Baskent Women’s Platform can be 
a potential strategic resource for an ICR process and its strategic value depends on its 
ability to criticize the Islamists from the inside.  
5.3.1.3 KA-DER (Association for the Support and Training of Women Candidates) 
[Kadın Adaylarini Destekleme ve Egitme Derneği] 
Ka-Der is a civil society organization that was founded in 1997 to promote the 
equal representation of women by election or appointment at all levels of the decision-
making process in Turkey. Berktay identifies Ka-Der as a secular feminist organization 
that has the aim to increase the number of women deputies in the parliament, regardless 
of their ideologies or political opinions. (Berktay, 2004:28) In other words, maintaining 
an equal distance from all political parties, Ka-Der’s main attempt is to raise the 
presence of women in Turkish politics. The main objective of Ka-Der is stated as to 
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develop gender awareness in the society so to combat the domination of men in 
Turkey’s social and political culture and the organization pursues this goal by preparing 
women to participate in political parties and by working to get political parties to accept 
and welcome women in their decision-making processes. (“Ka-Der’in Amacı”, n.d.) 
The overall mission of Ka-Der can be defined as to contribute to the quality of 
democracy in Turkey and to enhance women’s rights.  
The perception of Ka-Der towards the tension among the Islamists and secularists 
reveals out the neutral and reconciliatory position of the organization. Ka-Der criticizes 
the perception of the Muslim women as “passive”, “backward” and “obedient” and the 
Western women as “progressive”, “independent” and “contender”. (Ka-Der, 2004:10) 
According to the organization relating the backwardness of the people to Islam means to 
define their culture as problematic. In this sense, the organization opposes the 
homogenization of the out-group without differentiating the attitudes and thoughts of its 
members and claims that this kind of attitude would build a wall between the groups 
and cultures. (ibid.) By stating that this type of attitude may increase the strength of the 
conservative Islamists, the organization also reveals out its secular character.  
The organization proposes building bridges in order to better know and understand 
the “other” party instead of building walls that cannot be passed over. (Berktay, 
2004:30) Likewise, the main argument of Ka-Der is based on building bridges between 
all women, passing over their ideological and political differences. Indicating that 
solidarity is not possible without a genuine effort to understand each other, and that 
understanding can only begin when each party is informed about the “other”, Ka-Der 
strongly emphasizes the importance of preparing the groundwork for sharing knowledge 
and experience to facilitate mutual understanding, empathy and improvement of 
relations. (Ka-Der, 2004:8)  
Concerning the stance of Ka-Der in the headscarf conflict it can be said that they 
do not have a clear position. Yet, Ka-Der’s stand on the issue of veiled members in the 
organization is ambiguous. For instance, its members publicly avoid the question of 
whether they will accept veiled women’s membership or participation in the 
association’s activities. (Kozat, 2003:210) Moreover, the association did not take a 
public stand on the case of Merve Kavakçı and from her research about Ka-Der, Kozat 
states that she was told during her interviews with the staff in Ka-Der’s Istanbul branch 
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that there was a serious divide among the members on the issue of supporting Merve 
Kavakçı, and that the association finally decided not to make a general press 
statement.(Kozat, 2003: 210) Nevertheless, Ka-Der asserts that the individual members 
are permitted to express their opinion in the press. (ibid.) 
Taking all these aspects into consideration it becomes obvious that Ka-Der has an 
important potential in building bridges between the Islamist and secularist women. 
Although the underlying assumption of the organization is to increase the solidarity of 
women for the formation of strong women movement, the position, attitude and its style 
in approaching differences would really provide an important contribution to an ICR 
approach to be implemented on the headscarf conflict. Furthermore, since the activities 
of Ka-Der aim to raise the presence of women in Turkish politics and to support the 
women’s participation in politics, it can be claimed that the organization has or at least 
in the long run will have the capability to affect the decision making process. In this 
sense, the other strategic opportunity that the presence of Ka-Der could provide to an 
ICR process is its potential capability in transferring the change in the process to the 
decision making process.   
 
 
5.3.2 Human Rights Organizations as Strategic Resource 
 
 
 Although for the Kemalist CSOs in general, human rights issue does not appear to 
be included in their areas of interest, ÇYDD can be indicated as an exception among the 
three Kemalist CSOs analysed in this study. ÇYDD’s vice executive is also the head of 
the Prime Ministry Human Rights Consultation Board (İnsan Hakları Danışma Kurulu-
İHDK)82 and signed the minority rights declaration prepared by the Board generating 
many debates among the Kemalists83. Still, the membership of Mazlum-Der in this 
                                                 
82
 The vice executive of ÇYDD who is the head of İHDK defines the aims of İHDK in terms of 
improving human rights notion in Turkey and acting as bridge among the CSOs and public institutions. 
(ÇYDD 2. Başkanı Prof. Dr. İbrahim Kaboğlu'ndan mesaj”, 2004)  In this context the mission of ÇYDD 
is stated to be confined to creating a society that is respectful to human rights by undertaking the mission 
of secular education by saying that in an uneducated society human rights cannot go beyond a 
“discourse”. 
83
 Two interviewees from ADD who criticized the chairman of ÇYDD for signing the minority rights 
declaration. (11.06.2005, interview, Istanbul and 10.05.2005, interview, Ankara ) can be given as 
examples.  
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Board84 and the Islamist CSOs’ (that are analysed in this study) identification of 
themselves as supporters of human rights, makes the human rights field appear as a 
potential common ground generating aspect between the Islamist and Kemalist CSOs. 
However, since during the interview with the executive of Mazlum-Der it was stated 
that their work with ÇYDD in Human Rights Consultation Board is limited and did not 
have positive affects on their relationships; and since the Board was criticized by the 
Islamists for not accepting the headscarf ban as a violation of human rights (“Özgürlük 
isteyen kurul başörtüsünü görmedi”, 2004) limits the use of human rights as a common 
ground generating field. However, at this point it should also be asked: “Do the human 
rights organizations that do not belong to any of the adversary parties to the headscarf 
conflict, have the capacity to act as bridge builders among the adversaries in an ICR 
approach or further sharpen the division between the two sides?” Identification of 
human rights organizations as strategic resource is a debatable issue that will partially 
find its answer after analysing İHD as the most prominent one among the human rights 
organizations that do not belong to either of the camps in the conflict.       
5.3.2.1 İHD (Human Rights Association) [İnsan Hakları Derneği] 
İHD was founded in 1986 as a civil reaction and solidarity movement by some 
intellectuals, academicians, lawyers and journalists with leftist tendencies in order to 
support the people who were imprisoned because of their political thoughts and to react 
against violations of human rights and liberties. İHD defines itself as a non-
governmental and voluntary organization that is not a body of a political party or of a 
single political tendency. (“Principles of HRA”, n. d.) However, the initial political 
tendency of the organization was stated to be “Marxist-laicist”. (Plagemann, 2002: 364) 
Accordingly, in late 1980s İHD had close relations with “Cumhuriyet” that is one of the 
most prestigious newspapers in Turkey known for its conservative Kemalist identity. 
(Plagemann, 2002:367) However, in 1990s this situation began to change with İHD’s 
activities concerning the violation of human rights in the Kurdish region since the 
organization began to support the Kurdish rights, thus, breaking down an important 
taboo of Kemalist-laicist order. (ibid.) In this sense, İHD clearly began to distance itself 
                                                 
84
 For the other members of the Board you can look at: “İnsan Hakları Danışma Kurulu'nun tam 
listesi/23.11.2004” Retrieved on 27.07.2005 from: 
http://www.ortakpayda.org/makale.asp?foo=read&feox=108 
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from Jacobin laicism even though its secular identity still prevails. (ibid. 368) 
Consequently, İHD identifies itself as a non-governmental organization: 
 “…upholding the principle that the human rights are universal and indivisible; 
opposing the death penalty at regardless of geographical location and 
circumstance; opposing torture regardless of the individual, the geographical 
location and circumstance; defending the right to fair trail everywhere, for 
everyone and in any circumstances; strongly supporting the idea that the right of 
nations to self determination is a human right; defending unconditionally and 
without any restriction the right to freedom of expression; and defending the right 
to freedom of religion”. (“Principles of HRA”, n. d.) 
Parallel to the transformation in the position, principles, areas of interest, policies 
and activities of İHD, its relations with the Kemalist and Islamist CSOs also changed. 
Opposing the headscarf ban, its relationship with Mazlum-Der that is an Islamist CSO 
began to improve in terms of sharing knowledge, joining each other’s meetings or 
making joint press releases. Concerning this aspect, Plagemann says that the close 
relation between Mazlum-Der and İHD cuts across the polarization lines since each 
organization represents the political polarization in Turkey. (Plagemann, 2002: 394) On 
the other hand, supporting Kurdish rights, freedom to the headscarf in public places and 
struggling against other human rights violations criticizing the policies of the state, İHD 
appears to have poor relations with the Kemalist CSOs that can be identified as the 
supporters of the Ataturkist principles including “secularism” and “nationalism”. In this 
context, the harsh criticisms of Kemalists towards the executive İHD85 (Akın Birdal) get 
internal coherence. Taking into consideration this problematic relationship between 
İHD and the Kemalist CSOs it would be challenging to claim that İHD can act as a 
bridge builder in an ICR approach since the organization has a clear “anti-headscarf 
ban” position and is harshly criticized by the Kemalists.   
 The position of İHD towards the headscarf conflict reveals itself in the statements 
of its executive who harshly criticizes the policies of the state concerning the Kavakçı 
case: 
                                                 
85
  In a conference organized by ADD and ÇYDD, Vural Savaş indicated that the word “democrat” is 
used as camouflage of the enmity against Ataturk and the Republic. He claims that under the name of 
democratization, Ataturkist principles are violated and Ataturkist principles would be eliminated, the way 
towards regressive movements would be opened and the Turkish republic would be divided. In this sense 
among many other names, Birdal is also defined as a democrat having all these aims. For more 
information look at: “Apo da Birdal da Demokrat” Retrieved on 01.08.2005 from: 
http://www.milliyet.com.tr/2000/05/20/haber/hab03.html 
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“The political actors who restrict freedoms in all walks of life and who force a 
deep and authoritarian political and legal structure upon the people of Turkey 
have now moved onto attack a female Fazilet (Virtue) Party MP, supposedly in 
the name of women’s freedoms, modernity and civilization. Regimes where the 
majority in the Parliament abolishes the freedoms of others are dictatorial 
regimes, though they may be parliamentarian. This isn’t a stance adopted for 
modernity and civilization.”(Öndül, 1999) 
Going further the executive states that just as the male political Islamists have the right 
to work, to have education and being prime minister according to democratic tolerance, 
without discriminating between the sexes, female Islamists also have the same right. 
(Öndül, 1999) İHD also clearly asserts that they do not consider the claims about 
modernity and civilization, which are based upon symbols, clothes and formalities as 
valid and asserts that in Turkey’s institutions only one-way of thinking dominates and 
only one way of life is imposed. (ibid.)  
However, İHD also criticizes the Islamist groups and political parties that take 
advantage of women and see them and their headscarf as the focal point of their 
political agenda. Rather than positive discrimination to provide opportunities for 
women, İHD criticizes them for seeing the woman as a tool for their own ends and for 
reproducing the authoritarian system quoting “human rights” only when the issue of 
headscarf arises. In this sense it becomes obvious that İHD does not have a pro-Islamist 
stance.  
 İHD explicitly states that they view the headscarf issue from the “individual’s 
freedom” point of view and that they do not see the headscarf as an attempt to divide a 
country, to take the regime back to the middle ages, or as a threat of losing the gained 
rights of women. (Human Rights Bulletin, 1999:15) Likewise, the previous executive of 
the organization claims that healthy and democratic solutions cannot be produced under 
the influence of historical paranoia. (Öndül, 1999) According to İHD, the prohibition of 
wearing headscarf or constraints in dressing in general is in opposition to abolition of 
discrimination and interference in people’s private lives. The headscarf ban is regarded 
as practices discriminating against women to prevent them from having equal roles in 
the society and from attending in social life equally. (Tr: “Headscarf ban is 
discriminatory towards women”, 2005) In this sense the state is claimed not to have the 
authority to intervene in personal preferences of the people about their appearance in 
private life or public life or to force the people to change their preferences. (Keskin, 
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2005) Going further İHD also claims that the right of education and work; privacy of 
the individual life and the right to engage in public life must be protected without 
exception. The organization also appears to have a concern stating that increasing 
polarization and tension in the society resulting from such practices are worrisome. 
(Öndül, 1999)   
Consequently, if İHD’s run-down relations with the Kemalist CSOs and relatively 
close relations with the Islamist CSOs; as well as its clear anti-headscarf position are 
taken into consideration, İHD does not appear to be a potential, appropriate, and neutral 
bridge builder in an ICR approach.  
 
 
 
5.4 Strategic Objectives 
 
 
 
After assessing the headscarf conflict in the context of Islamist and Kemalist 
CSOs; indicating stakeholders’ visions towards the ICR approaches; strategic 
opportunities and limitations as well as the strategic resources, with this final part the 
strategic framework towards evaluating the applicability of the ICR approaches in 
Turkey’s headscarf conflict will be completed 
In order to find the appropriate ICR process(es) for the headscarf conflict just 
stating the issues, fears, concerns, prejudices, relationships, objectives and desired 
changes of the parties is not enough. These themes have to be approached by taking into 
consideration the strategies adopted by the parties towards the conflict at the moment 
and for this Figure 5.1 gives an important insight.  
In this inter-group conflict framework, first of all it is illustrated that when the 
parties assume that disagreement is inevitable and permanent, and agreement is 
impossible the conflict is claimed to be resolved totally in favor of one party or the 
other. The figure states that if the stakes are high the parties will engage in win-loose 
power struggle till one party yields; if the stakes are moderate the parties may turn to a 
third-party for judgment; and when stakes are low they may decide not to determine the 
outcome but simply wait for fate to intervene.  
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            Conflict Inevitable         Conflict Not Inevitable,      Although There 
           Agreement Impossible   Agreement Not Possible         is Conflict, 
Active                                                                                   Agreement is Possible    High Stakes  
   
Passive                                                                                                                     Low Stakes                                                                                                                                                            
 
* Win-Loose Power Struggle : When the conflict was highly escalated especially in 1997-1998 
adopted by both parties and still adopted by some Kemalist and Islamist CSOs;                                                                                                                
* Indifference or Ignorance; Fate: the Kemalist CSOs; 
* Problem-Solving: most of the Islamist CSOs; 
 
Figure 5.1 A framework for understanding inter-group conflict 
Taken from: Blake, Shepard and   Mouton   (1964 Cf. Fisher, 1989) 
On the other hand, if the parties assume that disagreement is not inevitable, they 
perceive that conflict can be avoided because interdependence is not necessary.Thus, 
depending on the stakes one or both parties may with-draw, maintain indifference or 
isolate itself from the relationship. Finally, it is suggested that if the parties assume that 
agreement is possible and therefore interdependence is necessary then with low stakes 
the parties are prone to smooth differences or make reference to broad common goals. If 
the stakes are moderate the parties are likely to enter into bargaining to reach 
compromise that meets both parties’ needs to an acceptable degree. However, with high 
stakes compromise will not be acceptable and the parties will be prone to engage in 
problem solving to find a creative resolution. As it is seen all these approaches vary on 
an active-passive dimension.   
Relating this inter-group conflict framework to Turkey’s headscarf conflict, it can 
be stated that especially in 1997 and 1998 when the headscarf conflict was highly 
escalated; both for the Islamists and the Kemalists the stakes were very high in terms of 
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their needs and values at the centre, they were in consensus that the conflict is inevitable 
but agreement is impossible. At this time, both parties were in a win-loose power 
struggle. Taking into consideration the declarations made by the political parties 
(especially the Welfare Party), National Security Council (MGK), the Constitutional 
Court, media and university rectors, this strategy can easily be observed during this 
period.  
However, today the situation seems more complex concerning the strategies 
adopted by the parties. From the assessment of the Kemalist CSOs, it became obvious 
that some of them still perceive the conflict as a win-loose power struggle. 
Nevertheless, the majority appear to avoid/ignore the headscarf conflict and isolate 
themselves from the relationship with Islamists since they see agreement as impossible; 
do not assume the conflict as inevitable and do not perceive interdependence as 
necessary. Moreover, since the headscarf ban continues, the actual needs and values of 
the Kemalists are not perceived as endangered so that their stakes in resolving the 
conflict appear to be low. It can be also claimed that there are some Kemalist CSOs’ 
representatives who perceive the headscarf tension as permanent and inevitable because 
of the clashing values and identities among the parties and, thus, perceive an agreement 
as impossible. Accordingly, these Kemalists prefer to wait for fate to intervene rather 
than deciding to determine a resolution. On the other hand, from the stakeholder 
analysis it became obvious that such as the Kemalists, the Islamist CSOs also do not 
adopt unique strategy towards the conflict. For instance, most of the Islamist CSOs’ 
representatives point out that there is an actual conflict and perceive an agreement with 
the Kemalists as possible. By emphasizing their basic needs and values (high stakes), 
these representatives appear to adopt a problem solving strategy or smoothing the 
difference and maintain interdependence. On the other hand, some radical Islamist 
CSOs such as Özgür-Der in our case see the headscarf controversy as power-struggle by 
indicating the wrong mentality lying beneath the politics of the Turkish state. This 
argument can be interpreted as an opposition towards the regime. 
For a successful ICR process the fundamental strategic objective would be to 
bring the Kemalists to the problem solving level. Therefore, an appropriate ICR 
approach should focus on strategy transformation, but how? The answer to this question 
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will illustrate the strategic objectives towards which an appropriate ICR approach 
should work. These objectives can be listed as the following:   
a- To increase parties’ awareness about the conflict, the costs of continuing the present 
strategies they adopted, and to generate an awareness of mutually acceptable parameters 
within which a future solution might be sought. In other words, to create ground rules 
through which the stakeholders can work jointly towards a superordinate goal. Given 
the findings of the conflict assessment, especially the Kemalist CSOs appear not to be 
ready to generate a mutually agreeable solution to the headscarf conflict. Thus, 
generating common orientation or deciding on the aspects that should be addressed for 
the resolution in the long-run can be in the agenda of an ICR approach.  
b- Creating interpersonal changes such as reduction in mutual stereotypes, attitudinal 
changes, improving interpersonal relationships and trust, and establishing personal 
relationships across the divide of the conflict; to make the disputants perceive each 
other as adversaries not enemies or generate more complex perception towards the 
adversary that is not based on stereotypes; to change the parties’ attitudes from 
adversarial attitude to cooperative or problem-solving one; to empower the parties to 
jointly decide on their shared future and future relationships; 
c- To make the parties stop perceiving the conflict in “win-loose” terms; as a power 
struggle or as a political and interest-based conflict, but rather as a joint problem that 
should be cooperatively resolved or as a protracted conflict where the parties’ needs, 
values and identities are threatened or thought to be threatened in the future;  
d- Increase parties’ belief that reconciliation with the adversary is possible and there are 
other options for approaching the headscarf conflict; to make the participants recognize 
that they do have a choice to constructively change the problematic aspects that are 
perceived as threat; in other words to make them realize that they can take control of 
their own future and that there are some other options except waiting for the resolution 
of the headscarf conflict with official methods, fate or just ignoring it; 
e- To create a group process through which the participants would be able to discuss the 
conflict, communicate their feelings, learn about each others’ differences and 
similarities, interests, needs, values, objectives, fears and concerns related to the 
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headscarf conflict (either in terms of political or psychological aspects) and observe 
their self-identifications in connection with the “other” so that they can become 
acquainted with each other; find the opportunity to evaluate in-group perceptions; 
recognize commonalities and compatibilities with the adversary party without ignoring 
the differences;  
f- Increase parties’ awareness that working cooperatively and improving relationships 
with each other is necessary; to provide the ground work and tools for the participants 
through which they would be able to redefine the conflict, reassess the costs of their 
objectives, create new ideas for solving the particular problems about the headscarf 
conflict, and visualize new policy options towards which the parties should jointly 
work.    
Moving along these strategic objectives an ICR approach will successfully address the 
current strategies of the adversarial parties that may ripen the parties in terms of 
achieving a concensus towards acting together or adopting problem-solving strategy 
towards the resolution of the headscarf conflict.   
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CHAPTER 6 
 
 
APPROPRIATE ICR APPROACH(ES) FOR TURKEY’S HEADSCARF 
CONFLICT 
 
 
 
 
 After assessing the headscarf conflict concerning the Kemalist and Islamist CSOs 
and building the strategy towards the appropriate ICR process, in this chapter the 
appropriate ICR approach(es) for Turkey’s headscarf conflict will be designated. 
Indicating the conditions that should be provided and taken into consideration prior to 
an intervention process has an important value for choosing the appropriate ICR 
approach(es). In this sense, prior to evaluating the applicability of the ICR approaches 
to the headscarf conflict in the first part of this chapter the following questions will be 
answered: “How to envision the causes of the headscarf conflict?”; “How to envision 
the resolution of the headscarf conflict?” The answers given to these questions will not 
only provide the framework through which the applicability of the ICR approaches can 
be evaluated, but also they will construct the case specific framework of the ICR 
process design that can be implemented in the future specifically to the headscarf 
conflict. 
 In the second part of the chapter, taking into consideration the assessment of the 
headscarf conflict; the strategic aspects indicated in the previous chapter and the 
conditions that will be mentioned in the first part of this chapter, the applicability of the 
seven theories of practice (ICR approaches that were categorized in the literature 
review) to the headscarf conflict will be evaluated.  
 
 
6.1 How to Envision the Causes of the Headscarf Conflict? 
 
 
Although the headscarf conflict keeps its intensity because of the headscarf ban 
and it appears to be about wearing or not wearing headscarf in public sphere, the causes 
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of this conflict are not that simple and straightforward. Almost all studies about the 
headscarf controversy try to explain its causes with some paradigms. Modernization 
project starting in the early Republican Period; revivalism of political Islam in 1980s; 
globalization paradigm that has brought the tension between universalism and 
particularism and emergence of “the crisis of identity” are some of these paradigms. 
Although, these explanations are well-located and provide simple explanations for the 
complex structure of the headscarf conflict, they appear to neglect the influence of other 
factors and the validity of alternative explanations.  
The roots of Turkey’s headscarf conflict are multiple and complex. In such a 
protracted conflict it has become very difficult to distinguish between causes and 
effects. Nevertheless, it is essential to understand and highlight all the factors of the 
conflict before trying to propose a solution. Although the headscarf conflict in Turkey is 
unique in many aspects, it shares essential characteristics with other inter-group 
protracted conflicts where the values, identities, and needs of the parties are at stake. In 
this context, it can be claimed that the characteristics and dynamics of the headscarf 
conflict are created by the parties’ needs, values, perceptions, attitudes, concerns, fears, 
goals and relations with each other.  
 In this thesis I chose to assess the roots and causes of the headscarf conflict from 
a subjective perspective focusing on the unmet human needs (need for identity, need for 
justice, need for recognition, need for security, need for freedom), threatened values 
(religious values and values given to other aspects as the visibility of women, public 
sphere, democracy, human rights), threatened identity aspects, problems of injustice and 
inequality (being deprived of the right to have education, work or political participation) 
power struggle (visibility of public space and women appear to be battle grounds among 
the Islamists and Kemalists) and parties’ perception of the conflict in zero-sum terms 
(especially the Kemalists’ thought that perceives understanding the adversary as giving 
concessions).  
 
6.2 How to Envision the Resolution of the Headscarf Conflict? 
 
For a successful intervention in the headscarf conflict, one of the fundamental 
principles that should be taken into consideration is based on not perceiving the conflict 
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as hopeless and stuck despite its complex, intractable, and deep-rooted character. 
Although for the headscarf conflict it seems as if there is not a near-term solution that 
will completely resolve it, the parties to the conflict (Islamist and Kemalist CSOs) can 
be empowered to work together with less distrust; make their interactions more 
constructive; be aware of their common identities and concerns; learn to co-exist 
without having exclusive fears and concerns towards each other; stop to see each other 
as enemies and understand the reason for their differences while accepting that these 
differences will most likely not wither away.  
In other words, the conflict should be seen as a necessary and potentially valuable 
dynamic that will lead to a shift in institutions, norms, relationships and even in social 
and political structure. Accordingly, the goal of the appropriate ICR approach for the 
headscarf conflict should not aim to direct the parties towards eliminating or ignoring 
the headscarf conflict, but to understand it and to suggest ways in which the conflict can 
be approached constructively. In this sense redefining Turkey’s “headscarf conflict” as 
a tremendous opportunity for constructive change and growth in the social and political 
context would ease the tension between the Islamists and Kemalists and constructive 
resolution process can be initiated instead of ignoring it or trying to resolve it with 
authoritative means.   
For constructive resolution of the headscarf conflict and for choosing or designing 
the appropriate ICR approach, addressing the case specific conditions has great 
importance. Given the stakeholder analysis, the conditions and aspects that should be 
addressed or taken into consideration in the appropriate ICR approach are listed in the 
next section under ten headings.  
 
 
6.2.1 Indicating the Factors that Nurture Intractability of the Conflict 
 
 
 The first condition that should be taken into consideration by the appropriate ICR 
approach is to address the factors that need to be changed for the conflict to be 
transformed from an intractable to a tractable one. These factors can be summarized as: 
1) The poor communication and lack of interaction between the Islamist and 
Kemalist CSOs; 
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2) Conflict avoidance strategy mostly used by the Kemalists (ignoring the 
existence of the headscarf conflict);  
3) High level of negative perceptions, misperceptions and stereotypes that the 
parties have towards each other;  
4) Parties’(most of the Kemalists) perception that “reconciliation with the 
adversary” is impossible; 
5) Parties’ perception of the headscarf conflict as a “power struggle” or in “zero-
sum” terms; 
6) Parties’ unwillingness to improve their relations and to act together; 
7) Parties’ (mostly the Kemalists) perception of the “adversary” as “enemy”; 
8) Parties’ use of the same words with different interpretations, ( none existence of 
a common language) or problem of redefining the conflict; 
9) Adversarial attitudes among the parties. 
 
 
6.2.2 Dealing with Unrecognized Options  
 
 
The most important aspect that should be approached by the appropriate ICR 
approach is the Kemalists’ strategy that is based on ignoring the conflict. As Deutsch 
states, in order to generate a cooperative orientation towards resolving a conflict, 
“reframing the conflict as a mutual problem to be resolved through joint cooperative 
efforts” is very important.(2000:52) In this sense, for the emergence of a constructive 
change, teaching the parties that avoiding a conflict is not a good option, that there are 
other alternative methods for approaching the problematic characters of the conflict, and 
that ignoring it may create destructive results, should be prior to the undertaking of the 
appropriate ICR process. 
 
 
6.2.3 Empowering the Parties to Understand the Most Important Aspects of the   
Conflict  
 
 
 Concerning the resolution of the headscarf conflict, if we take the protracted and 
complex nature of the conflict into consideration, it can be concluded that resolving it is 
a difficult task. The stakeholders generally indicate what is important for them in the 
context of the headscarf controversy but they are not aware of the underlying needs 
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lying beneath their interests. However, the identities, needs, values, prejudices, and 
fears of the parties give the enduring character to the conflict. In this sense for a 
successful ICR intervention into the headscarf conflict all these subjective aspects 
should be taken into consideration so that the participants should be given the 
opportunity to share their needs, values and fears with the other party and be acquainted 
with the perceptual aspects emphasized by the other party. Accordingly, they will be 
able to reframe the headscarf conflict through these aspects or to denote which of these 
aspects appear to be more important for the intractability as well as for the 
transformation of the headscarf conflict.  
 
 
6.2.4 Empowering the Parties to Decide on Their Own Future  
 
 
 In a general sense the implementation of problem-solving or relationship oriented 
ICR approaches require parties’ awareness of the conflict, their demands for its 
resolution and their willingness to improve their relations believing that it would 
constructively transform the conflict. However, for the headscarf conflict this is not the 
case. As it has been stated in the previous chapter most of the Kemalist CSOs 
representatives did not even identify the headscarf conflict as a “conflict” and both of 
the parties appeared not to have the willingness to improve their relationships. 
Underlining these aspects it can be argued that implementation of the ICR approaches 
that are based on analytical or problem-solving dialogue, would not generate productive 
results for the headscarf conflict. Giving the parties the opportunity to question what 
kind of relationship and shared future they want, parties’ awareness towards the conflict 
and hurting stalemate situation, their beliefs about the possibility of reconciliation and 
the necessity for improved relationships should be addressed prior to any intervention 
strategy. In other words, establishing or fostering a valid experience of ripeness among 
the Islamists and Kemalists in terms of developing a motivation to escape the conflict is 
the fundamental initial step for intervening in the headscarf conflict. 
 
6.2.5 Empowering the Parties to Reframe the Conflict 
Providing the stakeholders with the appropriate resolution approach for the 
headscarf conflict appears as an important condition for the resolution of the headscarf 
conflict. In this sense redefining and reframing the conflict has great importance. 
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Concerning the fact that some of the Kemalists do not even indicate the headscarf 
controversy as a conflict, in one of the stages the participants should be encouraged to 
acknowledge the conflict. This exercise can be defined as “Adversarial Conflict 
Framing” where the conflict is defined in terms of ‘us’ versus ‘them’, the resources at 
stake, and the opposing solutions sought. (Rothman, 1997) In this type of framing, the 
parties have to state what they think about the headscarf issue and what is important for 
them. The aim of this exercise is to increase the stakeholders’ awareness towards the 
headscarf conflict and towards each other’s positions since it is crucial before the 
parties’ adoption of problem-solving or cooperative attitude.  
 In another stage the participants should engage in “reflexive dialogue” through 
which they would be able to articulate their needs, values, fears, concerns and 
threatened identities related to the headscarf conflict and evaluate the previous 
adversarial stage. This type of reframing of the conflict is defined as “Integrative 
framing”86 and the aim is to indicate what the parties care about and why do they care 
about, who they are, and, given their self definitions as well as why the conflict matters 
to them so much. Although the stakeholders in the headscarf conflict appear to be 
familiar with each other’s needs, demands, fears and values through media or other 
communication channels, because of poor communication and lack of interaction they 
have never come to articulate these aspects in a face to face analytical dialogue platform 
so that some of their perceptions are distorted and they are not aware of the underlying 
needs of the “other”. In this sense as Rothman argues reflexive dialogue would 
encourage the parties to collaborate in setting new goals and restructuring their 
relationship through generating positive perceptions towards each other. (Rothman et. 
al. 2001)   
In the following stage, to avoid not addressing the political and power concepts of 
the headscarf conflict (that is a common deficiency of the ICR processes), the 
participants should be encouraged to reframe the conflict by using the central, 
conflictual concepts on which the whole headscarf conflict is situated. From the 
                                                 
86
 This dialogue is defined by Rothman as a form of guided ‘interactive introspection’ by which 
disputants speak about themselves in the presence of their adversaries and about their needs and values as 
viewed interactively through the constructivist prism of the conflict situation (Rothman, 1997). According 
to Rothman having first expressed themselves and heard each other in this way, disputants may then 
become allies in determining an agenda for future resolution approaches – further meetings, interest-
based problem-solving, functional cooperation, even traditional negotiation, and so forth (Rothman, 
1996). 
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stakeholder analysis, it became explicit that the stakeholders reveal the psychological 
and power aspects of the conflict through the concepts such as democracy, secularism, 
human rights, Islamism, headscarf, turban, public space, private space, modernization 
and citizenship. Although these concepts are used by the stakeholders to justify their 
needs, values, fears and identities, they appear to be interpreted differently because of 
the higher political aspects of the headscarf conflict. In order to identify all these 
concepts in a joint manner, the participants should concretly assess their own and each 
other’s psychological as well as political concerns that would in turn give participants 
the opportunity to redefine the larger conflict. Since all these concepts lie at the heart of 
the headscarf conflict, reframing these concepts and identifying the shared meanings 
would open the way towards the resolution of the conflict. Working on these concrete 
terms which are loaded with political concerns, would make the disputants concretely 
realize and evaluate the sincerity of the previously mentioned psychological concepts. 
By providing the stakeholders with a common language, in the long-run these redefined 
concepts can be used as a political tool through which the parties can actually go to 
reconciliation or agreement about the formal resolution of the conflict. 
 
 
6.2.6 Using the Women Organizations as Strategic Resource  
 
 
From the stakeholder analysis and from the brief overview of the three women 
organizations (Flying Broom, Başkent Women’s Platform and Ka-Der) it became 
evident that these women organizations have capacity to act as bridge builders in an 
ICR process. In this sense, these organizations should be included in order to generate a 
successful intervention. These women organizations may arrange some civil society 
projects in which both the Islamist and Kemalist CSOs can be brought together and 
common tasks with the aim to act together towards a common goal.    
Moreover, in an ICR workshop the representatives of these women organizations 
can be included as participants who would have a key role in terms of building bridges 
among the adversaries and possibly serving as facilitators. With this purpose, 
“Reframing the Headscarf Conflict from the Women Issue Perspective”87 exercise can 
be used in an idiosyncratic ICR workshop. This exercise has the purpose to grasp the 
power struggle theme of the headscarf conflict so that in one of the stages a 
                                                 
87
 This exercise is designed specifically to be implemented in headscarf conflict specific ICR workshop 
that would be conducted among the representatives of CSOs.   
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confrontation can be initiated around the question “Do you think that the visibility of 
woman is used as a battle ground by both of the parties?” This confrontation would 
probably act as a breaking point since both the Islamist and Kemalist women 
organizations would begin to question their own groups, find themselves with the 
women from the adversary party in the same position and the “neutral” women 
organizations who are highly inspired by the feminist approach would act as bridge 
builders presenting a different insight and orientation. The whole confrontation would 
make disputants realize to what extent the headscarf conflict revolves around needs, 
values and identity and the role of power struggle and politics in this conflict. Since the 
disputants (except the women organizations) would not probably accept that the woman 
and her visibility in the public sphere is used as a battle ground, they would have to 
partially overcome the power struggle mentality of the conflict that would provide a ripe 
ground for the following important stage. However, the important aspect of this exercise 
is based on the role of the women organization who could act as bridge builders.    
 
 
6.2.7 Addressing Negative Perceptions  
 
 
Since in the headscarf conflict some of the Kemalists perceive the Islamists as 
“enemy”, but not as “adversary” the necessity to reduce prejudices and stereotypes gets 
immense importance. From the stakeholder analysis it became obvious that although 
most of the Kemalists are aware of the needs and values of the Islamists, they do not 
find these aspects sincere but as means that are used to reach some destructive political 
objectives. In this sense from the Islamists point of view only revealing out needs, past 
sufferings and values would not be sufficient for the reduction of the Kemalists’ 
concerns, prejudices and fears. In order for their needs for security to be addressed, 
during the appropriate ICR process the commonalities or the shared identities between 
the adversaries should be emphasized without making the participants ignore the 
differences. Empathy generating exercises in which the parties would have to wear 
adversary’s shoes also need to be used to make the parties move from adversarial to 
collaborative, problem-solving attitude and generate a working relationship. 
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6.2.8 Generating a Common Goal and a Common Task  
 
 
  Another important aspect that is observed in the conflict assessment is that for 
both parties, polarization that may threaten the communal peace and unity of the state is 
something to be avoided. This finding can be strategically used in the appropriate ICR 
process as a catalyst for inducing the parties to work jointly towards this shared vision. 
For instance, the participants may be introduced with a worse case-future-scenario 
concerning the headscarf conflict on which they would have to work jointly to find out 
the most appropriate resolution method and to analyze how it could be prevented. 
Alternatively, by using analogies the participants may be introduced with other similar 
cases in the world or with cases that are worse than their case. (e.g. Iranian women, 
Afghanistan, abortion conflict in the U.S.) (Kaufman, 2002:218)  These activities would 
make disputants realize the costs of the continuing confrontation or avoidance policies; 
that they have the capacity to work together; that there should be other options except 
the present strategies and that, they have to improve their relations or at least recognize 
each others’ differences. Besides the abovementioned activities, given the stakeholder 
analysis it can be claimed that the parties’ shared vision towards the women’s status in 
Turkey can be used as another common goal in an ICR process. Taking into 
consideration the recent stage of the headscarf conflict, in the final part of this exercise, 
the participants may try to generate a creative option about how to approach the 
headscarf conflict, what should be done in social or political level, which level of the 
society has the capacity for applying these new options for action and as civil society 
organizations what kind of actions they can do. In this sense, creating a new relational 
structure or another option which would make it possible for the basic needs and other 
concerns of all those involved to be satisfied may be the final outcome of the 
appropriate ICR process.  
 
 
6.2.9 Dealing with Power Asymmetry 
 
 
The power asymmetry between the Kemalists and Islamists is an important aspect 
that should be carefully addressed in an ICR process. Given our conflict assessment, the 
power asymmetry among the parties reflects itself in their incompatible goals and 
strategies adopted towards the headscarf controversy. In this context, how power would 
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be addressed during the intervention is very important since power relations between 
the parties should be overridden for successful intervention. Accordingly, in an ICR 
workshop by providing each of the parties equal time; including the same number of 
participants of each party who have comparable status in terms of profession and gender 
and equal legitimacy; including a balanced third party who are familiar with and 
sensitive to the concerns of each of conflicting parties can be indicated as some 
examples through which the power asymmetry should be addressed during an ICR 
process. (Rouhana and Kelman, 1994)  
 
 
6.2.10 Training the Participants  
 
 
Educating the parties who ignore the conflict they are involved in, and who are not 
aware of the alternative conflict resolution methods has great importance in creating 
peaceful relations. Figure 6.1 where the progression of a conflict is illustrated 
successfully visualizes the importance of education strategy within the conflict process. 
In this figure, the stages of a conflict are indicated in relation to the power asymmetry 
and relations among the adversarial parties, as well as their awareness of the conflict. 
The figure indicates that when there is power asymmetry and unpeaceful relations 
among the conflicting parties, and when they have low awareness of the conflict, the 
conflict is in its latent stage. Thus, at this stage the parties should be educated to 
increase the awareness of the parties about the conflict and its resolution. Subsequently, 
it is illustrated that when the parties are aware of the conflict, and have unstable 
relations characterized by power asymmetry, they engage in confrontation that is 
followed by negotiation strategy requiring the power asymmetry to be balanced. The 
final stage of the conflict progression figure refers to sustainable peace where the parties 
reach peaceful relations.  
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Figure 6.1 The progression of conflict 
 
Original Source: Adam Curle, Making Peace (London: Tavistock Press, 1971) 
Taken From: John Paul Lederach, Building Peace (Washington: USIPP, 1997) 
Applying this figure to Turkey’s headscarf conflict, it becomes obvious that power 
asymmetry, conflict awareness and relations aspects indicated in the figure completely 
suit the conditions that characterize the headscarf conflict. Thus, given the power 
asymmetry; poor relations between the adversarial parties and the Kemalists’ low 
awareness of the conflict88, it becomes obvious that in order to transform the headscarf 
conflict from an intractable to a tractable one where negotiation can be implemented, 
using education as an initial strategy has great importance.  
What is meant by education or training is introducing the participants to 
communication and problem-solving skills, empathy building, prejudice decreasing, 
stereotype breaking exercises with the assumption that misunderstanding and lack of 
human compassion are among the primary causes of conflict. In this sense 
“compassionate listening” becomes important and as Abu-Nimer indicates, it requires: 
 “questions which are non-adversarial and listening which is not judgemental. 
Listeners seek to humanise the enemy. They do not defend themselves but accept 
                                                 
88
 The Kemalists’ low awareness of the headscarf conflict can be closely related to their willingness to 
protect the status quo.   
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whatever others say as their perceptions and validate the right to their own 
perception.”(Abu-Nimer, 2002: 141) 
Abu-Nimer also argues that for the adversaries who meet for the first time and have a 
great deal of fear and know little about each other, compassionate listening is perfectly 
suitable since it introduces them to each other’s perspectives. (Abu-Nimer, 2002) In 
other words, listening should be taught to the people who are paralysed by high level of 
prejudices and stereotypes. In other words these skills are necessary for a constructive 
dialogue and will empower the participants to look at their conflict from an outside 
perspective so that they will not be locked in unproductive or destructive traps that 
would threaten the success of the dialogue. 
Moreover, introducing participants with theoretical definitions and types of inter-
group or communal conflicts; conflict assessment tools and other mechanisms of 
conflict resolution such as negotiation, mediation and arbitration are other important 
parts of the education strategy. With these skills, the participants will be able to 
analytically analyze the conflict and realize that there are other options for the 
resolution of the headscarf conflict. As Babbitt notes “Conflict resolution training 
provides both analytical and behavioral instruction, enabling participants to expand their 
range of both assessments of the conflict and actions aimed at resolving or transforming 
it”. (Babbit, 1997:370)  Moreover, she states that “Joint training allows both parties to 
engage in a mutual learning process, with the crucial assumptions that these new skills 
will form the basis for interaction between parties when they do meet for…negotiation 
on the conflict”. (Babbit, 1997:367) Combining this theoretical knowledge with their 
experiences in the civil society, the CSOs’ representatives will be able to design 
appropriate ICR approaches to all types of organizational or communal conflicts. The 
long-term affect of the education approach used in an ICR process will be the 
introduction of the ICR field to the participants and provide them with the theoretical 
and practical capacity to institutionalize the ICR method in Turkey.  
The other reason for using the education strategy in the appropriate ICR process is 
to prevent the confrontations from entering in deadlock as well as to help disputants be 
effective and not violate moral aspects. Since in the “interactive” conflict resolution 
processes confrontation between the adversary parties is inevitable but at the same time 
necessary, at every stage using training tools and some exercises, the education strategy 
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will also give the participants the opportunity to re-evaluate and consider their in-group 
perceptions. Another reason for using the education strategy so frequently is highly 
related to the interviewees’ concern towards the ICR methods in general and their 
claims suggesting that a simple dialogue cannot solve the headscarf conflict. In this 
sense, to break the parties’ prejudices related to the ICR’s efficiency, systematic and 
repeated training in conflict resolution mechanisms will make them familiar with the 
conflict resolution field helping them to understand that there are some other alternative 
options for resolving protracted conflicts.  
 
 
6.3 Evaluating the Applicability of the ICR Approaches 
 
 
The seven theories of practice categorized in this study differ in how they define 
the roots of protracted conflicts and this in turn shapes the intervention strategies they 
propose in protracted conflicts. In this part, the applicability of the ICR approaches will 
be analyzed according to their suitability to adress the roots of the headscarf conflict 
and the compatibility of their conflict resolution orientation with the orientation with 
which the headscarf conflict should be approached. In the first section taking into 
consideration the assessment of the headscarf conflict as well as how the roots of the 
headscarf conflict should be envisioned, the ICR approaches will be analyzed to find 
out which one(s) are most proper to address the causes of the headscarf conflict. 
Subsequently, taking into consideration the assessment of the headscarf conflict; 
strategic opportunities, limitations and objectives; conditions for its resolution; and the 
ICR approaches’ methodological orientations as well as their general orientation 
towards the resolution of protracted conflicts, the applicability of the ICR approaches to 
the headscarf conflict will be evaluated.  
 
 
6.3.1 Suitability to Address the Causes of the Headscarf Conflict 
 
 
 First of all it should be stated that all theories of practice stated in this study 
approach protracted conflicts in constructive terms since they do not aim to direct the 
parties towards eliminating or ignoring the conflicts they are involved in. Rather all 
these approaches aim to make the parties understand the conflict and suggest ways in 
which the conflicts can be approached constructively instead of ignoring them or trying 
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to resolve them with authoritative means. In this sense, all ICR approaches appear as 
proper processes to envision the headscarf conflict in constructive terms; and provide an 
opportunity for constructive change and growth in the social and political context. 
Moreover, grasping the subjective aspects of the protracted conflicts, these ICR 
approaches completely suit the vision through which the headscarf conflict is analyzed 
in this study.  
 Concerning the assessment of Turkey’s headscarf conflict, it became obvious that 
for the Islamist and Kemalist CSOs fundamental needs such as identity, recognition, 
security and justice are at stake. In this sense, human needs approaches that see unmet 
human needs as the sources of deeply rooted conflicts can be appropriately used to 
adress the underlying causes of the headscarf controversy. 
 On the other hand, more specifically identity and psychoanalytic approaches put 
threatened or frustrated identities at the centre of the conflicts, in addition, 
psychoanalytic approaches emphasize how threatened identity rooted in unresolved past 
loss and suffering launches and perpetuates inter-group conflicts.  In this sense it can be 
claimed that since human needs approaches focus on wider area of needs while identity 
and psychoanalytic approaches focus only on identity needs, human needs approaches 
are more appropriate in explaining the complex nature of the headscarf conflict. 
However, focusing on the psychological aspects of the conflict and threatened identity 
aspects, identity and psychoanalytic approaches can provide a greater understanding of 
the prejudices, stereotypes, enemy discourses and negative attitudes of the stakeholders 
so that their relationship can be further elucidated.  
 On the other hand, communal relations that do not especially concern themselves 
with the root causes of any specific conflict, begin with the reality of intergroup conflict 
characterized by hostility, polarization, distrust, absence of cooperation, and that there 
are continuing incidents which perpetuate the conflict. This relationship oriented 
assumption is highly appropriate for the headscarf conflict since what has escalated the 
conflict and has brought it to the current stage is the dynamic interaction of the 
abovementioned aspects. From the assessment of the headscarf conflict it is also 
apparent that the unwillingness of the parties to participate in a dialogue with the 
adversary and especially the Kemalist CSOs’ win-loose strategy that has to be urgently 
approached for the resolution of the conflict are closely related with the poor 
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relationship among the parties shaped with distrust, negative perceptions, stereotypes 
and enmity. These aspects emphasized by communal relations cannot be indicated as 
the root causes of the headscarf conflict but rather as affects that nurture the escalatory 
dynamic of the conflict. In this context, this type of understanding of protracted 
conflicts can be appropriate for designing constructive intervention strategies that would 
provide the framework through which deeper causes of the headscarf conflict can be 
addressed.    
Intercultural communication approaches perceive the cultural differences in 
beliefs and behaviours as barriers to effective inter-group communication and sources of 
misperception and distrust that is central in inter-group conflict. The scholars of these 
approaches claim that the conflict is exacerbated by the fact that each side has 
significant trouble in understanding what the other is saying and as a result is unable to 
respond effectively on a number of occasions. Moreover, it is asserted that intercultural 
miscommunication readily occurs when symbols and rituals which mark and celebrate 
identity for one group generates threat and fear for another. Concerning these arguments 
of intercultural communication approaches, it becomes obvious that they grasp an 
important escalatory aspect of the headscarf conflict. Although the Kemalists and 
Islamists share a common culture, history and even the same religion, their 
interpretations of some central aspects to the headscarf conflict such as secularism, 
democracy, public sphere and citizenship are completely different and this appears to be 
an important factor that prevents the parties to communicate effectively further 
exacerbating the tensions. As it is the case in communal relations, these aspects also 
appear not to explain the roots of the headscarf conflict but the poor communication that 
blocks the resolution of the conflict through dialogue. However, intercultural 
communication’s emphasis on value differences among the parties that is claimed to 
originate from different world views, grasp the nature of the headscarf conflict where 
both the Islamists and Kemalists’ values come to clash.  
Besides these approaches, transformation-oriented approaches that see problems 
of injustice and inequality as causes of protracted conflicts also provide an appropriate 
vision for explaining the headscarf conflict that is shaped with discrimination against 
veiled women who are deprived of their rights for education, work and political 
participation. Moreover, concerning not only psychological aspects of group relations 
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but also social, economic, political and military relations as well, transformation 
approaches appear as the most appropriate ones that have the capacity to take into 
consideration almost all underlying causes of the headscarf conflict. From the analysis 
of the headscarf conflict it became apparent that focusing only on subjective elements or 
oversimplifying the conflict by eliminating political or other structural aspects would 
not generate constructive changes. However, since this is the general case in ICR 
approaches, transformation oriented approaches appear as an exception with their 
comprising and not oversimplifying understanding of protracted conflicts. Moreover, 
characterizing protracted conflicts as complex, dynamic, nonlinear systems with a core 
set of interrelated and mutually influential variables, these approaches appear to 
comprisingly grasp the nature of the headscarf conflict.  
Finally, principled negotiation sees the zero-sum view as the causes of conflicts 
and focuses on the incompatible positions into which groups are locked claiming that 
this zero-sum nature of the conflict can be altered and the parties can become able to 
devise solutions for mutual benefit. In this context, principled negotiation does not seem 
to recommend an appropriate vision to grasp the nature of the headscarf conflict. First 
of all, I agree that zero-sum vision towards a conflict prevents its resolution and going 
further this vision can be indicated among the aspects generating and escalating the 
headscarf conflict. Moreover, I agree that this kind of vision should be addressed in an 
intervention process. However, believing that some conflicts are inherently zero-sum, 
not the nature of the conflict but the visions of the parties towards the conflict can be 
changed. Concerning the headscarf conflict it is obvious that holding the key state 
institutions, such as the military, at their hands the Kemalists are the powerful party and 
they benefit from the statusquo perceiving the headscarf case in zero-sum terms. 
However, as long as one of the parties holds the power, the nature of the conflict will 
going to have zero-sum character. Thus, in the early stages of these types of conflicts 
directing the parties to work jointly towards a win-win agreement is not an appropriate 
strtaegy. Nevertheless, to address the zero-sum vision of the parties the most important 
thing is to make the parties reconcile along what kind of relationship and shared future 
they want. Moreover, since principled negotiation is claimed to be more relevant in 
distributional disputes – those which are about the allocation of resources – it does not 
appear as an appropriate approach to grasp the main causes of the headscarf conflict that 
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can be indicated in terms of subjective, non-divisive, non-negotiable value and need 
based aspects.   
Evaluating the ICR approaches’ understanding of the roots of protracted conflicts, 
it can be concluded that although they emphasize different aspects of the causes of 
protracted conflicts for the most part they do not directly disagree with each other and 
do not claim that the causes of conflict identified by the others’ theories are irrelevant. 
Thus, concerning the protracted, complex structure of the headscarf conflict they all 
appear to successfully address specific aspects of the headscarf conflict. However, from 
the assessment of the headscarf conflict conducted in this study it can be claimed that 
especially transformation oriented approaches as well as the human needs and identity 
approaches provide the most proper theoretical explanation for the causes of the 
headscarf conflict.  
 
 
6.3.2 Suitability to Address the Resolution of the Headscarf Conflict 
 
 
Taking the assessment of the headscarf conflict; the strategic limitations, 
opportunities, sources and objectives; as well as the previously mentioned conditions 
for approaching the headscarf conflict into consideration, in this part the seven theories 
of practice will be evaluated having the purpose to designate the most appropriate ICR 
orientation(s) towards the headscarf conflict. Although each of these theories of practice 
aim to resolve protracted conflicts, there are significant differences among them in what 
exactly they aim.  
6.3.2.1 Human needs approaches 
  The ICR processes that are based on “human needs theory” claim that unmet, 
frustrated, core human needs should be surfaced, fully analyzed, and addressed before 
any kind of bargaining or negotiation succeeds. In other words concerning the 
resolution of protracted conflicts, the supporters of human needs approaches claim that 
deep-rooted conflicts can be resolved only by the satisfaction of the basic needs through 
constructive conflict-regulation. To sum up, in human needs approaches the key is to 
translate the interests (and positions) of the adversary parties into their underlying needs 
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for collective identity, security, and participation and make them recognize the shared 
and nonnegotiable character of those needs and how they are central to the dispute.   
In this context, the methodological orientation of human needs approaches that is 
based on analytical problem-solving workshops and analytic dialogues wherein the 
causes of conflict can be analytically understood appears to propose a promising, 
constructive step towards the resolution of Turkey’s headscarf conflict. The Kemalist 
and Islamist participants involved in such workshops would find the opportunity to self-
analyze the conflict; see their own and other group’s frustrated needs; and analyze their 
relationships. They would also be informed of each others’ perceptions, alternative 
means of attaining values and goals, and of costs of pursuing present policies. However, 
given the findings of stakeholder analysis, it can be claimed that high level of distrust, 
negative perceptions and stereotypes shape the relationship between the Islamist and 
Kemalist CSOs; most of the Kemalist CSOs representatives are even not willing to 
participate in a dialogue with the Islamists; and the underlying needs, values or causes 
of the conflicts are indicated by the parties via using same concepts but with different 
meanings. These aspects indicate that these stakeholders are not ready yet for analytical 
problem-solving workshop. In this sense, using the human needs approach and its 
techniques in the early stages of an ICR intervention would probably not produce 
constructive outcomes but rather exacerbate the conflict.   
6.3.2.2 Identity and psychoanalytic approaches 
 Identity approaches claim that articulating and mutually engaging the 
fundamental identity issues is the ultimate point for satisfactory resolution and that 
disputants should engage in interactions which first evoke mutual threats to identity and 
then should offer mutual assurances which communicate an acceptance of each other’s 
core identity and right to exist. In this sense, identity approaches seem to be applicable 
to Turkey’s headscarf conflict. Similarly, psychoanalytic approaches that encourage the 
mutual expression of sorrow for losses, appears to be applicable to the headscarf case 
since in both the Kemalists’ and Islamists’ undertsandings of the headscarf controversy 
psychological aspects have significant importance. For instance, the Kemalists’ enemy 
discourse can be related to the assassinations of some Kemalist intellectuals by the 
fundamentalist Islamists.  Likewise, because of the headscarf ban thousands of veiled 
girls had to leave their educations and jobs and had to cope with psychological 
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problems. All these factors indicate the psychological aspects of the conflict that nurture 
its intractable character so that they should be constructively addressed in the 
appropriate ICR process.  
However, as it is the case for the application of human needs approaches, before 
addressing threatened identities or mourning past losses the parties to the headscarf 
conflict have to be ready for entering in such an analytical dialogue. In this sense, first 
of all the stakeholders should be empowered and taught that there are other options 
besides following their current strategies. Subsequently, they should be provided with 
communication based approaches in order to break the cycle that prevents adversaries 
enter into a dialogue so that the space where the parties can mutually mourn their losses 
or where they can mutually analyze each others’ needs, concerns and fears can be 
analyzed.  
Nevertheless, some techniques used under identity approaches (especially 
“antagonistic reframing” of the conflict and “reflexive dialogue”) that are mentioned in 
the first part of this chapter can be constructively used in the middle stages of an 
appropriate ICR process. Moreover, education strategy that is adopted by some of the 
identity approaches (ex: in Interactive Problem Solving; Kelman, 1999) is compatible 
with the appropriate methodological orientation through which the headscarf conflict 
should be approached. 
6.3.2.3 Principled negotiation 
Principled negotiation whose methodological orientation can be categorized under 
four parts including separating the people from the problem; focusing on interests, not 
positions; inventing options for mutual gain; and insisting on objective criteria do not 
appear to recommend an appropriate vision for the resolution of the headscarf conflict. 
Although principled negotiation theorists argue that almost all disputes can be resolved 
using these principles, the intractable conflicts such as the headscarf conflict in Turkey 
seem to need something more than the mere application of these principles. Through the 
mere articulation of the parties’ positions in terms of their interests a creative solution 
that would bridge the differences between the Islamist and Kemalist CSOs cannot be 
generated. Given that there is an extreme level of mistrust, stereotypes and negative 
perceptions among the Islamist and Kemalist CSOs, the use of principled negotiation in 
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the early stages can even be counter-productive. It is also important to note that 
principled negotiation is based on rational cost-benefit analysis that cannot be 
implemented in protracted conflicts where values, human needs and other psychological 
aspecs epitomize the positions of the parties. 
 Accordingly, since the fundamental objective of the principled negotiation is an 
agreement among the parties and since in the highly escalated headscarf conflict the 
parties appear not to be ready for reaching an agreement inapplicability of this approach 
once again comes to the fore. Moreover, separating people from issues is not such an 
easy undertaking for value-based conflicts and cannot be implemented at the initial 
stage of the intervention process. Thus, only articulating positions in terms of interests 
would automatically eliminate the needs, values, concerns and fears of the parties that 
are at the centre of the headscarf conflict. In this sense, all these aspects need to be 
systematically addressed throughout the whole process rather than trying to separate the 
substantive issues from relational issues only at the initial stage. Although principled 
negotiation is a useful tool for conflict resolution and its principles provide guidance to 
the practitioners, the value and identity centered characteristics of the headscarf conflict 
require the use of different approaches for its resolution. 
 Going further, Fisher and Ury (1991) claim that if participants are asked about 
why they are taking their positions, interests may arise and it can be found that both 
parties’ interests are actually compatible. However, in Turkey’s headscarf conflict this 
is not the case since among the issues, values, needs or objectives emphasized by the 
Islamist and Kemalist CSOs no compatibility could be analyzed. Besides, the objective 
criteria principle that is defined as an important factor leading the parties to reach an 
integrative agreement does not appear to suit the context of the headscarf conflict. Since 
the Kemalist CSOs appear to be satisfied with the current situation and have no 
intention in changing the status quo their BATNA will be the continuation of the 
headscarf ban that will not produce constructive change and block the resolution 
process.    
6.3.2.4 Communal relations 
The core principle of these approaches asserts that effective conflict resolution 
requires significant changes in how people from different communities interact with 
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each other at the local level. In this sense, the conflictual communal relationships are 
put at the centre of these approaches claiming that communal dialogues aim to change 
relationships between adversaries so that in the long run peace would be brought even 
in the most intractable conflicts. Parallel to this theoretical framework, community 
relations do not use solely small-group dialogue processes as intervention tools, but they 
also focus on community development projects to increase the control of the groups on 
decisions affecting their own lives. Accordingly, the development of local organizations 
which will articulate the needs and concerns of their community are emphasized as the 
initial tools to be used in these approaches. The second phase of community relations 
work is based on developing constructive local-level interaction and cooperative 
relationships between people from different groups. While specific interactions can vary 
widely – from sporting encounters, to school and cultural exchanges, or discussions of 
joint concerns such as children’s safety or clean water – the core assumption is that 
functional cooperation around substantive matters can contribute to the breakdown of 
negative images and diminish intergroup hostility.  
Since the headscarf conflict is not a communal conflict and there is not a tension 
at the grassroots level, these approaches cannot be applied directly to this conflict. 
However, taking the theoretical framework of the communal relations works, they can 
be modified to suit the context of the headscarf conflict in Turkey. Analyzing the 
headscarf conflict in the context of CSOs, it appears that the CSOs in Turkey cannot act 
as moderators or bridge builders since most of them are not politically neutral but rather 
polarized along the headscarf controversy. However, as this study states there are some 
strategic resources in the civil society that can act as potential bridge builders among the 
Islamist and Kemalist CSOs. Thus, while in communal relations the community 
relations are set at the centre, in the modified communal relations works the relationship 
among the Islamist and Kemalist CSOs can be defined as the focal point.89 So that with 
the activities of potential bridge builders (from the stakeholder analysis the women 
organizations appear to have the greatest capacity) the relations between the Islamist 
                                                 
89
 From the stakeholder analysis it became obvious that in an ICR process that would be implemented 
among the Islamist and Kemalist CSOs their relations should be placed at the centre.  
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and Kemalist CSOs can be improved that in the long-run would affect decision-making 
process.90    
6.3.2.5 Intercultural communication 
Intercultural communication aims to improve inter-group communication through 
increasing mutual awareness of barriers to effective communication, weakening 
negative stereotypes, emphasizing knowledge of each other’s culture, and developing 
new shared historical accounts. Accordingly, these approaches build their practice 
around increasing knowledge of other cultures, developing less threatening metaphors 
and images of opponents, addressing the differences that revolve around dissimilarity in 
attitudes, perceptions, cultural values, communication style, needs or goals and creating 
new, shared meaning . 
Concerning high level of prejudice, stereotypes, poor relationship and limited 
interaction among the Islamist and Kemalist CSOs it becomes obvious that before 
applying analytical, cognitive or emotion based approaches as human needs, identity 
and psychoanalytical approaches in the context of CSOs, communication based 
approaches appear as more appropriate. The stakeholder analysis conducted in this 
study reveals that the Islamist and Kemalist CSOs indicate their needs, perceptions, 
values or fears by using same concepts but attributing different meanings to them. Thus, 
this condition appears to form an important strategic obstacle to a potential analytical 
dialogue process among the parties. In this sense preceding such intervention process, 
communication based approaches should be implemented in the context of the headscarf 
conflict. In this way, value based aspects can be redefined and new communication 
patterns can be developed through which the whole conflict can be reframed.  
                                                 
90
 The rationale for choosing CSOs as the target level of the society whose relationship will be improved 
can be based on the CSOs’ ability to affect the public opinion and grass roots through the writings and 
other activities of their representatives who work in academia, media, private sector, education or 
jurisprudence and through their organizational activities. However, for the resolution of Turkey’s 
headscarf conflict what should be influenced is the decision making process or state since Turkey’s 
headscarf conflict is not a communal but politicized conflict that can be resolved only by political 
applications. In this sense, if highly politicized CSOs come to reconciliation about the headscarf conflict 
this would inevitably draw the attention of the decision-makers. Although the state has a heterogeneous 
structure, what should be constructively influenced within this structure are the conservative-Kemalist 
institutions. Sharing similar identities, needs, fears and values with these institutions, the Kemalist CSOs 
would be affective in spillover affect.  
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Analyzing the methodological orientation of these approaches, it becomes evident 
that they provide wide range of strategically valuable tools that can be implemented to 
the headscarf conflict. For instance, as a specific tool “transcendent discourse” that is 
designed to approach the differences and that aims to create a new shared language 
through which the parties can coordinate their differing world views can be 
constructively implemented to generate common definitions to the concepts that have 
central importance in the headscarf conflict. Involving third parties in the peacemaking 
process who can ‘translate’ between the parties even when they are apparently speaking 
the same language is another technique recommended by intercultural communication 
approaches and that can be used in an ICR approach designed to be implemented in the 
context of the headscarf conflict. The other technique that is presented in the context of 
these approaches is “relational empathy”. With the use of this tool in an ICR process the 
Islamist and Kemalist CSOs can find the opportunity to improve the common 
understanding about how their own prejudices influence the development of 
understanding in the encounter and learn to work at merging their views with those of 
the others and adopt a set of “dialogic attitude” for use in conflict interaction. Like 
“transcendent discourse”, this tool also provides the parties with the opportunity to 
create new, shared meanings.  
6.3.2.6 Transformation-oriented approaches 
Transformation oriented approaches imply a process of change in a conflict’s 
manifestation at personal, relational, structural and cultural levels. These approaches 
focus on changes in perceptions and attitudes toward the conflict; on improvements in 
interaction and communication; not only on psychological aspects of group relations but 
on social, economic, political and military relations as well; on social environment 
necessary to fulfil basic human needs; on access to religious, economic, political and 
administrative resources and opportunities to participate in decision-making procedures; 
and on identifying and reshaping the patterns that contribute to promoting indigenous 
resources and mechanisms that are effective in responding constructively to conflicts. In 
this sense, transformation approaches are long term intervention processes generally 
implemented as peace building strategies in the communities divided along armed 
conflicts.  
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 Although in the context of the headscarf conflict Turkey’s society is not divided 
along violence and peace building does not emerge as a necessary intervention strategy, 
the theoretical principles of transformation approaches give a valuable insight for a 
successful intervention in the headscarf conflict. First of all, not focusing in resolving 
the conflicting issues but in rebuilding relations among the polarized institutions 
including CSOs should be adopted as the primary intervention principle for the 
headscarf conflict. Rebuilding the relationship among the Islamist and Kemalist CSOs 
may even provide an important step towards improving the relationship between the 
institutions of the state that have controversial positions towards the headscarf conflict. 
 From the stakeholder analysis it is found out that the CSOs are not ready to enter 
into analytical problem solving dialogue or to reach an agreement on certain issues. In 
this sense using “empowerment” strategy that is also the methodological orientation of 
the transformation approaches can give the CSOs the opportunity to decide on what 
kind of relations and shared future they want. This would be the first step taken in the 
complex process of reconciliation so that the parties can generate more complex but 
above all more accurate images of the “adversary”.  
 In the long run, this process may even transform the Islamist and Kemalist CSOs 
into strategic resource that can jointly organize some projects towards the shared future 
that they envision. In other words, “empowerment” strategy can be used as the initial 
intervention strategy in the context of CSOs so that the parties can be ready to take 
further steps in terms of entering in a dialogue where communication based approaches 
can be successfully implemented and new shared meanings or shared language can be 
created. In this sense, the ripe ground would be constructed for the application of 
problem solving and negotiation based approaches.   
Elicitve training that is another strategy recommended by these approaches highly 
suits the training strategy that should be implemented in an appropriate ICR process. 
With the elicitive training the parties can generate their own indigenous methods 
towards the resolution of the headscarf conflict. In fact from the stakeholder analysis it 
became obvious that the stakeholders give greater credibility to power based resolution 
methods such as the ones imposed by the state or the ones based on arbitration and 
adjudication. Moreover, since facilitative dialogue groups, communal dialogue projects 
or other ICR approaches are not familiar to the Turkish society, the stakeholders appear 
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to have a considerable concern related to these resolution methods. Accordingly, using 
“elicitive”91 and “prescriptive”92 training the participants can find out the most 
appropriate approach for addressing the headscarf conflict.  
 From all these evaluations of the applicability of the ICR approaches to the 
headscarf conflict, it can be concluded that the strategies used by some approaches need 
case specific modifications and some of them are not proper to be used at the initial 
stages of an intervention to the headscarf conflict. However, despite these drawbacks, in 
general sense all ICR approaches recommend promising intervention strategies and 
proper visions to approach the roots and resolution of the headscarf conflict. The most 
important principle on which all these ICR approaches are based is the importance of 
involving the parties in the resolution process. This principle that also epitomizes the 
aim of this study suggests that authoritative third parties or unilateral action by the 
parties is not likely to produce good solutions and that constructive conflict resolution 
requires exploration and innovation by the parties themselves. Moreover, all these 
approaches view conflict resolution as a long-term process involving both pre- and post-
settlement tasks, not just reaching a signed agreement. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
91
 According to Lederach, elicitive training requires particular attention to language and metaphors which 
reveal both how conflicts are understood and possibilities for their transformation. (Lederach, 1995: 73–
83) Having participants recounting proverbs and engaging in storytelling helps them to understand how a 
conflict is framed and to identify possibilities for its resolution. In elicitive trainings the participants 
develop their own understanding of conflict and are encouraged to develop local approaches to their 
problems. In this sense it can be argued that culture treated as a critical resource, not as a barrier, to 
conflict transformation.  
 
92
 Prescriptive training refers to the conflict assessment tools, conflict resolution methods, communication 
or problem-solving skills trainings that are theoretically generated by the U.S or European 
scholar/practitioners and that form the basis of the Conflict Resolution field. In these trainings the trainer 
is the expert.  
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CHAPTER 7 
 
 
 CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
 
The main aspiration of this study was to find out the appropriate ICR approaches 
towards the headscarf conflict. Arguing that conflict assessment is crucial before 
intervening in a conflict, in this study the headscarf conflict was approached from a 
“conflict resolution perspective” and concerning the civil society organizations the 
“stakeholder analysis” of the conflict was conducted. Analyzing the empirical findings 
of the stakeholder analysis, a case specific strategy was formulated towards the 
appropriate ICR process.  
From the general findings of the “stakeholder analysis” it can be concluded that 
the headscarf conflict is a protracted inter-group conflict based on complex set of 
historical, religious, cultural and political issues among which the identity and value 
aspects are at the center. The lack of interaction and poor interaction between the 
stakeholders; perception of the veiled women as a battleground; and stakeholders’ 
negative perceptions and stereotypes towards each other appeared to increase the 
intractable character of the conflict. In this sense, the headscarf appears at the cross-
roads of the power relationship between modernity-tradition; civilization-backwardness; 
secularism-religion; Kemalism-Islamism; citizenship-pluralism; secular national 
identity-religious/cultural identity as well as the power relationship between different 
womanhoods in Turkey. Although the current stage of the headscarf conflict appears to 
be a stalemate threatening the actual and future needs and values of the primary parties, 
from the assessment some strategically promising points for the entry of a third party 
were found. Concerning these strategic opportunities as well as the possible limitations 
the applicability of the ICR approaches to the headscarf conflict was evaluated.   
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Concerning the general findings from the conflict assessment and case specific 
ICR process the major implications of this study for the Conflict Resolution field in 
general; Interactive Conflict Resolution field and Turkey’s “headscarf conflict” in 
particular can be summarized as the following:    
 - Moving beyond just “waiting for the resolution of the headscarf conflict with official 
methods” or just “ignoring it”:  This study explored the applicability of an alternative, 
non-official, long-term method for the resolution of the headscarf conflict. One of the 
most crucial assumptions on which it is based, indicates that for the official resolution 
of protracted communal conflicts, reconciliation among the opinion leaders (mid-level 
leaders) is a very important step since in the long run this will provide a ripe pre-
negotiation process or a common voice representing a common ground and the 
minimum consensus to the society. In relation to Turkey’s headscarf conflict, the 
institutionalized application of appropriate ICR approaches among civil society 
organizations, intellectuals, women organizations, political parties’ youth branches, 
academicians etc. will form the most important step towards the official resolution of 
the conflict although it may take a long-time. Going further through some modifications 
the appropriate ICR approaches can even be applied at the grassroots level including 
people involved in local communities or members of CSOs. 
- Conducting a thorough assessment of the conflict is crucial before intervening: This 
study emphasizes the importance of conducting an assessment of the conflict before 
applying some conflict resolution methods. This is very crucial for the correct match of 
the conflict assessment and the conflict resolution method that will be implemented. In 
the ICR field, many scholar/practitioners directly intervene in the conflict without 
conducting a deep analysis of the conflict and this situation sometimes leads to 
unsuccessful intervention.  
- Institutionalization of ICR in Turkey: By introducing the general theoretical basis of 
ICR approaches and by evaluating its applicability to Turkey’s cultural context 
(although it is limited to CSOs and the headscarf conflict), this study proposes an 
alternative framework for the resolution of “protracted” communal, organizational, 
environmental, cultural and other types of inter-group conflicts. The third party role 
may be adopted by some neutral civil society organizations in terms of conducting 
problem-solving workshops in relation to these types of conflicts. When the ICR 
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approaches become institutionalized by some civil society organizations, positive 
impact on Turkish government’s decision-making process might be created. Presenting 
the ICR approaches to the CSOs would open a new insight in terms of not waiting for 
the authoritative resolution to the problems or leaving them to fate, but taking a more 
active and constructive approach. By increasing the awareness of the CSOs that they are 
politically effective and can make difference to the structural sources of the communal 
conflicts, the ICR approaches would empower the CSOs as social agents who can 
actively engage in decision-making process and work outside the government to change 
the conflictual relationships. In this particular study, such third party role was found to 
be suitable for the bridge-builder CSOs.   
- Conflict can be embraced, not just avoided or extinguished. Conflict should be seen as 
a necessary and potentially valuable dynamic that will lead to a shift rather than just 
identifying and eliminating existing conflict. So the goal of this research project was not 
to eliminate or ignore the intractable conflict, but to understand it and to suggest ways 
in which that conflict can be resolved constructively. My own conjecture is that 
intractable conflicts offer a tremendous opportunity for constructive change and growth 
in a social and political context. I believe that identifying Turkey’s “headscarf conflict” 
in these terms would ease the tension between conflicting groups and constructive 
resolution process can be initiated instead of ignoring it or trying to resolve it with 
aggressive means. Bringing together the CSOs’ representatives with adversary 
perspectives, experiences, and values in ways that realize their differences and enable 
them to build consensus about how to resolve common problems should be the 
significant aspiration of an ICR process that would be implemented in the context of 
CSOs. However, if participation could be further expanded across social divisions, the 
process would be an important mechanism within civil society to facilitate a social 
change. 
- The social justice implications of research and practice can’t be ignored: As a future 
implication, the present study suggests that the researchers need to not just analyze and 
propose solutions for a conflict, but must also consider the role of a practitioner and 
apply the proposed resolution approaches. Consequently, based on the findings of this 
study, my future plan is to design and conduct an idiosyncratic ICR process with the 
participation of the examined sample of the civil society organizations.  
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- Bridging theory, research and practice: Concerning the conflict resolution field in 
general this study underlines the importance of bridging theory, research, and practice. 
Taking into consideration the “theoretical” aspect of the study, it can be stated that the 
nature and underlying causes of the headscarf conflict and its capacity to generate 
change were analysed by approaching the conflict as a “protracted” one and by focusing 
on stakeholders’ perceptions, needs, values and interests rather than focusing on the 
structural aspects of the conflict. This was the role of theory that was effective in 
determining the mechanisms to deal with the conflict. Taking into consideration the role 
of “research” in this study, it can be asserted that the unit of analysis was the interaction 
between the stakeholders as well as their perceptions towards each other, the conflict 
and the ICR approaches. Finally, concerning the “practice” oriented character of this 
study, it should be stressed that, the aim of evaluating the applicability of the ICR 
processes was to provide the theoretical mentality, methodological orientation and tools 
that appear to propose constructive change in inter-personal perceptions, stereotypes, 
attitudes and relationships.  
- Need for interactively elaborating on identities: Since identities cannot be taken as 
predetermined or unchanging categories but as categories that change in close relation 
with the “other”, another contribution of the ICR approaches to the headscarf conflict 
would be providing parties the opportunity to elaborate upon their identities through 
active interaction with the adversary party. In other words, providing relational setting 
as well as ground for constructive communication, all needs, values, concerns and 
historical grievances can be expressed and questioned through interaction with the 
adversary. This could be the only process to transform the perceptions, or stereotypes 
that become an important part of the identities and can be stated as the most appropriate 
intervention point in protracted conflicts in which identity is at stake.  
- Need for transforming “antagonistic” relations into “agonistic” ones in the headscarf 
conflict: Despite the considerable difference in their values, identities and needs the 
Islamists and Kemalists need to live together politically. In this sense the ICR principles 
would provide the parties with the notion of a common ground to realize that there are 
other options for approaching the conflicts and live together. As Göle states there exists 
a possibility for recognition of difference only when one finds similitude with the other. 
(Göle, 2003:17) Accordingly, one has to discern the ‘concrete other’, single individuals 
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with life histories, in order to be able to tolerate difference as making part of a social 
bond (Benhabib, 1992 cf. Göle, 2003:20). Although in the context of the headscarf 
conflict, there are over-politicized definitions of identity and conspiracy arguments 
hardening the possibility of finding similarity with the adversary, particpating in an ICR 
process where constructive dialogue prevail the possiblity for a social bond, 
communication and public debate would be generated. This would be the fundamental 
step towards transforming the antagonistic relations between the parties into agonistic 
relations where the sides would see each other as adversary rather than enemy; the 
differences would be legitimized and recognized by the adversary parties. (Mouffe, 
1999:756) Concerning the headscarf conflict, it can be argued that with the 
transformation of antagonistic relations it would be possible to mobilize the needs and 
concerns of the parties in the realm of politics instead of eliminating or imprisoning 
them to private sphere. At this point the ICR approaches appear as the most appropriate 
methods for initiating this long, communal and political process.  
- Need for empowerment: In the protracted conflicts such as Turkey’s headscarf conflict, 
where one of the parties is not ready to reach an agreement on substantial issues; is not 
willing to enter into a problem-solving dialogue; and even does not accept the existence 
of the conflict, the need for empowerment comes as a crucial strategy. Through this 
strategy they would be given the opportunity to decide on what kind of relations do they 
want and what kind of shared future do they want according to which they can jointly 
decide on how to approach the conflict and its resolution and state joint objectives 
towards that end. This intervention strategy would be the first step taken in the complex 
process of reconciliation.  
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CHAPTER 8 
 
 
APPENDIX A  
 
 
 
 
INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
 
 
1) How do you identify yourself? Where do you position yourself in Turkey’s political 
spectrum? 
 
2)  How do you identify the headscarf conflict? Is it a political, communal, cultural, 
identity based, religious or gender based conflict? 
 
3) What do you think about this conflict, what is your attitude and where do you see 
yourself in the context of this conflict?  
 
4) How do you identify your organization? Concerning the headscarf conflict, what is 
the attitude and position of your organization?  
 
5) How do you evaluate the attitudes and positions of the ones who oppose/support the 
headscarf ban? What are their interests and demands?  
 
6) Which groups of the society or which institutions are most affected by the headscarf 
conflict or will be affected in case the conflict is not resolved?  
 
7)  According to you, in the context of the headscarf conflict, what is the most 
important issue? 
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8) What kind of change do you envision about the headscarf conflict? Concerning this 
conflict, what kind of society and political environment do you dream of? How can 
the headscarf conflict be resolved? 
 
9)  What are the other CSOs that are concerned with the headscarf conflict? Among 
these CSOs, which are the ones you work with?  
 
10) Concerning the headscarf conflict, was there any activity where the CSOs having 
different visions and positions shared their needs, values, fears, concerns, interests 
related to the conflict? Did you participate in such an activity? How was it, what 
was the outcome? What do you think? 
 
11) Among Turkey’s problems, what is the place of the headscarf conflict? What is the 
importance of this conflict?  
 
12)  Is it possible to initiate a dialogue process among the adversary parties? If yes, how 
this dialogue should be initiated? If no, why? What will be the limiting factors? 
 
13)  If a successful dialogue process is initiated among the CSOs do you think that it can 
be successful in the long-run? How? What kind of change can this kind of dialogue 
generate? Will you participate in such a dialogue process?   
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